harmless error in Guam

2025If the trial court has committed an evidentiary error over an objection, “the proper standard for evaluating whether reversal is required is the harmless error standard.” People v. Bosi, 2022 Guam 15 ¶ 15 (quoting People v. De Soto, 2016 Guam 12 ¶ 19).

2025See Bosi, 2022 Guam 15 ¶ 59 (“The fourth prong of the harmless error analysis supports harmless error because the emails are cumulative of ample testimony.”).

2026See Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4; People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41. “‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005)). [51] Our review of the record shows a pattern of prosecutorial conduct that undermines the procedural safeguards of GRE 404(b).

2026See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 , 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 29 , 476 P.3d 224, 235 (Wyo. 2020). “‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005)). such decisions would cause more damage to the rule of law than correcting course, courts may choose overruling as the lesser evil.”).

2025The test for harmless error for constitutional error is “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” People v. Quitugua, 2015 Guam 27 ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41), and for a non-constitutional error whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict,” People v. Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [11] “Our review of evidentiary sufficiency is de novo, but it is ‘highly deferential’ to the findings of the trier of fact.” P

2021People v. Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶ 10.

2026See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 , 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 29 , 476 P.3d 224, 235 (Wyo. 2020). “‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005)). such decisions would cause more damage to the rule of law than correcting course, courts may choose overruling as the lesser evil.”).

2026See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 , 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 29 , 476 P.3d 224, 235 (Wyo. 2020). “‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005)). such decisions would cause more damage to the rule of law than correcting course, courts may choose overruling as the lesser evil.”).

2026See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 , 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 29 , 476 P.3d 224, 235 (Wyo. 2020). “‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005)). such decisions would cause more damage to the rule of law than correcting course, courts may choose overruling as the lesser evil.”).

2025The test for harmless error for constitutional error is “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” People v. Quitugua, 2015 Guam 27 ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41), and for a non-constitutional error whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict,” People v. Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [11] “Our review of evidentiary sufficiency is de novo, but it is ‘highly deferential’ to the findings of the trier of fact.” P

2025The test for harmless error for constitutional error is “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” People v. Quitugua, 2015 Guam 27 ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41), and for a non-constitutional error whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict,” People v. Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [11] “Our review of evidentiary sufficiency is de novo, but it is ‘highly deferential’ to the findings of the trier of fact.” P

2025People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41 (citing People v. Jesus, 2009 Guam 2 ¶¶ 53-55; United States v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying similar standards under Federal Rules of Evidence)).

2025However, the Second Circuit has also cautioned that “the mere fact that the properly admitted evidence, standing alone, would have been sufficient to support the conviction is not determinative . . . .” Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 526 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (“The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.”).12 11 Assuming the challenge to R.C.’s testimony was preserved. 12 This is not to say we cannot consider whether “the prosecution’s case was strong enough to s

2025As the Supreme Court has instructed, this determination requires examining “the trial record as a whole.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983); see also People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26 n.4 (“‘Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific,’ and ‘often involve a review of the entire trial record.’” (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005))).

2025The Second Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he strength of the prosecution’s case without the erroneously admitted evidence ‘is probably the single most critical factor in determining whether the error was harmless.’” Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2011)); United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The strength of the prosecution’s case is the most important factor.”).

2025However, the Second Circuit has also cautioned that “the mere fact that the properly admitted evidence, standing alone, would have been sufficient to support the conviction is not determinative . . . .” Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 526 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (“The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.”).12 11 Assuming the challenge to R.C.’s testimony was preserved. 12 This is not to say we cannot consider whether “the prosecution’s case was strong enough to s

2025“A harmless error inquiry typically involves analysis of numerous factors, including: (1) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted evidence; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.” Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41 (citing United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 217 (2d Cir. 2005)). [33] If a party does not object to an evidentiary ruling at trial, this court instead reviews the issue for plain error.

2025This court will not reverse for plain error “unless (1) there was an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious under current law; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4) reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.’” Reyes, 2020 Guam 33 ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Nathan, 2018 Guam 13 ¶ 9). 2 If the error is constitutional in nature, the proper harmless error standard is “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” People v. Asprer, 2019 Guam 19 ¶

2025The Second Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he strength of the prosecution’s case without the erroneously admitted evidence ‘is probably the single most critical factor in determining whether the error was harmless.’” Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2011)); United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The strength of the prosecution’s case is the most important factor.”).

2025Our analysis proceeds under the harmless error standard for non-constitutional errors: whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict.” Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [21] “When a trial court abuses its discretion, ‘we are required to reverse the conviction unless the prosecution demonstrates that the error is harmless.’” People v. Vargas, 2024 Guam 1 ¶ 30 (quoting People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26).

2025Our analysis proceeds under the harmless error standard for non-constitutional errors: whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict.” Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [21] “When a trial court abuses its discretion, ‘we are required to reverse the conviction unless the prosecution demonstrates that the error is harmless.’” People v. Vargas, 2024 Guam 1 ¶ 30 (quoting People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26).

2025See Morales, 2022 Guam 1 ¶ 12 (citing People v. Roby, 2017 Guam 7 ¶ 18).

2025The Second Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he strength of the prosecution’s case without the erroneously admitted evidence ‘is probably the single most critical factor in determining whether the error was harmless.’” Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2011)); United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The strength of the prosecution’s case is the most important factor.”).

2025The test for harmless error for constitutional error is “whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” People v. Quitugua, 2015 Guam 27 ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41), and for a non-constitutional error whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict,” People v. Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [11] “Our review of evidentiary sufficiency is de novo, but it is ‘highly deferential’ to the findings of the trier of fact.” P

2025“The harmless error ‘inquiry typically involves analysis of numerous factors, including: (1) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted evidence; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.’” Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 59 (quoting Roten, 2012 Guam 3 ¶ 41).

2025Our analysis proceeds under the harmless error standard for non-constitutional errors: whether “it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict.” Sharpe, 2024 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (quoting Callahan, 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 17 ). [21] “When a trial court abuses its discretion, ‘we are required to reverse the conviction unless the prosecution demonstrates that the error is harmless.’” People v. Vargas, 2024 Guam 1 ¶ 30 (quoting People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 26).

2022See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 486 P.3d 113, 118 (Wash. 2021) (en banc) (“[T]he issue of consent inherently exists within the element of forcible compulsion.”); People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he question of consent is, of necessity, addressed in a determination as to whether the act was committed by force or coercion.”); Day v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“‘[L]ack of consent’ is an inescapable result of ‘forcible compulsion.’”); State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 125 (S.D. 2009) (“Because force or coercion and consent cannot co-exist, it

2022See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 486 P.3d 113, 118 (Wash. 2021) (en banc) (“[T]he issue of consent inherently exists within the element of forcible compulsion.”); People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he question of consent is, of necessity, addressed in a determination as to whether the act was committed by force or coercion.”); Day v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“‘[L]ack of consent’ is an inescapable result of ‘forcible compulsion.’”); State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 125 (S.D. 2009) (“Because force or coercion and consent cannot co-exist, it

2022See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 486 P.3d 113, 118 (Wash. 2021) (en banc) (“[T]he issue of consent inherently exists within the element of forcible compulsion.”); People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he question of consent is, of necessity, addressed in a determination as to whether the act was committed by force or coercion.”); Day v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“‘[L]ack of consent’ is an inescapable result of ‘forcible compulsion.’”); State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 125 (S.D. 2009) (“Because force or coercion and consent cannot co-exist, it

2022“Where the trial court has abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, the proper standard for evaluating whether reversal is required is the harmless error standard.” People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14 ¶ 16 (citing De Soto, 2016 Guam 12 ¶ 43). [13] “Where a defendant raise[d] the issue of sufficiency of the evidency by a motion for judgment of acquittal, we review the trial court’s denial of the motion de novo.” People v. Song, 2021 Guam 14 ¶ 16 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Aguon, 2020 Guam 24 ¶ 11).

2022See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 486 P.3d 113, 118 (Wash. 2021) (en banc) (“[T]he issue of consent inherently exists within the element of forcible compulsion.”); People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he question of consent is, of necessity, addressed in a determination as to whether the act was committed by force or coercion.”); Day v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“‘[L]ack of consent’ is an inescapable result of ‘forcible compulsion.’”); State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 125 (S.D. 2009) (“Because force or coercion and consent cannot co-exist, it

2021Additionally, prosecutorial misconduct is subject to cumulative-error analysis, which “‘aggregates all errors found to be harmless and analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.’” People v. De Soto, 2016 Guam 12 ¶ 69 (quoting Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003)); see also Moses, 2007 Guam 5 ¶¶ 57-58.