harmless error in Arkansas

2020Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991).

2008Under the harmless-error rule enunciated in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), and adopted by this court in Riggs v. State, supra, the remaining evidence in the instant case would be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Appellant’s confession did not influence the jury’s verdict.

2019Watson v. State, 318 Ark. 603, 606 , 887 S.W.2d 518, 519 (1994) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

2019Watson v. State, 318 Ark. 603, 606 , 887 S.W.2d 518, 519 (1994) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

1992Still, some constitutional rights are subject to the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

1992The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a reluctance in recent cases to make a harmless error determination under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which is the case on which the majority premises its reversal.

2025In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986), the Supreme Court elaborated on the harmless-error analysis: The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross- examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2019Watson v. State, 318 Ark. 603, 606 , 887 S.W.2d 518, 519 (1994) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

2019In Winfrey v. State , 293 Ark. 342 , 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987), this court refused to find harmless a circuit court's erroneous decision to prohibit a criminal defendant from using on cross-examination the victims' prior-inconsistent statements.

2019In Winfrey v. State , 293 Ark. 342 , 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987), this court refused to find harmless a circuit court's erroneous decision to prohibit a criminal defendant from using on cross-examination the victims' prior-inconsistent statements.

2016Rodriguez v. State, 372 Ark. 335, 339 , 276 S.W.3d 208, 212 (2008) (harmless-error doctrine).

2016Rodriguez v. State, 372 Ark. 335, 339 , 276 S.W.3d 208, 212 (2008) (harmless-error doctrine).

1993In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502 (1987), the opinion of the court states that the harmless error inquiry is appropriate only when the trial was not fundamentally unfair.

1992In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502 (1987), the opinion of the court states that the harmless error inquiry is appropriate only when the trial was not fundamentally unfair.

2024See Massengale v. State, 319 Ark. 743, 746 , 894 S.W.2d 594, 595 (1995).

2024See Massengale v. State, 319 Ark. 743, 746 , 894 S.W.2d 594, 595 (1995).

2020See Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324 , at 16, 560 S.W.3d 441, 452 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)).

2014See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244 , ___ S.W.3d ___.

2004See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (indicating that errors relating to mitigating circumstances are prejudicial under any standard).

2004See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 [ 106 S.Ct. 1669 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1986) (indicating that errors relating to mitigating circumstances are prejudicial under any standard).

1993Quite probably one’s right to be informed of a charge is that type of fundamental right that cannot be reviewed for harmless error since the right to notice of a charge is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Schad v. Arizona,__ U.S._, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958)).

1992Quite probably one’s right to be informed of a charge is that type of fundamental right that cannot be reviewed for harmless error since the right to notice of a charge is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Schad v. Arizona, _ U.S _, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958)).

1993Quite probably one’s right to be informed of a charge is that type of fundamental right that cannot be reviewed for harmless error since the right to notice of a charge is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Schad v. Arizona,__ U.S._, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958)).

1992Quite probably one’s right to be informed of a charge is that type of fundamental right that cannot be reviewed for harmless error since the right to notice of a charge is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Schad v. Arizona, _ U.S _, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958)).

2015See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying the harmless-error analysis to an instruction that omitted the materiality element of a tax offense); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 , 117 S.Ct. 337 , 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996) (per curiam) (applying the harmless-error analysis |Bto an instruction that failed to instruct the jury that it could convict the defendant as an aider and abettor only if it found that the defendant had the “intent or purpose” of aiding the confederate’s crime); Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375 , 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999) (holding t

2015See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying the harmless-error analysis to an instruction that omitted the materiality element of a tax offense); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 , 117 S.Ct. 337 , 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996) (per curiam) (applying the harmless-error analysis |Bto an instruction that failed to instruct the jury that it could convict the defendant as an aider and abettor only if it found that the defendant had the “intent or purpose” of aiding the confederate’s crime); Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375 , 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999) (holding t

2025See Lawson, 2024 Ark. 143, at 5 , 7 697 S.W.3d at 532 (“Harmless error exists when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error is slight.”).

2025See Lawson, 2024 Ark. 143, at 5 , 7 697 S.W.3d at 532 (“Harmless error exists when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error is slight.”).

2025Roston v. State, 362 Ark. 408 , 208 S.W.3d 759 (2005); Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120 , 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995).

2025Roston v. State, 362 Ark. 408 , 208 S.W.3d 759 (2005); Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120 , 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995).

1995See, Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117 , 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995), and Greene, 317 Ark. 350 , 878 S.W.2d 384 (stating that when mitigating circumstances are found, the statute does not authorize a harmless error review).

1995See, Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117 , 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995), and Greene, 317 Ark. 350 , 878 S.W.2d 384 (stating that when mitigating circumstances are found, the statute does not authorize a harmless error review).

2001See Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111 , 3 S.W.3d 305 (1999) (harmless-error rule applied in the context of an involuntary confession); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

2001See Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111 , 3 S.W.3d 305 (1999) (harmless-error rule applied in the context of an involuntary confession); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).