harmless error in Illinois

2026Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 40 . 15 No. 1-22-0373 ¶ 57 In sum, where both the United States Supreme Court and our own supreme court have repeatedly identified the exercise of real discretion as the essential requirement of Miller, we are wholly unpersuaded that we may entertain a harmless error analysis in its absence. ¶ 58 Even if we were convinced that harmless error could be asserted under these circumstances, we would not find its requirements met here. “[T]he test for determining if a constitutional error is harmless is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained

2025“Under a harmless-error analysis, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error.” Id. (citing Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 363 ).

2024Our supreme court has delineated a two-part test constituting the harmless-error analysis, under which we must first determine “whether any error occurred—in other words, whether the instruction was correct.” People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 , 95–96 (1998).

2024If there was error in the jury instruction, then, second, we must determine “whether, in spite of that error, evidence of [the] defendant’s guilt was so clear and convincing as to render the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 96 . ¶ 55 Relevant to the first prong of the harmless-error analysis, we have already found that there was error in the written instructions submitted to the jury on each of the four counts.

2026“An error that is amenable to harmless error analysis is not a structural error” subject to second- prong plain error review, People v. Logan, 2024 IL 129054, ¶ 80 , and “[e]rroneous admission of evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis,” People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 95 ; see People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 424 (2005) (determining that admission of grand jury testimony in violation of the confrontation clause was “more accurately described as a trial error” rather than a structural defect in the trial (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Temple, 2014 IL App (1s

2023Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 363 (in a harmless error analysis, the burden is on the State to persuade the appellate court). 17 In its brief to this court, the State cites People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 428 (2005), to argue that “the critical question is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” For the reasons discussed below, we find that the State has not carried its burden of persuasion on this critical question. ¶ 118 First, the State argues that defendant’s videotaped statement was but one part of an overwhelming body of evidence.

2023In a harmless error analysis, “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 181 - 23 No. 1-21-0848 82.

2022When a defendant preserves an issue for review, “the reviewing court conducts a harmless-error analysis in which the State has the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 (2009) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 181 (2005)). “ ‘In other words, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 181 -82 (quoting People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003)). ¶ 77 Admission of hearsay is harmless if there is no “reasonable possibility the verdict would

2024Meanwhile, the State contends it was harmless because the evidence consisted of a single mention of bisexuality, and the trial court gave limiting instructions. ¶ 75 Where, as here, “the defendant has made a timely objection and properly preserved an error for review, the reviewing court conducts a harmless-error analysis in which the State has the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 , 922 N.E.2d 344, 355 (2009).

2024Meanwhile, the State contends it was harmless because the evidence consisted of a single mention of bisexuality, and the trial court gave limiting instructions. ¶ 75 Where, as here, “the defendant has made a timely objection and properly preserved an error for review, the reviewing court conducts a harmless-error analysis in which the State has the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 , 922 N.E.2d 344, 355 (2009).

2024See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010) (“When a defendant has forfeited appellate review of an issue, the reviewing court will consider only plain error. [Citation] Harmless-error analysis is conducted when a defendant has preserved an issue for review. [Citation].”). -9- 2024 IL App (2d) 230566-U “A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by [section 5-4.5-35 of the Code (id. § 5-4.5-35)] for an offense or offenses within the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors

2022Thus, Strickland does not support the State’s harmless error argument in this case. ¶ 83 In sum, a “harmless error” inquiry is irrelevant to our second-prong plain error analysis, in which prejudice “is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, regardless of the strength of the evidence. [Citations.]” (Emphasis in original.) Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613 .

2020Our supreme court has stated, “The violation of a supreme court rule does not mandate reversal in every case ***, and this court has applied the harmless-error doctrine to errors stemming from the violation of our rules.” People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 193 , 917 N.E.2d 401, 414 (2009). ¶ 29 Here, assuming error, the failure to properly admonish defendant in this instance falls short of the gravity necessary to constitute second prong plain-error.

2020Our supreme court has stated, “The violation of a supreme court rule does not mandate reversal in every case ***, and this court has applied the harmless-error doctrine to errors stemming from the violation of our rules.” People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 193 , 917 N.E.2d 401, 414 (2009). ¶ 29 Here, assuming error, the failure to properly admonish defendant in this instance falls short of the gravity necessary to constitute second prong plain-error.

2021The admission of such a confession is a “trial error,” which occurs during a case’s presentation to the trier of fact and “may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). ¶ 67 Under a harmless-error analysis, the critical question is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2021The admission of such a confession is a “trial error,” which occurs during a case’s presentation to the trier of fact and “may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). ¶ 67 Under a harmless-error analysis, the critical question is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2025“This standard is equivalent to the harmless error standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 60 Applying these principles, the Illinois Supreme Court has held in some instances that the presence of false testimony was not harmless (People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326 (1997); People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211 (1995)), and in other instances, it has held that the presence - 13 - of false testimony was harmless (Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d at 424 ; People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506 (2001)).

2023“This standard is equivalent to the harmless error standard.” Id. (quoting People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 349 (1977)). ¶ 89 Reviewing all the evidence at trial, we cannot say there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the allegedly false photo array testimony at issue affected the judgment of the jury.

2003We now address the merits of Saraceno's argument under Supreme Court Rule 615(a)(134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) which reads in pertinent part: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." "`It is well settled that a defendant's claim of improper jury instructions is reviewed under a harmless-error analysis.'" Gonzalez, 326 Ill.App.3d at 636 , 260 Ill.Dec. 354 , 761 N.E.2d 198 , quoting People v. Amaya, 321 Ill.App.3d 923, 929 , 255 Ill.

2003We now address the merits of Saraceno's argument under Supreme Court Rule 615(a)(134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) which reads in pertinent part: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." "`It is well settled that a defendant's claim of improper jury instructions is reviewed under a harmless-error analysis.'" Gonzalez, 326 Ill.App.3d at 636 , 260 Ill.Dec. 354 , 761 N.E.2d 198 , quoting People v. Amaya, 321 Ill.App.3d 923, 929 , 255 Ill.

2020Harmless-error analysis is ‘based on the notion that a defendant’s interest in an error-free trial must be balanced against societal interests in finality and judicial economy.’ ” People v. Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2011) (quoting People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259, 275-76 (1988)).

2020Harmless error analysis is “based on the notion that a defendant’s interest in an error-free [proceeding] must be balanced against societal interests in finality and judicial economy.” People v. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d 259, 275-76 (1988).

2016People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2007); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 162 (2009) (affirming the use of a harmless error analysis). ¶4 On January 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

2016People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2007); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 162 (2009) (affirming the use of a harmless error analysis). ¶4 On January 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

2011Cf. People v. Lucas, 48 Ill. 2d 158, 163 (1971) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)) (applying a harmless-error analysis and finding, in light of the totality of the evidence, that a Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2011Cf. People v. Lucas, 48 Ill. 2d 158, 163 (1971) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)) (applying a harmless-error analysis and finding, in light of the totality of the evidence, that a Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2026See People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 327 (1992) (observing that the harmless-error rule applies to confessions allegedly obtained in violation of the fifth amendment). “[T]o establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.” Woods, 2023 IL 127794, ¶ 56 .

2021The improper admission of a defendant's statements to the police is subject to a harmless-error analysis (People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 328 (1992)), unless the statements are alleged to have been physically coerced.

2024See People v. Shafer, 2020 IL App (4th) 180343, ¶ 61 . “[M]ost errors of constitutional dimension are subject to a harmless error analysis.” People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 344 (1998).

2000See, e.g., People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 103 (1996); People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 69 (1995); see also Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d at 345 (applying a harmless error analysis to the jury’s consideration of evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor).

2024See People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 80 , 797 N.E.2d 631, 639 (2003) (stating a harmless error analysis could be applied to a claim that the trial court did not follow Krankel procedures). ¶ 28 In Moore, the defendant raised pro se posttrial claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking the appointment of alternate counsel.

2024See People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 80 , 797 N.E.2d 631, 639 (2003) (stating a harmless error analysis could be applied to a claim that the trial court did not follow Krankel procedures). ¶ 28 In Moore, the defendant raised pro se posttrial claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking the appointment of alternate counsel.

2020See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 175 (“Generally, a defendant forfeits review of any putative jury 31 instruction error if the defendant does not object to the instruction or offer an alternative instruction at trial and does not raise the instruction issue in a posttrial motion.”). ¶ 68 Defendant correctly notes that where, as here, the issue is preserved, “ ‘a defendant’s claim of improper jury instructions is reviewed under a harmless-error analysis.’ ” People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill.

2009When the issue is preserved, as it is here, “ c[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s claim of improper jury instructions is reviewed under a harmless-error analysis.’ ” People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill.

2012People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 488 (2010) (defendants had “properly preserved their claims of error, thus requiring the State to show that the errors were nonprejudicial under a harmless error analysis”); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003) (the “ ‘important difference’ ” between plain error and harmless error analysis is that, in a harmless error analysis, the burden of persuasion is on the State (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))).

2011In a harmless-error analysis, which applies where, as in the case at bar, the defendant has made a timely objection, it is the State that `bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.' Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. at 1778 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 520 .

2025“Harmless-error analysis is based on the notion that a defendant’s interest in an error-free trial must be balanced against societal interests in finality and judicial economy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 23 .

2025The harmless-error analysis is “based on the notion that a defendant’s interest in an error-free trial must be balanced against societal interests in finality and judicial economy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2016People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2007); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 162 (2009) (affirming the use of a harmless error analysis). ¶4 On January 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

2016People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2007); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 162 (2009) (affirming the use of a harmless error analysis). ¶4 On January 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

2025“This standard is equivalent to the harmless error standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 60 Applying these principles, the Illinois Supreme Court has held in some instances that the presence of false testimony was not harmless (People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326 (1997); People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211 (1995)), and in other instances, it has held that the presence - 13 - of false testimony was harmless (Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d at 424 ; People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506 (2001)).

2025“This standard is equivalent to the harmless error standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 60 Applying these principles, the Illinois Supreme Court has held in some instances that the presence of false testimony was not harmless (People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326 (1997); People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211 (1995)), and in other instances, it has held that the presence - 13 - of false testimony was harmless (Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d at 424 ; People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506 (2001)).

2021“The admission of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal trial following the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress is subject to the harmless error rule.” People v. Hobson, 169 Ill.

2021“The admission of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal trial following the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress is subject to the harmless error rule.” People v. Hobson, 169 Ill.

2023This court rejected the State’s harmless error argument, refusing to speculate on whether the circuit court would have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing had counsel adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c). [Citation.]” Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 48 . ¶ 79 The Suarez court noted that the supplemental petition filed by postconviction counsel contained a new claim whose merits were not discussed by the parties’ briefs.

2020Thus, the supreme court “h[e]ld that the - 16 - appellate court [had] erred in applying a harmless error analysis where no compliance with Rule 651(c) was shown.” Id.

2015See People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 410 (2006) (explaining that under a plain-error analysis the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error and under a harmless-error analysis the defendant must convince the court that the error was prejudicial).

2015See People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 410 (2006) (explaining that under a harmless-error analysis the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error and under a plain-error analysis the defendant must convince the court that the error was prejudicial).

1999Errors which "abridge[] the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury *** cannot be disposed of by the harmless-error rule[.] *** The right to a trial by an impartial tribunal is so basic that a violation of the right requires a reversal." People v. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 411, 298 N.E.2d 705, 711 (1973).

1999Errors which "abridge[] the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury *** cannot be disposed of by the harmless-error rule[.] *** The right to a trial by an impartial tribunal is so basic that a violation of the right requires a reversal." People v. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 411, 298 N.E.2d 705, 711 (1973).

2021As the court elaborated: “[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has said that structural errors fall within ‘a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that defy analysis by harmless error standards.’ [Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).] If, therefore, analysis is impossible for harmless-error purposes, then it is hard to see how it would be possible for purposes of Strickland prejudice—after all, prejudice is the central inquiry in a harmless error inquiry.

2012The Neder Court noted the harmless-error inquiry was, "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" Id.

2021People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 71 .

2016Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 49 . ¶ 27 Following a lengthy analysis of Fulminante and whether the harmless analysis was applicable to coerced confessions, the supreme court concluded: “In light of Fulminante, the rule set forth in Wilson, that ‘use of a defendant’s coerced confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is never harmless error’ (Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 41 ), cannot stand as a matter of federal constitutional law.

1998Review under the harmless error rule presupposes an actual verdict. ‘The inquiry *** is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Emphasis in original.) Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 124 L.

1998Review under the harmless error rule presupposes an actual verdict. ‘The inquiry *** is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Emphasis in original.) Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 124 L.