harmless error in Texas

2005The following year, the court of criminal appeals stated that “[e]xcept for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Cain v. State , 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim.

2005The following year, the court of criminal appeals stated that “[e]xcept for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Cain v. State , 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim.

2007I would hold that the error was harmless under the Dinkins factors. (1) Source of the error The source of the error was the State’s single question about appellant’s post-arrest silence as to his claim of self-defense prior to appellant’s counsel’s objection and its single repetition of the question after the objection was overruled. (2) Extent to which the State emphasized, the error There was no other mention of appellant’s post-arrest silence, so this evidence was not strongly emphasized by the State. (3) Weight a juror would probably place on appellant’s post-arrest silence In applying the

2007I would hold that the error was harmless under the Dinkins factors. (1) Source of the error The source of the error was the State's single question about appellant's post-arrest silence as to his claim of self-defense *295 prior to appellant's counsel's objection and its single repetition of the question after the objection was overruled. (2) Extent to which the State emphasized the error There was no other mention of appellant's post-arrest silence, so this evidence was not strongly emphasized by the State. (3) Weight a juror would probably place on appellant's post-arrest silence In applying

2026“In applying the harmless error test, the primary question is whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error might have contributed to the conviction or punishment.” Vasquez, 484 S.W.3d at 532 (quoting Mosely v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2023When applying the harmless error test for constitutional errors under Rule 44.2(a), courts must “ask whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error might have contributed to the conviction.” Love, 543 S.W.3d at 846 (citing Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.

2025See generally G & H Towing v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293 , 297-98 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (discussing the 36 application of the harmless error rule to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment).

2024The harmless error rule states that, before reversing a judgment because of an error of law, the reviewing court must find that the error amounted to such a denial of the appellant’s rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause declaratory relief and rendering final judgment and awarding attorney’s fees to defendant, without incorporating interlocutory summary judgment into final judgment). 4 Jeremy necessarily concedes as much in his fifth issue on appeal where he challenges the trial court’s directed verdict on his petition for modification. 7 “the rendition of an impr

2015Harmless error analysis for Confrontation Clause violations assumes that “the damaging potential of the cross-examination [would have been] fully realized.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986).

2015A violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to a harmless error analysis.126 In the context of improper limitation of cross-examination, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applies the three-pronged test established in Delaware v. Van Arsdall.127 First, the appellate court must assume that the damaging potential of the cross-examination was fully realized.128 Second, with that assumption in mind, the appellate court must review the error in connection with the following factors: (1) the importance of the witness’s testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumula

2006See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (setting forth five factors to employ in a harmless error analysis when a violation of a Confrontation Clause occurs); Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim.

2004See also De La Rosa v. State, 961 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (applying Van Arsdall factors). “[S]ince a violation of the right to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause necessarily means the testimony was not permitted before the fact finder, the Court was called upon to develop a harmless error analysis where evidence had been excluded.” Shelby, 819 S.W.2d at 547 .

2023See Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“[T]he improper admission of an involuntary confession is ‘trial’ error, subject to a harmless error analysis.”) (quoting Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279 , 306-12 (1991)).

2019See, e.g., Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 823 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, pet. ref’d), citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)(recognizing that the admission of a coerced conviction is considered trial error and is subject to a harmless error analysis).

2019The standard of materiality for a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony is the well-known harmless error standard of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), i.e., that "the evidence is material (and harmful) unless it can be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony made no contribution to the defendant's conviction or punishment." Napper , 322 S.W.3d at 241 . "[F]alse testimony is material only if there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that it affected the judgment of the jury." Weinstein , 421 S.W.3d at 665 .

2019The standard of materiality for a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony is the well-known harmless error standard of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), i.e., that "the evidence is material (and harmful) unless it can be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony made no contribution to the defendant's conviction or punishment." Napper , 322 S.W.3d at 241 . "[F]alse testimony is material only if there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that it affected the judgment of the jury." Weinstein , 421 S.W.3d at 665 .

2018"Even when a defendant can rebut this presumption with evidence that he was deprived of adequate counsel during a critical stage, this deprivation of counsel is subject to a harmless error or prejudice analysis." Id. (citing Satterwhite v. Texas , 486 U.S. 249 , 257, 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (subjecting deprivation of right to counsel to harmless error analysis when deprivation did not contaminate "the entire criminal proceeding") ).

2018"Even when a defendant can rebut this presumption with evidence that he was deprived of adequate counsel during a critical stage, this deprivation of counsel is subject to a harmless error or prejudice analysis." Id. (citing Satterwhite v. Texas , 486 U.S. 249 , 257, 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (subjecting deprivation of right to counsel to harmless error analysis when deprivation did not contaminate "the entire criminal proceeding") ).

2025Co., 603 S.W.2d 818 , 819–20 (Tex. 1980) (explaining that the harmless error rule “establishes a sound and common sense policy of not reversing a judgment unless the error or errors can be said to have contributed in a substantial way to bring about the adverse judgment”); see also Walker v. Owens, 492 S.W.3d 787 , 790–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (holding that a trial court committed harmless error in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss outside of the deadline in Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, as Rule 91a “does not contain any sanction for non-compliance with the forty-fi

2006Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. 1980), the Court held that the harmless error rule applies to all errors in that it draws no distinction as to the type of error involved in its requirement for reversal.

2022See Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62 .7 7 Because we find that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, we need not conduct a harmless error analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.

2012App. 6 Because we find no error in the charge, we need not conduct a harmless error analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“[T]he improper admission of an involuntary confession is ‘trial’ error, subject to a harmless error analysis.”) (quoting Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279 , 306-12 (1991)).

2011See Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (“[W]e hold that the knowing use of perjured testimony is trial error, subject to the harmless error standard applicable on habeas corpus,” and “we hold that the applicant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the error contributed to his conviction or punishment.”); Chabot, 300 S.W.3d at 771 (“Although the present case involves unknowing, rather than knowing, use of testimony, we see no reason for subjecting the two types of error to different standards of harm.”); Napper, 322 S.W.3d at 244 (“For habeas

2013Since Turner, however, the high criminal court has determined that all errors with the exception of certain federal constitutional errors labeled “structural” are subject to a harmless- error analysis. 10 See High v. State, 964 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Crim.

2003See also High v. State, 964 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2024See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that a harmless-error analysis is applicable to the trial court’s failure to give a requested Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a) limiting instruction upon admission of extraneous-offense evidence).

2022Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 653 (Tex. Crim.

2018While we understand that the harmless-error inquiry is not "intended to satisfy any punitive, deterrent, or remedial purpose[,]" that the potential for errors like this to continue in future cases plays no part in our decision to overturn a verdict, and that we "should adhere strictly to the question of whether the error committed in a particular case contributed to the verdict obtained in that case [,]" [emphasis in original] Snowden , 353 S.W.3d at 821 , it would be highly problematic for us to suggest that constitutional violations such as this one that happen behind closed doors outside th

2015The harmless error inquiry “should adhere strictly to the question of whether the error committed in a particular case contributed to the verdict obtained in that case.” Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. Crim.

2010In Linton , we recognized that the harmless error rule applies to the failure to read and plead to enhancement allegations, and we held that no harm results when a defendant is not misled into believing that the State abandoned the allegations and the defendant does not incriminate himself. 15 S.W.3d at 620–21. [2] Here, appellant entered into a written stipulation agreeing that he was the same person convicted of the felony offense of robbery, and the trial court explained to appellant before accepting the stipulation that this robbery conviction was the same one alleged in the enhancement pa

2003However, as the court pointed out in Linton v. State, 15 S.W.3d 615, 620-21 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd), all errors with the exception of certain federal constitutional errors labeled as “structural” are subject to a harmless error analysis.

1996When conducting a harmless error analysis "[i]t is the effect of the error and not the existence of overwhelming evidence or the lack thereof that dictates our judgment." Ibid.

1996When conducting a harmless error analysis “[i]t is the effect of the error and not the existence of overwhelming evidence or the lack thereof that dictates our judgment.” Ibid.

2013In Marin v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “our system may be thought to contain rules of three distinct kinds: (1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (8) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request.” Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), modified on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (Except for structural errors, “no error ... is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.”).

2006See Marin v. State , 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that article 1.051(e) A clearly does not contemplate a forfeiture of the statutory right from a mere failure to object at trial @ ), overruled on other grounds , Cain v. State , 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as "structural," no error is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis). 3.

2017We further explained that Cain "issued a broad mandate that overruled several prior cases” and repeated our statement that "appellate courts should not automatically foreclose the application of the harmless error test to certain categories of errors.” Id. at 172.

2001In Gonzales , the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on its analysis in Cain, held that “except for certain ... constitutional errors ... no error is categorically immune [from] a harmless error analysis.” Id. (citing Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).

2023See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim.

2017See id. at 662 .

2015The 14 majority in Cain took Matchett’s holding regarding art. 26.13(a)(4) and expanded it to hold that “except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Id.

2004In Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that cases involving statutes with absolute requirements (specifically Article 26.13 concerning guilty plea admonishments), should be examined with a “case by case determination of whether in fact a meaningful harm analysis is possi *66 ble.” The following year, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated more forcefully that “[ejxcept for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntarin

2010In Herron v. State , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the defendant's confession in a harmless error analysis of denial of an accomplice-witness instruction. 86 S.W.3d 621, 633 (Tex. Crim.

2007In Herron v. State , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the defendant's confession in a harmless error analysis of denial of an accomplice-witness instruction. 86 S.W.3d 621, 633 (Tex. Crim.

2020“A ‘structural error’ is not subject to a harmless-error test.” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

2006P. 44.2. 2 “Except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 339 (citing Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).

1991MILLER, Judge, dissenting to denial of State’s Motion for Rehearing This Court determined in Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), that Tex.R.App.Proc. 81(b)(2) 1 was the rhetorical and semantic equivalent of the harmless error standard for constitutional errors announced by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

1991MILLER, Judge, dissenting to denial of State's Motion for Rehearing This Court determined in Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), that Tex.R.App.Proc. 81(b)(2) [1] was the rhetorical and semantic equivalent of the harmless error standard for constitutional errors announced by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2024Cooks, 240 S.W.3d at 911 (“Even when a defendant can rebut this presumption with evidence that he was deprived of adequate counsel during this critical stage, this deprivation of counsel is subject to a harmless error or prejudice analysis.”).

2016Even when a defendant can rebut the presumption that his trial counsel continued to represent him during the time period for filing a motion for new trial by presenting evidence that he was deprived of adequate counsel during this stage, “this deprivation of counsel is subject to a harmless error or prejudice analysis.” Cooks, 240 S.W.3d at 911 .

2025The Court of Criminal Appeals explained in elaborate detail that although a sentencing factor should be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder, an error in the submission of that factor is not structural and is subject to a harmless- error analysis: The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 , 113 S. Ct. 2078 , [2080] (1993).

2025The Court of Criminal Appeals explained in elaborate detail that although a sentencing factor should be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder, an error in the submission of that factor is not structural and is subject to a harmless- error analysis: The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 , 113 S. Ct. 2078 , [2080] (1993).

2006In regard to appellant’s reliance on Hood , we note the reliance of the majority in Hood on cases such as Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals found that certain error was not subject to a harmless-error analysis.

1998We cautioned, however, that “[w]e do not decide today whether all ‘mandatory’ statutes are immune to a harmless error analysis.” Id. 2 On rehearing, we held that our analysis of the ten day preparation requirement was “improvident” and proceeded instead to analyze whether there was a violation of Article 28.10(b).