harmless error in New Hampshire

2017State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 74 (2003) (quotation omitted).

2004In State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 75 (2003), in dicta, we stated that admission of a coerced confession was an error to which the harmless error doctrine did not apply.

2009Id. at 633-34 .

2003In Williams , we explained that the United States Supreme Court, while rejecting a per se rule that the harmless error doctrine does not apply to constitutional errors at trial, stated that “only such constitutional errors as necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair require reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted).

1997Our inquiry in a harmless error analysis is not “whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

1997Our inquiry in a harmless error analysis is not “whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

2006Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (citation and quotation omitted).

1990In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the United States Supreme Court articulated the harmless error doctrine and “rejected the argument that errors of constitutional dimension necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (1986) (emphasis added).

2022State v. Edic, 169 N.H. 580, 588 (2017) (quotation omitted).

2020State v. Edic, 169 N.H. 580, 588 (2017) (quotation omitted).

2009"Errors that partially or completely deny a defendant the right to the basic trial process, such as the complete denial of a defendant's right to counsel, or adjudication by a biased judge, rise to the level of fundamental unfairness, thereby obviating consideration of the harmless error doctrine." O'Leary, 153 N.H. at 714 , 903 A.2d 997 .

2009“Errors that partially or completely deny a defendant the right to the basic trial process, such as the complete denial of a defendant’s right to counsel, or adjudication by a biased judge, rise to the level of fundamental unfairness, thereby obviating consideration of the harmless error doctrine.” O’Leary, 153 N.H. at 714 .

2026See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012) (declining to address parties’ other arguments where holding on one issue is dispositive).

2019See Antosz v. Allain , 163 N.H. 298 , 302, 40 A.3d 679 (2012) (declining to address parties' other arguments where holding on one issue was dispositive).

2026See Ainsworth, 151 N.H. at 693-94 . 2 In light of our decision, we need not address the parties’ harmless error arguments.

2009See State v. Ainsworth, 151 N.H. 691, 693-94 (2005). *315 Today, we overrule that portion of Skidmore that created an exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement and consequently applied the harmless error standard of review to the trial court’s error.

1994While this other evidence is to be considered in a harmless error analysis, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 , 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992), “[i]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04 , 636 A.2d 64, 66 (1993) (quotation omitted).

1994While this other evidence is to be considered in a harmless error analysis, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 , 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992), “[i]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04 , 636 A.2d 64, 66 (1993) (quotation omitted).

2006See Williams, 133 N.H. at 634; see also State v. Soucy, 139 N.H. 349, 352 (1995).

2003See Williams, 133 N.H. at 634 ; see also State v. Soucy, 139 N.H. 349, 352 (1995).

1997“The evaluation of whether this standard has been achieved involves consideration of the alternative evidence presented at trial and of the character of the inadmissible evidence itself.” State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 157-58 , 652 A.2d 671, 679 (1994) (quotation and citations omitted).

1997“The evaluation of whether this standard has been achieved involves consideration of the alternative evidence presented at trial and of the character of the inadmissible evidence itself.” State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 157-58 , 652 A.2d 671, 679 (1994) (quotation and citations omitted).

1994While this other evidence is to be considered in a harmless error analysis, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 , 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992), “[i]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04 , 636 A.2d 64, 66 (1993) (quotation omitted).

1994While this other evidence is to be considered in a harmless error analysis, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 , 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992), “[i]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04 , 636 A.2d 64, 66 (1993) (quotation omitted).

2024This analysis “is similar to the harmless error analysis we use to evaluate preserved claims of error, with one important distinction: whereas the State bears the burden under harmless error analysis, the defendant bears the burden under the plain error test.” Id.

2018This third prong of the plain error test “is similar to the harmless error analysis we use to evaluate preserved claims of error, with one important distinction: whereas the State bears the burden under harmless error analysis, the defendant bears the burden under the plain error test.” State v. Mueller, 166 N.H. 65, 70 (2014).

2011State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 75 (2003). “[W]e have never clearly defined any single analytical framework for determining which constitutional errors are or are not subject to harmless error analysis.” Kousounadis, 159 N.H. at 427 .

2011See Kousounadis, 159 N.H. at 428 (“Harmless error analysis depends upon the existence of a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the elements of the crime.

2006State v. Thompson, 149 N.H. 565, 567 (2003).

2006Id.

1993The analysis to determine the effect of a federal constitutional error is the same as that applied to violations of the State Constitution: the error will require reversal unless it is shown “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

1990In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the United States Supreme Court articulated the harmless error doctrine and “rejected the argument that errors of constitutional dimension necessarily require reversal of criminal convictions.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 (1986) (emphasis added).

2025See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n.9 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).

2024(Quotation and brackets omitted.) Because we agree with DOS that any error in the court’s immunity analysis was harmless, we need not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ immunity arguments. [¶39] “A harmless error is an error that does not affect the outcome.” Attorney General v. Morgan, 132 N.H. 406, 408 (1989) (quotation omitted).

2023See, e.g., State v. McBreairty, 137 A.3d 1012, 1019-1020 (Me. 2016) (assessing whether a prosecutor’s misstatement at trial was harmless error based on the totality of the circumstances); State v. Harris, 745 N.W.2d 397, 408-09 (Wis. 2008) (employing the totality of the circumstances to determine harmless error); State v. Oscarson, 845 A.2d 337, 348-49 (Vt. 2004) (employing a list of factors to determine whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Vt. 1996) (formally adopting a factor-based totality of the 10 Here, the alternative evidence

2023See, e.g., State v. McBreairty, 137 A.3d 1012, 1019-1020 (Me. 2016) (assessing whether a prosecutor’s misstatement at trial was harmless error based on the totality of the circumstances); State v. Harris, 745 N.W.2d 397, 408-09 (Wis. 2008) (employing the totality of the circumstances to determine harmless error); State v. Oscarson, 845 A.2d 337, 348-49 (Vt. 2004) (employing a list of factors to determine whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Vt. 1996) (formally adopting a factor-based totality of the 10 Here, the alternative evidence

2023See, e.g., State v. McBreairty, 137 A.3d 1012, 1019-1020 (Me. 2016) (assessing whether a prosecutor’s misstatement at trial was harmless error based on the totality of the circumstances); State v. Harris, 745 N.W.2d 397, 408-09 (Wis. 2008) (employing the totality of the circumstances to determine harmless error); State v. Oscarson, 845 A.2d 337, 348-49 (Vt. 2004) (employing a list of factors to determine whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Vt. 1996) (formally adopting a factor-based totality of the 10 Here, the alternative evidence

2023See, e.g., State v. McBreairty, 137 A.3d 1012, 1019-1020 (Me. 2016) (assessing whether a prosecutor’s misstatement at trial was harmless error based on the totality of the circumstances); State v. Harris, 745 N.W.2d 397, 408-09 (Wis. 2008) (employing the totality of the circumstances to determine harmless error); State v. Oscarson, 845 A.2d 337, 348-49 (Vt. 2004) (employing a list of factors to determine whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Vt. 1996) (formally adopting a factor-based totality of the 10 Here, the alternative evidence

2020They contend that the trial court erred by holding that: (1) they failed to challenge the eligibility of two members of the board at the earliest possible time; (2) allowing two ex officio board members who did not reside in the city to vote was a harmless error; (3) the non-resident board members’ participation in the board’s decision did not render all subsequent board votes on the defendants’ plan invalid and voidable; (4) ex officio board members were not required to be residents of the city; and (5) the non-resident members’ participation on the board could not be challenged because they

2019See McNair v. McNair, 151 N.H. 343, 355 (2004) (applying a harmless error standard to trial court’s ex parte communications).

2019See State v. Forbes, 157 N.H. 570, 577 (2008).

2018“To meet this third prong, the defendant must demonstrate that the error was 3 prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Thomas, 168 N.H. at 606 (quotation omitted).

2014See United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 494 (11th Cir. 2011).

2013See Etienne, 163 N.H. at 80 .

2013See State v. Beede, 156 N.H. 102, 109 (2007).