harmless error in Montana

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans-in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected-and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans—in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected— and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans-in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected-and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans-in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected-and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

1980State v. Gallagher (1968), 151 Mont. 501 , 445 P.2d 45 .

1980State v. Gallagher (1968), 151 Mont. 501 , 445 P.2d 45 .

2018In re S.C. , 2005 MT 241 , ¶ 29, 328 Mont. 476 , 121 P.3d 552 .

2018In re S.C. , 2005 MT 241 , ¶ 29, 328 Mont. 476 , 121 P.3d 552 .

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans-in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected-and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans—in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected— and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008In so doing, we relied upon the “well established [principle]... that ‘no civil case shall be reversed by reason of error which would have no significant impact upon the result; if there is no showing of substantial injustice, the error is harmless.’ ” In re A.N., ¶ 39 (quoting Newbauer v. Hinebauch, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 20 , 288 Mont. 482, ¶ 20 , 958 P.2d 705, ¶ 20 ). ¶44 Many other jurisdictions similarly apply the harmless error doctrine in termination proceedings.

2008In so doing, we relied upon the “well established [principle]... that ‘no civil case shall be reversed by reason of error which would have no significant impact upon the result; if there is no showing of substantial injustice, the error is harmless.’ ” In re A.N., ¶ 39 (quoting Newbauer v. Hinebauch, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 20 , 288 Mont. 482, ¶ 20 , 958 P.2d 705, ¶ 20 ). ¶44 Many other jurisdictions similarly apply the harmless error doctrine in termination proceedings.

2008In so doing, we relied upon the “well established [principle]... that ‘no civil case shall be reversed by reason of error which would have no significant impact upon the result; if there is no showing of substantial injustice, the error is harmless.’ ” In re A.N., ¶ 39 (quoting Newbauer v. Hinebauch, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 20 , 288 Mont. 482, ¶ 20 , 958 P.2d 705, ¶ 20 ). ¶44 Many other jurisdictions similarly apply the harmless error doctrine in termination proceedings.

2008In so doing, we relied upon the "well established [principle] . . . that `no civil case shall be reversed by reason of error which would have no significant impact upon the result; if there is no showing of substantial injustice, the error is harmless.'" In re A.N., ¶ 39 (quoting Newbauer v. Hinebauch, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 20 , 288 Mont. 482, ¶ 20 , 958 P.2d 705, ¶ 20 ). ¶44 Many other jurisdictions similarly apply the harmless error doctrine in termination proceedings.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans-in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected-and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

2008The State, citing to In re F.H., J.K., and B.K., 266 Mont. 36 , 878 P.2d 890 (1994) and In re A.N. and C.N., 2000 MT 35 , 298 Mont. 237 , 995 P.2d 427 , notes that we have previously applied the doctrine of harmless error in the parental termination context. ¶42 The State asserts that DPHHS did not present evidence of abuse and neglect in support of a formal adjudication at the May 6 hearing because the parents stipulated to treatment plans—in which they admitted their children had been abused or neglected— and also stipulated in open court to the TLC Petition.

1995The issue was whether the harmless error standard in Chapman applied to jury instructions which violate the principles set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 .

1995The issue was whether the harmless error standard in Chapman applied to jury instructions which violate the principles set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 .

1995The Court held that it did, and stated that an “otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose, 478 U.S. at 576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3105 .

1995The Court held that it did, and stated that an “otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose, 478 U.S. at 576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3105 .

1979Harmless error will not be made the basis for reversal, e.g., Halko v. Anderson, 108 Mont. at 593 , 93 P.2d at 959 .

1979Harmless error will not be made the basis for reversal, e.g., Halko v. Anderson, 108 Mont. at 593 , 93 P.2d at 959 .

2026We therefore reject the Bradleys’ argument that the court’s premature entry of default judgment was a harmless error. ¶20 Failure to comply with Rule 55(b)(2)’s notice requirements renders a default judgment “premature and voidable.” In re Marriage of Neneman, 217 Mont. at 159 , 703 P.2d at 167 .

2026We therefore reject the Bradleys’ argument that the court’s premature entry of default judgment was a harmless error. ¶20 Failure to comply with Rule 55(b)(2)’s notice requirements renders a default judgment “premature and voidable.” In re Marriage of Neneman, 217 Mont. at 159 , 703 P.2d at 167 .

2026Notably, the harmless error inquiry does not require the Court “to definitely say whether or not the tainted evidence actually influenced the jury’s decision to convict.” State v. Reichmand, 2010 MT 228, ¶ 23 , 358 Mont. 68 , 243 P.3d 423 .

2026Notably, the harmless error inquiry does not require the Court “to definitely say whether or not the tainted evidence actually influenced the jury’s decision to convict.” State v. Reichmand, 2010 MT 228, ¶ 23 , 358 Mont. 68 , 243 P.3d 423 .

2025We have long emphasized that “the doctrine of harmless error should be applied in parental termination cases only in the rarest of occasions and with great caution.” In re J.C., 2008 MT 127, ¶ 53 , 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 .

2025We have long emphasized that “the doctrine of harmless error should be applied in parental termination cases only in the rarest of occasions and with great caution.” In re J.C., 2008 MT 127, ¶ 53 , 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 .

2025Wilkins, 299 Mont. at 82, 746 P.2d at 590 .

2025We have long emphasized that “the doctrine of harmless error should be applied in parental termination cases only in the rarest of occasions and with great caution.” In re J.C., 2008 MT 127, ¶ 53 , 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 .

2025We have long emphasized that “the doctrine of harmless error should be applied in parental termination cases only in the rarest of occasions and with great caution.” In re J.C., 2008 MT 127, ¶ 53 , 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 .

2025Whether Lambert is entitled, on this record, to withdraw his admission to failing to register “as required” considering State v. Hinman. ¶33 Lambert asks, in the alternative, to withdraw his March 20, 2023 admission to failing to register “as required,” invoking State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116 , 412 Mont. 434 , 530 P.3d 1271 , which held that post-2007 amendments to Montana’s Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act operate as punishment and apply prospectively.

2025Evid. 105 for some of Ruiz’s statements in that call, he did not ask for instruction on the statements he alleges were erroneously admitted here. ¶10 Constitutional error is subject to the harmless error analysis outlined in State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶ 47 , 306 Mont. 215 , 32 P.3d 735 , and State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12, ¶ 31 , 403 Mont. 32 , 478 P.3d 1159 .

2020Appellants ask that we apply a harmless error analysis because the redemption statutes are meant to be remedial in nature, citing Grazer v. Jones, 2012 UT 58, ¶ 18 , 289 P.3d 437 (Utah) (“Our past decisions can be understood to rest not solely on an undefined notion of substantiality, but also on an analysis of prejudice or injury”). ¶11 However, we are mindful that this is an appeal from a preliminary injunction.

2020Appellants ask that we apply a harmless error analysis because the redemption statutes are meant to be remedial in nature, citing Grazer v. Jones, 2012 UT 58, ¶ 18 , 289 P.3d 437 (Utah) (“Our past decisions can be understood to rest not solely on an undefined notion of substantiality, but also on an analysis of prejudice or injury”). ¶11 However, we are mindful that this is an appeal from a preliminary injunction.

2018The general rule stated in § 46-20-701(2), MCA, requiring the defendant to establish the claimed error was prejudicial does not apply where, as here, " 'the only means to meet that burden-the court record-was not preserved by reason of the commission of the error itself.' " State v. Price , 2009 MT 129 , ¶ 27, 350 Mont. 272 , 207 P.3d 298 (quoting Tapson , ¶ 35 ).

2018The general rule stated in § 46-20-701(2), MCA, requiring the defendant to establish the claimed error was prejudicial does not apply where, as here, " 'the only means to meet that burden-the court record-was not preserved by reason of the commission of the error itself.' " State v. Price , 2009 MT 129 , ¶ 27, 350 Mont. 272 , 207 P.3d 298 (quoting Tapson , ¶ 35 ).

2016Comm’rs, 2013 MT 243, ¶ 35 , 371 Mont. 356 , 308 P.3d 88 (quoting M.

2016Comm’rs, 2013 MT 243, ¶ 35 , 371 Mont. 356 , 308 P.3d 88 (quoting M.

2015See, e.g., State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26 , 319 Mont. 362 , 84 P.3d 648 (after reviewing the record “Legg does not meet the narrow [Finley] criteria required to invoke our discretionary plain error review, we decline to address the merits of Legg’s argument under plain error review”); State v. Hart, 2000 MT 332 , 303 Mont. 71 , 15 P.3d 917 (after reviewing the record, we determined that Hart failed to meet the second prong of Finley and “decline[d] to address Hart’s contention” that the prosecutor’s statements violated his right to confrontation, reasoning that “Hart has failed to demonstrate that

2015See, e.g., State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26 , 319 Mont. 362 , 84 P.3d 648 (after reviewing the record “Legg does not meet the narrow [Finley] criteria required to invoke our discretionary plain error review, we decline to address the merits of Legg’s argument under plain error review”); State v. Hart, 2000 MT 332 , 303 Mont. 71 , 15 P.3d 917 (after reviewing the record, we determined that Hart failed to meet the second prong of Finley and “decline[d] to address Hart’s contention” that the prosecutor’s statements violated his right to confrontation, reasoning that “Hart has failed to demonstrate that

2015State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, ¶ 26 , 340 Mont. 262 , 173 P.3d 690 . ¶6 We conclude sufficient evidence exists to meet the harmless error standard.

2015State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, ¶ 26 , 340 Mont. 262 , 173 P.3d 690 . ¶6 We conclude sufficient evidence exists to meet the harmless error standard.

2015While we construe the State’s argument to be a harmless error argument here, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s failure to adequately address Wilkes’s newly discovered evidence claim was harmless. ¶15 While this case was pending on appeal and after briefing had ended, we decided Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242 , 380 Mont. 366 , 355 P.3d 742 .

2015While we construe the State’s argument to be a harmless error argument here, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s failure to adequately address Wilkes’s newly discovered evidence claim was harmless. ¶15 While this case was pending on appeal and after briefing had ended, we decided Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242 , 380 Mont. 366 , 355 P.3d 742 .