harmless error in Alaska

1996Alaska Civil Rule 61 dictates that an error in the admission of evidence is not grounds for reversal “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” 5 In Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969), we articulated the harmless error standard as follows: The test is not whether, with the erroneous matter elided from the record, there would be enough evidence to support a conviction.

1983In Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969), the supreme court discussed an appropriate harmless error test for nonconstitutional errors.

1998In determining whether there is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Billingsley v. State, 807 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Alaska App.1991) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963))); see also Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 645 (Alaska 1977). 1 We are deciding the harmless error question based upon our findings and decision in Hazelwood v. State, 912 P.2d 1266 (Alaska App.1996), b

1998In determining whether there is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Billingsley v. State, 807 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Alaska App.1991) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963))); see also Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 645 (Alaska 1977). 1 We are deciding the harmless error question based upon our findings and decision in Hazelwood v. State, 912 P.2d 1266 (Alaska App.1996), b

1999See Veal v. Newlin, Inc., 367 P.2d 155 , 157 n. 8 (Alaska 1961) ("Harmless error must be disregarded.”); see also Alaska R.

1988Veal v. Newlin, Inc., 367 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1961).

1984Martinez v. Bullock, 535 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Alaska 1975).

1977In Martinez v. Bullock, 535 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Alaska 1975), we employed the analytical approach found in the United States Supreme Court case of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), and utilized it in determining *775 whether the error there was of the harmless type.

1978Accordingly, the constitutional error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 840 (Alaska 1976), is not applicable, and the harmless error standard articulated in Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 629-32 (Alaska 1969), is applicable. 22 .

1977A violation of a mandate of Crim.R. 38 is not prejudicial error unless such nonadherence has affected a substantial right of the defendant, (footnotes omitted) The same year, the United States Supreme Court adopted the requirement that a constitutional error is reversible unless “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 18 In Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 840 (Alaska 1976), we followed the Chapman standard.

1983In Martinez , we quoted approvingly from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), in which the United States Supreme Court set out its approach to applications of the doctrine of harmless error: It comes down on its face to a very plain admonition: "Do not be technical, where technicality does not really hurt the party whose rights in the trial and in its outcome the technicality affects.".. .

1983In Martinez , we quoted approvingly from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), in which the United States Supreme Court set out its approach to applications of the doctrine of harmless error: It comes down on its face to a very plain admonition: "Do not be technical, where technicality does not really hurt the party whose rights in the trial and in its outcome the technicality affects.".. .

1988The court rejected a harmless error argument stating: "There is no way to ascertain what sentence the court would have given if it had entertained a correct view of its discretionary power.” Id. at 741 .

1987But see Deal v. State, 587 P.2d 740, 741 (Alaska 1978) (rejecting a similar harmless error argument).

2019For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.[29] In contrast, constitutional violations found subject to harmless-error analysis have “each involved ‘trial error’ — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 Alvarez-Perdomo argues that each of the three rationales identified in

1996In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), the United States Supreme Court for the first time held the harmless error doctrine applicable, under the federal constitution, to a conviction in which an involuntary confession was introduced against the accused.

2018Should we overrule our reliance on the harmless error analysis we applied in LaVigne v. State , 812 P.2d 217 , 220 (Alaska 1991) ? 2) Was it structural error to fail to instruct the jury that the State must prove that Jordan acted at least negligently regarding the circumstance that the marijuana weighed four ounces or more? [ 11 ] We assume, as the court of appeals did, that Jordan's possession of marijuana under the circumstances of this case implicated his privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution. 12 With that assumption, we do not reach the first question because we conclude that exclu

2018Rev . 192, 193 (2006) ); see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 27, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is ... a distinction of true importance between a harmless-error test that focuses on what the jury did decide, rather than on what appellate judges think the jury would have decided if given an opportunity to pass on an issue."). 94 Sullivan , 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). 95 Jordan v. State , 367 P.3d 41 , 53 (Alaska App. 2016). 96 Anderson v. State , 337 P.3d 534 , 540 (Alaska App. 2014). 97 Hughes v. State , 513 P.2d

2018Rev . 192, 193 (2006) ); see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 27, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is ... a distinction of true importance between a harmless-error test that focuses on what the jury did decide, rather than on what appellate judges think the jury would have decided if given an opportunity to pass on an issue."). 94 Sullivan , 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). 95 Jordan v. State , 367 P.3d 41 , 53 (Alaska App. 2016). 96 Anderson v. State , 337 P.3d 534 , 540 (Alaska App. 2014). 97 Hughes v. State , 513 P.2d

2018Rev . 192, 193 (2006) ); see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 27, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is ... a distinction of true importance between a harmless-error test that focuses on what the jury did decide, rather than on what appellate judges think the jury would have decided if given an opportunity to pass on an issue."). 94 Sullivan , 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). 95 Jordan v. State , 367 P.3d 41 , 53 (Alaska App. 2016). 96 Anderson v. State , 337 P.3d 534 , 540 (Alaska App. 2014). 97 Hughes v. State , 513 P.2d

2020Although the defense attorney conceded the overall brutality of the assaults, she made various factual arguments about why the assaults should nevertheless not be found to be “most serious.”20 Because a jury might have resolved those factual questions 18 Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (Alaska App. 2005) (approvingly citing United States Supreme Court decisions holding that “courts must apply a harmless error analysis when assessing the effect of Sixth Amendment errors”). 19 Id. at 17 (explaining that “the evidence was undisputed that Milligrock’s assault was committed upon a woman who ha

2020Although the defense attorney conceded the overall brutality of the assaults, she made various factual arguments about why the assaults should nevertheless not be found to be “most serious.”20 Because a jury might have resolved those factual questions 18 Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (Alaska App. 2005) (approvingly citing United States Supreme Court decisions holding that “courts must apply a harmless error analysis when assessing the effect of Sixth Amendment errors”). 19 Id. at 17 (explaining that “the evidence was undisputed that Milligrock’s assault was committed upon a woman who ha

2020In previous appeals of orders authorizing hospitalizations for evaluation, we have applied a harmless error analysis to the failure to interview the respondent during the screening investigation.19 Past cases concerned only orders authorizing hospitalization for evaluation: The respondents were not subsequently committed under 18 See In re Hospitalization of Heather R., 366 P.3d 530, 533 (Alaska 2016) (explaining that “a screening investigation should omit an interview with the respondent only if such an interview would not be reasonably possible”). 19 See, e.g., In re Hospitalization of Paige

2020In previous appeals of orders authorizing hospitalizations for evaluation, we have applied a harmless error analysis to the failure to interview the respondent during the screening investigation.19 Past cases concerned only orders authorizing hospitalization for evaluation: The respondents were not subsequently committed under 18 See In re Hospitalization of Heather R., 366 P.3d 530, 533 (Alaska 2016) (explaining that “a screening investigation should omit an interview with the respondent only if such an interview would not be reasonably possible”). 19 See, e.g., In re Hospitalization of Paige

2020Although the defense attorney conceded the overall brutality of the assaults, she made various factual arguments about why the assaults should nevertheless not be found to be “most serious.”20 Because a jury might have resolved those factual questions 18 Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 16 (Alaska App. 2005) (approvingly citing United States Supreme Court decisions holding that “courts must apply a harmless error analysis when assessing the effect of Sixth Amendment errors”). 19 Id. at 17 (explaining that “the evidence was undisputed that Milligrock’s assault was committed upon a woman who ha

2020In previous appeals of orders authorizing hospitalizations for evaluation, we have applied a harmless error analysis to the failure to interview the respondent during the screening investigation.19 Past cases concerned only orders authorizing hospitalization for evaluation: The respondents were not subsequently committed under 18 See In re Hospitalization of Heather R., 366 P.3d 530, 533 (Alaska 2016) (explaining that “a screening investigation should omit an interview with the respondent only if such an interview would not be reasonably possible”). 19 See, e.g., In re Hospitalization of Paige

2019For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.[29] In contrast, constitutional violations found subject to harmless-error analysis have “each involved ‘trial error’ — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 Alvarez-Perdomo argues that each of the three rationales identified in

2019For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.[29] In contrast, constitutional violations found subject to harmless-error analysis have “each involved ‘trial error’ — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 Alvarez-Perdomo argues that each of the three rationales identified in

2019V. 36 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he term ‘privilege against self- incrimination’ is not an entirely accurate description of a person’s [Fifth Amendment] constitutional protection against being ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ ” United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000).

2019For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.[29] In contrast, constitutional violations found subject to harmless-error analysis have “each involved ‘trial error’ — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 Alvarez-Perdomo argues that each of the three rationales identified in

2019For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.[29] In contrast, constitutional violations found subject to harmless-error analysis have “each involved ‘trial error’ — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”30 Alvarez-Perdomo argues that each of the three rationales identified in

2018Rev . 192, 193 (2006) ); see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 27, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is ... a distinction of true importance between a harmless-error test that focuses on what the jury did decide, rather than on what appellate judges think the jury would have decided if given an opportunity to pass on an issue."). 94 Sullivan , 508 U.S. at 280 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). 95 Jordan v. State , 367 P.3d 41 , 53 (Alaska App. 2016). 96 Anderson v. State , 337 P.3d 534 , 540 (Alaska App. 2014). 97 Hughes v. State , 513 P.2d