harmless error in California

2026“Any error in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818” (Watson), whereby “reversal is only required if it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the jury been properly instructed.” (People v. Perez-Robles (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 222 , 235 (Perez-Robles).) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.

2026Accordingly, the trial court erred when it resentenced Cervantez without his personal presence. 5 Harmless error Because resentencing Cervantez in his absence violated his “federal constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, we review the error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 23 . . ., to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” i.e., “ ‘only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348; Velasco, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

2026“The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means, such as routine police procedures.” (People v. Banks (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 376 , 383.) “The ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is closely related in purpose to the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).

2026Accordingly, the trial court erred when it resentenced Cervantez without his personal presence. 5 Harmless error Because resentencing Cervantez in his absence violated his “federal constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, we review the error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 23 . . ., to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” i.e., “ ‘only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348; Velasco, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

2024To determine whether the retroactive application of these amendments requires us to vacate the jury’s true findings, we apply the harmless error standard set forth in In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez) and In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 (Ferrell). “[A] reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would support a valid theory of liability.” (Lopez, at p. 568.) As applied to jury instructions that omitted statutory elements added by a subs

2023(In re Ferrell, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 602.) If “ ‘ “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” would have found in favor of the defendant on the’ valid theory, ‘given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (In re Lopez [, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580], quoting 26 Aledamat, at p. 15; accord, Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 [‘[A] court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element’].)” (In re Ferrell at p.

2025A structural error, like having a biased judge or being deprived of 6 criminal defense counsel, requires automatic reversal because it “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 , 309–310.) Pec alternatively argues since his federal constitutional rights were violated, we should apply the harmless error test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires reversal unless the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless.

2024Harmless error Even if the trial court had erred, which it did not, any such error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 [applying Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 harmless error standard to admission of involuntary confession].) Hours after his initial interview at the motel, defendant was arrested, and detectives interviewed him at the police department jail.

2021(Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 583 .) The harmless error inquiry for the erroneous omission of an instruction regarding one or more elements of an offense focuses primarily on the weight of the evidence adduced at trial.

2017The issue in Rose was "whether the harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana [ (1979) ] 442 U.S. 510 [ 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 ] [ ( Sandstrom ) ], and Francis v. Franklin [ (1985) ] 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ]." ( Id . at p. 572, 106 S.Ct. 3101 , fn.omitted.) The Sandstrom court held that an instruction in a homicide prosecution that " 'the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,' violates t

2024“By thus cutting off all questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s rights secured by the Confrontation Clause.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679 .) Harmless Error The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024The factors relevant to this harmless-error analysis include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination 28 otherwise permitted, and . . . the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) Here, as set forth ante, the prosecution’s case with respect to count 1 turned largely on the credibility of Doe 1 and her family.

2023Prejudice “An instruction that omits or misdescribes an element of a charged offense violates the right to jury trial guaranteed by our federal Constitution, and the effect of this violation is measured against the harmless error test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [(Chapman)].” (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1165 .) Chapman requires reversal unless the state can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ( Chapman, supra, at p. 24 .) Under Chapman, the question “is not what effect the constituti

2017In Neder , supra , 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , the trial court "erred in refusing to submit the issue of materiality to the jury with respect to those charges involving tax fraud." *826 ( Id . at p. 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827 .) The United States Supreme Court "h[e]ld that the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967), applies to this error." ( Ibid . ) The high court noted that it had previously "recognized that 'most constitutional errors can be harmless.' [Citation.] '[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator,

2022(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490 .) Only where jury instructions relieve “the prosecution of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offense violate the defendant’s due process rights under the federal Constitution” does the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 apply.

2017(People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ] (Flood).) Under Chapman , the harmless error analysis “is ‘whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” (Flood, supra, at p. 494 .) 3.

2024“Neder . . . sharply limited the application of Sullivan’s broad language. . . . [W]e made clear in Aledamat that the relevant inquiry is not the jury’s verdict actually rested on a valid theory, but whether any rational jury would surely have rendered the same verdict had it been properly instructed.” (Lopez, at p. 584, citing People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 9 (Aledamat).) Franco argues that the standard for harmless error set forth in Lopez does not apply here because that case concerned an example of “alternative-theory” instructional error.

2024Given that the error at the very least is misleading as to an element of the offense, we find it appropriate to apply the more stringent harmless error standard.4 The Chapman standard, “compels the reviewing court to reverse the conviction unless it concludes that no ‘rational juror who made the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional error].’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 244.) Stated differently in the context of alternative-theory error, “The r

2022(See People v. Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1003 [“Any error in failing to instruct on imperfect defense of others is state law error alone, and thus subject, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, to the harmless error test articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836”]; see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 [concluding “error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under Watson”].) 7 There

2022VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 173-174 .) Any error is harmless and this type of sentencing error is subject to a harmless error analysis.

2024(People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 503 .) Our application of a harmless error review in Sandoval demonstrates that such review is possible, and the omission is not structural. ( Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 840–843; cf. People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946 , 963–964 [applying harmless error review to an unpled firearm enhancement].) Finally, amicus curiae argues that using a prejudice analysis to deny individual defendants a remand contravenes the Legislature’s unarticulated intent to have the new statute 20 PEOPLE v. LYNCH Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. apply retroactively

2024(Taylor v. Department of Industrial Relations etc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 801, 807 .) “The denial of the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances is reviewed under the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 838 .) Statutory interpretation entails ascertaining the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the purpose of the law.

2026The Trial Court’s Error Was Not Harmless “[U]nder article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, ‘[a] judgment may not be reversed on appeal . . . unless “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” it appears the error caused a “miscarriage of justice.’” [Citation.] The constitutional constraint, which applies in civil as well as criminal cases, ‘generally “prohibits a reviewing court from setting aside a judgment due to trial court error unless it finds the error prejudicial.’”” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766 , 786.) Where, as here,

2025(See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [error based solely on state law is subject to Watson harmless error analysis]; see also, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958 [procedural error under section 1172.6 is “state law error only, tested for prejudice under [Watson]”]; and, Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 716-717 [the harmless error standard in Watson applies where the superior court improperly considered an appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing].) Under Watson, Edwards “has the burden of showing that it is reasonably probable that, in the absence of the error, he ... would

2024VI, § 13; see In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 624 (Jesusa V.) [“We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed, except in a narrow category of circumstances when we deem the error reversible per se.

2024VI, § 13; see In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 624 (Jesusa V.) [“We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed, except in a narrow category of circumstances when we deem the error reversible per se.

2024(People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 503 .) Our application of a harmless error review in Sandoval demonstrates that such review is possible, and the omission is not structural. ( Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 840–843; cf. People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946 , 963–964 [applying harmless error review to an unpled firearm enhancement].) Finally, amicus curiae argues that using a prejudice analysis to deny individual defendants a remand contravenes the Legislature’s unarticulated intent to have the new statute 20 PEOPLE v. LYNCH Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. apply retroactively

2022It would simply mean that the errors are “more likely to be prejudicial under the traditional harmless-error standard.” (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 503 .) The fact that the statutory scheme enabled the Court of Appeal 19 In re CHRISTOPHER L.

2026The Trial Court’s Error Was Not Harmless “[U]nder article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, ‘[a] judgment may not be reversed on appeal . . . unless “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” it appears the error caused a “miscarriage of justice.’” [Citation.] The constitutional constraint, which applies in civil as well as criminal cases, ‘generally “prohibits a reviewing court from setting aside a judgment due to trial court error unless it finds the error prejudicial.’”” (TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766 , 786.) Where, as here,

2025(See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29 [error based solely on state law is subject to Watson harmless error analysis]; see also, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958 [procedural error under section 1172.6 is “state law error only, tested for prejudice under [Watson]”]; and, Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 716-717 [the harmless error standard in Watson applies where the superior court improperly considered an appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing].) Under Watson, Edwards “has the burden of showing that it is reasonably probable that, in the absence of the error, he ... would

2024(People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 670 [court’s failure to instruct on the affirmative defense of unreasonable belief in consent evaluated under Watson]; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in Watson’ ”].) Just as the jury rejected Hall’s claims of self-defense on count 2, the jury would have rejected a claim of defense of Sergeant Martin, especially since Hall

2022The Error Was Prejudicial Having concluded that the trial court erred in its formulation of the supplemental jury instructions, we examine whether the error was prejudicial. “ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ].’ [Citations.] ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (Peopl

2024The Error was Harmless In this harmless error review, we ask whether the appointment of the guardian ad litem affected the “outcome of a proceeding.” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) Father contends we should limit our review to the outcome of the proceeding that resulted in the guardian ad litem appointment.

2024(Id., subd. (c).) But “ ‘[i]f the outcome of a proceeding has not been affected, denial of a right to notice and a hearing may be deemed harmless and reversal is not required.’ ” (In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327 (A.D.), quoting In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 918 ; A.D., at p. 1325 [“a failure to give notice in dependency proceedings is subject to a harmless error analysis”; the appealing party must show “a more favorable result was likely absent the error”].) Similarly, we review the juvenile court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion, and discretion is abused

2025(See People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342 , 363–364 [examples of structural error include the denial of counsel or of self- representation, racial discrimination in jury selection, and trial with a biased judge].) Moreover, in 2006, our high court conducted a harmless error review when a trial court failed to instruct on the doctrine of unconsciousness in a capital murder trial.

2024Neither the instruction on the elements of the gang offense nor any other instruction given by the court “connected the reasonable doubt standard of proof to that charge.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) The court concluded this error was amenable to the harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).9 The court explained the appropriate standard under Chapman to determine the prejudicial effect of the erroneous omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction is this: “If it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury must have found

2023This is in accord with the harmless error standard first set forth in Neder: The error is harmless “where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17 , italics added; People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 832 (Merritt); Birdsall, at p. 867.) In Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th 400 , the California Supreme Court considered a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the major participant and reckless indifference elements of the felony-murder special circumstance under subdiv

2022However, that is not the situation before us in this case, as the trial court did not explain its reasons and, more importantly, explicitly referred to the aggravating circumstances that could have supported the exercise of its discretion at the time of sentencing. 13 the jury, is not structural error.’ [Citation.] Such an error does not require reversal if the reviewing court determines it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 52-53 ; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 8

2022(People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 ; People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); see Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 670-671, 698 [assessing prejudice resulting from admission of testimonial hearsay under Chapman].) Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless err

2022Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier); accord, People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) “The harmless error inquiry asks: ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (Geier, at p. 608; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Li

2025(See People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196 (Gonzalez).) “Structural errors” are reversible per se and differ from “trial errors” that are subject to the harmless error 10 standard. “[T]rial errors can be fairly examined in the context of the entire record and are amenable to harmless error review.

2023(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 191 , 197–199, 200, fn. 4 (Gonzalez) [“. . . we have since clarified that Watson applies to the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses.”]; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) In applying this harmless error analysis, a court must be mindful 26 that the failure to provide the jury with the option of convicting on voluntary manslaughter “creates a specific kind of risk—that the jury, faced with an all- or-nothing choice between first degree murder or acquittal” will convict the defendant of murder even though the prosecutio

2004(Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 8-9.) Harmless error analysis has been utilized by the Supreme Court where improper instructions have been given on an element of an offense (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ] [mandatory rebuttable presumption], overruled on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire [(1991)] 502 U.S. [62,] 72, fn. 4 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ]; Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 218 , 109 S.Ct. 2419 ] [mandatory conclusive presumption]; Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1

2004(Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 8-9.) Harmless error analysis has been utilized by the Supreme Court where improper instructions have been given on an element of an offense (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ] [mandatory rebuttable presumption], overruled on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire [(1991)] 502 U.S. [62,] 72, fn. 4 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ]; Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 218 , 109 S.Ct. 2419 ] [mandatory conclusive presumption]; Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 439 , 107 S.Ct. 1

2013(People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 , overruled on other grounds in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 .) It is the People’s burden under Chapman to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. ( Chapman, supra, at p. 24 .) “‘Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Delaware v. Van Arsdall[ (1986) 475 U.S. 673 ,] 681.) The

2012Because her mental state was a hotly contested issue at trial, Perla contends the appropriate harmless error test is furnished not by Neder, but by Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 404-405 [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ], We disagree.

2025(See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , 59–60 [the typical harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies in dependency cases]; A.F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691–692 [applying the prejudice standard for federal constitutional errors].) As mentioned, the record shows the Department provided D.F. notice of the new allegations concerning his anger several weeks before the adjudication.

2021“The harmless error analysis applies in juvenile dependency proceedings even where the error is of constitutional dimension.” (In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 798 .) We may only reverse the juvenile court’s ruling if we conclude that it is “ ‘reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.’ ” (Ibid. [quoting In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 ].) “[E]rrors in civil trials require that we examine ‘each individual case to determine whether prejudice actually occurred in light of the entire record.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins.

2025(In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 798 .) As stated by the court in In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412-413 , “[b]ecause the issue is not one of constitutional dimension, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have differed in the absence of the procedural irregularity.” The California Supreme Court has summarized the harmless error rule as follows: “We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed, except in a narrow category of circumstances when we deem the error reversible per se.

2022(J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 182 ; In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 798 [“The harmless error analysis applies in juvenile dependency proceedings even where the error is of constitutional dimension.”]; In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327 ; In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 624 [“We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed, except in a narrow category of circumstances . . .”]; In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701 , 715-716 [where agency makes “little to no effort” to provide notice; harmless error analysis applied]; In re Chr