harmless error in Georgia

1996Freeman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 503, 505 (4), supra. And given that State’s Exhibits 13 and 14 include similar reports of sexual abuse and that State’s Exhibit 14 was before the jury without objection, “applying the standard for harmless error set forth in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 SE2d 869 ) (1976), we find it highly probable that [any] error [in admitting State’s Exhibit 13] did not contribute to the judgment of conviction.

1996Freeman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 503, 505 (4), supra. And given that State’s Exhibits 13 and 14 include similar reports of sexual abuse and that State’s Exhibit 14 was before the jury without objection, “applying the standard for harmless error set forth in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 SE2d 869 ) (1976), we find it highly probable that [any] error [in admitting State’s Exhibit 13] did not contribute to the judgment of conviction.

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2025The victim had adopted the language of the gang while he was in prison and had been telling people that he was a 1 “In light of the harmless-error analysis we undertake [elsewhere in] this opinion, we review the record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 ( 882 SE2d 227 ) (2022). 3 member of the gang.

2025The victim had adopted the language of the gang while he was in prison and had been telling people that he was a 1 “In light of the harmless-error analysis we undertake [elsewhere in] this opinion, we review the record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 ( 882 SE2d 227 ) (2022). 3 member of the gang.

2017Even if the prior violent act of Thompson was admissible, any error in excluding the evidence was harmless. 3 See Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 431-432 (2) (d) ( 788 SE2d 433 ) (2016) (explaining that the harmless error doctrine remains viable under the new Evidence Code).

2017Even if the prior violent act of Thompson was admissible, any error in excluding the evidence was harmless. 3 See Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 431-432 (2) (d) ( 788 SE2d 433 ) (2016) (explaining that the harmless error doctrine remains viable under the new Evidence Code).

2014See also Wagner v. State, 311 Ga. App. 589, 594, n. 3 ( 716 SE2d 633 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring specially) (“Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 (II) (A) ( 113 SCt 1770 , 123 LE2d 508) (1993)).

2014See also Wagner v. State, 311 Ga. App. 589, 594, n. 3 ( 716 SE2d 633 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring specially) (“Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.”) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734 (II) (A) ( 113 SCt 1770 , 123 LE2d 508) (1993)).

1982“Applying the standard for harmless error set out in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 ( 230 SE2d 869 ) (1976), it can be fairly said that it was highly probable that any erroneous admission of [Agent Jackson’s] testimony did not contribute to the judgment in this case.” Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 76 ( 235 SE2d 515 ) (1977). 2.

1982“Applying the standard for harmless error set out in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 ( 230 SE2d 869 ) (1976), it can be fairly said that it was highly probable that any erroneous admission of [Agent Jackson’s] testimony did not contribute to the judgment in this case.” Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 76 ( 235 SE2d 515 ) (1977). 2.

2014State v. Gamblin, 251 Ga. App. 283, 284 (1) ( 553 SE2d 866 ) (2001). “[Rjather, we must apply the rule that a defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment [or accusation] perfect in form and substance.” State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723, 724 ( 681 SE2d 645 ) (2009).

2010Compare Howard, 252 Ga. App. at 488 (2) (“An indictment may be valid as to an offense requiring proof of an underlying or predicate offense, however, even if the count as to the compound offense omits an essential element of the predicate offense — as long as the indictment charges the predicate offense completely in a separate count or where the defendant is put on notice of the predicate offense by the facts alleged in the indictment to show how the compound offense was committed.”). 6 Delaby, 298 Ga. App. at 727 . 7 272 Ga. 818 ( 537 SE2d 327 ) (2000). 8 Id. at 819 (1). 9 See id. 10 (Citati

2009Cf. State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 532 (2), n.14 ( 543 SE2d 721 ) (2001) (noting that a total deprivation of the right to trial counsel in criminal cases is a structural defect that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and therefore is not subject to the harmless error analysis); Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 460-461 (2) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (holding that the application of the harmless error doctrine would be inappropriate when a criminal defendant was erroneously denied counsel during a plea-withdrawal hearing during which he argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly

2009Cf. State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 532 (2), n.14 ( 543 SE2d 721 ) (2001) (noting that a total deprivation of the right to trial counsel in criminal cases is a structural defect that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and therefore is not subject to the harmless error analysis); Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 460-461 (2) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (holding that the application of the harmless error doctrine would be inappropriate when a criminal defendant was erroneously denied counsel during a plea-withdrawal hearing during which he argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly

2009Cf. State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 532 (2), n.14 ( 543 SE2d 721 ) (2001) (noting that a total deprivation of the right to trial counsel in criminal cases is a structural defect that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and therefore is not subject to the harmless error analysis); Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 460-461 (2) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (holding that the application of the harmless error doctrine would be inappropriate when a criminal defendant was erroneously denied counsel during a plea-withdrawal hearing during which he argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly

2009Cf. State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 532 (2), n.14 ( 543 SE2d 721 ) (2001) (noting that a total deprivation of the right to trial counsel in criminal cases is a structural defect that affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and therefore is not subject to the harmless error analysis); Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 460-461 (2) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (holding that the application of the harmless error doctrine would be inappropriate when a criminal defendant was erroneously denied counsel during a plea-withdrawal hearing during which he argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly

2026Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur. 3 Because we reviewed two of the errors for only plain error, “we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless-error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.” Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 366 (12), n. 35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024), citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (declining to “decide exactly how multiple standards may interact under cumulative review of different types of errors”). 15

2026Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur. 3 Because we reviewed two of the errors for only plain error, “we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless-error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.” Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 366 (12), n. 35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024), citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (declining to “decide exactly how multiple standards may interact under cumulative review of different types of errors”). 15

2024It is well settled that “[e]rroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless error test.” Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) (851 SE2d 541) (2020).

2024It is well settled that “[e]rroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless error test.” Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) ( 851 SE2d 541 ) (2020).

2015However, because Howell denied making such a seemingly innocuous gesture, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he had an ulterior motive for making it — i.e., that he had intended to influence her testimony. 5 As Justice Hunstein similarly pointed out in her dissent in Slackman, supra at 673, it was (the Defendant’s) own behavior in uttering the statement in (the court reporter’s) presence which caused her to be a witness. 6 “Unlike a harmless-error analysis, where the appellee bears the burden of showing that an error did not likely affect the outcome below, a plain-error analysis requi

2014See Wagner v. State, 311 Ga. App. 589, 594, n. 3 ( 716 SE2d 633 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring specially). “[T]he hurdle to establishing plain error is high, . . . and . . . the failure to specifically articulate how the alleged error satisfies this high standard increases the likelihood that... claims in this regard will be rejected.” Kelly, supra at 32 (1), n. 2.

2014We note that, as a general rule, admission of evidence is “a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent evidence of its abuse.” 11 Furthermore, the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness, “like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to a harmless-error analysis.”12 But to determine whether a constitutional error is harmless, we must consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.13 And here, we conclude that even if 11 Martinez v

2014We note that, as a general rule, admission of evidence is “a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent evidence of its abuse.” 11 Furthermore, the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness, “like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to a harmless-error analysis.”12 But to determine whether a constitutional error is harmless, we must consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.13 And here, we conclude that even if 11 Martinez v

2014State v. Gamblin, 251 Ga. App. 283, 284 (1) ( 553 SE2d 866 ) (2001). “[Rjather, we must apply the rule that a defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment [or accusation] perfect in form and substance.” State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723, 724 ( 681 SE2d 645 ) (2009).

2014State v. Gamblin, 251 Ga. App. 283, 284 (1) ( 553 SE2d 866 ) (2001). “[Rjather, we must apply the rule that a defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment [or accusation] perfect in form and substance.” State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723, 724 ( 681 SE2d 645 ) (2009).

2003Thus, a new trial is not required by the trial court’s harmless error.” (Citation omitted.) McDuffie, supra, 248 Ga. at 548 (2); see Stephens v. State, 233 Ga. App. 32, 34 (2) ( 503 SE2d 311 ) (1998); Stanley v. State, 195 Ga. App. 706, 708-709 (9) ( 394 SE2d 785 ) (1990).

2003Thus, a new trial is not required by the trial court’s harmless error.” (Citation omitted.) McDuffie, supra, 248 Ga. at 548 (2); see Stephens v. State, 233 Ga. App. 32, 34 (2) ( 503 SE2d 311 ) (1998); Stanley v. State, 195 Ga. App. 706, 708-709 (9) ( 394 SE2d 785 ) (1990).

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2021Still got a right to an attorney.”4 Wright 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tyner v. State, 334 Ga. App. 890, 894 (1) ( 780 SE2d 494 ) (2015), quoting Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204 (2) (b) ( 686 SE2d 648 ) (2009). 4 The full conversation between the trial court and Wright is as follows: - WRIGHT: Your Honor, I have not been able to have my motion to suppress evidence.

2021“Harmless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” Id.

2009If an examination of the record reveals that a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a post-waiver request for counsel during trial, it is a structural Sixth Amendment violation, Leveto, 540 F3d at 207-208 , and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal, United States v. Proctor, 166 F3d 396, 406, n. 13 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 149 (126 SC 2557, 165 LE2d 409) (2006).

2013Balbosa, 275 Ga. at 575-576 (2).

2013Balbosa, 275 Ga. at 575-576 (2).

2013“Where a party fails to object to certain inadmissible evidence, but later objects to substantially the same evidence, the objection should be overruled because the failure to object the first time makes this harmless error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Phelps v. Huff, 214 Ga. App. 398, 402 (2) (a) ( 448 SE2d 64 ) (1994); see also Bell v. Bell, 210 Ga. 295, 296-297 (4) ( 79 SE2d 524 ) (1954) (there is no ground for reversal where challenged evidence was previously admitted without objection). 2 Furthermore, even after Pulte objected to the questioning that indicated that Pulte commiss

2013“Where a party fails to object to certain inadmissible evidence, but later objects to substantially the same evidence, the objection should be overruled because the failure to object the first time makes this harmless error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Phelps v. Huff, 214 Ga. App. 398, 402 (2) (a) ( 448 SE2d 64 ) (1994); see also Bell v. Bell, 210 Ga. 295, 296-297 (4) ( 79 SE2d 524 ) (1954) (there is no ground for reversal where challenged evidence was previously admitted without objection). 2 Furthermore, even after Pulte objected to the questioning that indicated that Pulte commiss

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 8 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal . . . .”11 In this case, although Clay concedes he “clearly waived his right to counsel [during] the . . .

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 8 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal . . . .”11 In this case, although Clay concedes he “clearly waived his right to counsel [during] the . . .

2026Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur. 3 Because we reviewed two of the errors for only plain error, “we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless-error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.” Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 366 (12), n. 35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024), citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (declining to “decide exactly how multiple standards may interact under cumulative review of different types of errors”). 15

2026Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur. 3 Because we reviewed two of the errors for only plain error, “we need not decide how that could affect our evaluation of the cumulative harm because these claims fail even under the stricter harmless-error standard for preserved non-constitutional errors.” Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 366 (12), n. 35 ( 907 SE2d 871 ) (2024), citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (declining to “decide exactly how multiple standards may interact under cumulative review of different types of errors”). 15

2025He points to past cases where we have said that “[w]here im- proper bolstering has occurred, [the harmless error analysis] must be made without reliance on the testimony that was improperly bolstered.” McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 167 (2021).

2025See Puckett v. State, 303 Ga. 719, 722 (2018) (any error in admitting the prior consistent statements was harmless where “the testimony was largely cumulative of the unobjected-to testimony of [other witnesses]”); Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95 , 105–06 (2016) (wrongly admitted evidence 9 “Where improper bolstering has occurred, [the harmless error analysis] must be made without reliance on the testimony that was improperly bolstered.” McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 167 (2021).

2025See Platt, 319 Ga. at 11 (3); Harris, 314 Ga. at 283, 287-289 (5). 43 rule out the likelihood that the jury instead reached that verdict based at least in part on the extensive, graphic, and highly prejudi- cial evidence of Harris’s past violent acts.

2025See Platt, 319 Ga. at 11 (3); Harris, 314 Ga. at 283, 287-289 (5). 43 rule out the likelihood that the jury instead reached that verdict based at least in part on the extensive, graphic, and highly prejudi- cial evidence of Harris’s past violent acts.

2022See Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 138 (1) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict,” and “[w]hen applying a harmless-error analysis, we review the evidence de novo and weigh it as a reasonable juror would rather than in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s guilty verdict.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 4.

2022See Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 138 (1) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict,” and “[w]hen applying a harmless-error analysis, we review the evidence de novo and weigh it as a reasonable juror would rather than in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s guilty verdict.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 4.

2024“Erroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error test,” and “[a] nonconstitutional error is harmless if the State shows that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 315 Ga. 117, 122 (4) ( 880 SE2d 509 ) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024“Erroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error test,” and “[a] nonconstitutional error is harmless if the State shows that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 315 Ga. 117, 122 (4) ( 880 SE2d 509 ) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).