harmless error in Maine

2024The factors are the following: [T]he importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see Huntley, 681 A.2d at 12. [¶24] Whether the erroneously admitted testimony is highly prejudicial or important to the State’s proof is relevant to the harmless error analysis because prejudicial effec

1998In these circumstances, we find that the proffered evidence falls within the scope of the Jacques exception to Rule 412, and we must conclude that the court erred by excluding all evidence of the victim’s alleged past sexual behavior. 7 III. [¶ 15] The harmless error doctrine “recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” See

1998Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ; cf. e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 (holding that “the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis”). [¶ 17] When a trial error is of constitutional magnitude, the appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 8 See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81

1998Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ; cf. e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 (holding that “the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis”). [¶ 17] When a trial error is of constitutional magnitude, the appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 8 See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

1998Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ; cf. e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 (holding that “the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis”). [¶ 17] When a trial error is of constitutional magnitude, the appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 8 See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81

2022See, e.g., State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶¶ 2, 9-11 , 755 A.2d 1075 (concluding that the admission of a confession obtained by a state actor attempting to mislead the defendant about his right to remain silent rendered the trial fundamentally unfair); State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1981) (“One step in applying a harmless-error standard is to assess the strength of the state’s evidence against the defendant.” (emphasis added)). [¶37] In sum, whether grounded in our supervisory power or the factors considered in determining whether substantial rights have been affected, prosecutors in

1987We will not set aside the judgment because of trial error, even though preserved, if “it meets the customary harmless-error standard that the ‘conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or [that it] had but very slight effect.’ ” State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 514 (Me.1981) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).

2025See State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1985) (applying a harmless error analysis in a case involving an erroneous limitation on the right to present a closing argument); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 , 24 (2014) (“[E]ven assuming that Herring established that complete denial of summation amounts to structural error, it did not clearly establish that the restriction of summation also amounts to structural error.”); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 , 117 n.2 (1983) (stating that a violation of the right to counsel is “subject to harmless error analysis unless the deprivation, by its very nature

2024See Judkins v. State, 2024 ME 45, ¶¶ 20, 22 , --- A.3d --- (indicating that, for an error of constitutional dimension to be harmless, we must be confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the outcome).

2024See id. at 734 . [¶35] Finally, when presented with a claim of cumulative error, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment of conviction in a case in which the errors were “pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935).9 9 The Supreme Court views the standard of review to be applied in this context as governed by federal standards, whether the case resides in federal or state court.

2012See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 .

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

2022See State v. Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶¶ 27, 29 , 782 A.2d 319 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (differentiating between structural and nonstructural defects and stating that examples of structural errors include a total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and the lack of an impartial judge)). [¶33] In Chapman v. California, the United States Supreme Court applied a harmless error test to improper prosecutorial comments and concluded that not deem a state constitutional claim preserved.

2019See Greaton v. Greaton, 2012 ME 17, ¶ 7 , 36 A.3d 913 (describing the harmless error standard). 6 [¶10] In support of its decision, the court made factual findings relevant to the best interest factors stated in section 1653(3).

2019See Greaton v. Greaton, 2012 ME 17, ¶ 7 , 36 A.3d 913 (describing the harmless error standard). 6 [¶10] In support of its decision, the court made factual findings relevant to the best interest factors stated in section 1653(3).

2017In Recuenco , the Supreme Court held that if a defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, “there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” Id.; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying harmless error analysis when a jury was not instructed on one essential but undisputed element of a crime). [¶ 42] The appropriate harmless error inquiry on an issue of constitutional rights in a termination of parental rights case is whether, upon re

2017In Recuenco , the Supreme Court held that if a defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, “there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.” Id.; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying harmless error analysis when a jury was not instructed on one essential but undisputed element of a crime). [¶ 42] The appropriate harmless error inquiry on an issue of constitutional rights in a termination of parental rights case is whether, upon re

1998Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 683-84 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 ; see also State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 105 (Me.1995) (stating that “the harmless error inquiry focuses on the importance to the defense of the evidence excluded and the prejudicial effect of the exclusion”). [¶ 19] Applying the Van Arsdall harmless-error factors to the court’s exclusion of all evidence regarding the child victim’s past sexual behavior in the instant case, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the court’s error did not affect the factfinding process of the jury.

1997We agree. • [¶ 11] Pursuant to the harmless error analysis we review the entire record as a whole and ignore errors that are harmless, even some constitutional violations. 8 State v. *696 Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 105 (Me.1995).

1992We have consistently held that preserved error will be treated as harmless “only if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” State v. Naylor, 602 A.2d 187, 189 (Me.1992); State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981).

1987Under that standard, as we explicated it in State v. True, 438 A.2d at 467-69 , an appellant to prevail must demonstrate that he suffered a significantly higher level of prejudice from an unpre-served error than that required by the harmless-error standard.

2024Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶¶ 16-17 , 711 A.2d 851 (“[T]he appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, 12 after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained”); see State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 103, ¶¶ 18-19 , 982 A.2d 320 . [¶23] When an error violates a constitutional right, the harmless error analysis focuses on the importance of the evidence, the prejudicial effect of its admission, and whether there was overwhelming admissible evidence to support the judgment of conviction.

2024Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶¶ 16-17 , 711 A.2d 851 (“[T]he appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, 12 after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained”); see State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 103, ¶¶ 18-19 , 982 A.2d 320 . [¶23] When an error violates a constitutional right, the harmless error analysis focuses on the importance of the evidence, the prejudicial effect of its admission, and whether there was overwhelming admissible evidence to support the judgment of conviction.

2025Given our discretion, we do not understand this language to automatically require vacatur of a judgment of conviction.14 But this language does suggest that the circumstances are narrow in which a defendant should not be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea when he prevails in suppressing a portion of evidence on appeal. [¶37] Discussing when, if ever, the harmless-error standard should be applied when determining whether a judgment stemming from a conditional plea should be vacated, the First Circuit reasoned that, while it was “highly The need to certify for appeal that a case involvin

1993M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) expressly requires that a conditional guilty plea shall be in writing and “shall specifically state any pretrial motion and the ruling thereon to be preserved for appellate review.” Moreover, the rule expressly requires that the court and the prosecutor “shall file a written certification that the record is adequate for appellate review and that the case is not appropriate for application of the harmless error doctrine.” Although not contained in Rule 11(a)(2) as originally adopted in 1985, the requirement of written certification by the court and the prosecutor was added

2024Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶¶ 16-17 , 711 A.2d 851 (“[T]he appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, 12 after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained”); see State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 103, ¶¶ 18-19 , 982 A.2d 320 . [¶23] When an error violates a constitutional right, the harmless error analysis focuses on the importance of the evidence, the prejudicial effect of its admission, and whether there was overwhelming admissible evidence to support the judgment of conviction.

2024Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶¶ 16-17 , 711 A.2d 851 (“[T]he appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, 12 after a review of the whole record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained”); see State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 103, ¶¶ 18-19 , 982 A.2d 320 . [¶23] When an error violates a constitutional right, the harmless error analysis focuses on the importance of the evidence, the prejudicial effect of its admission, and whether there was overwhelming admissible evidence to support the judgment of conviction.

2023“We determine the effect of error by looking to the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the misconduct, the prosecutor’s purpose in making the statement (i.e., whether the statement was willful or inadvertent), the weight of the evidence supporting the verdict, jury instructions, and curative instructions.” State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 33 , 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he State has the burden of persuasion on appeal in a harmless error analysis.” Id. ¶ 39. [¶28] Nightingale challenges two portions of these comments.

2023“We determine the effect of error by looking to the totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the misconduct, the prosecutor’s purpose in making the statement (i.e., whether the statement was willful or inadvertent), the weight of the evidence supporting the verdict, jury instructions, and curative instructions.” State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 33 , 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he State has the burden of persuasion on appeal in a harmless error analysis.” Id. ¶ 39. [¶28] Nightingale challenges two portions of these comments.

2001"Pursuant to the harmless error analysis we review the entire record as a whole and ignore errors that are harmless, even some constitutional violations.” State v. York, 1997 ME 156, ¶ 11 , 705 A.2d 692, 695 . .

2001"Pursuant to the harmless error analysis we review the entire record as a whole and ignore errors that are harmless, even some constitutional violations.” State v. York, 1997 ME 156, ¶ 11 , 705 A.2d 692, 695 . .

2025However the harmless error test is applied in the conditional-plea context, we agree with the view of all the circuits addressing the issue that “it is only the rare case in which [the court] may definitively make the harmlessness determination necessary to preclude remand.” Id. at 1090 (majority opinion) (quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also United States v. Dyer, 54 F.4th 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Buster, 26 F.4th 627, 635-36 (4th Cir. 2022).

2025See Hussein, 2019 ME 74, ¶ 19 , 208 A.3d 752 .

2025See Hussein, 2019 ME 74, ¶ 19 , 208 A.3d 752 .

2025State v. Kessler, 453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983); see State v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 124-25 , 8 A. 544, 545 (1887); State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 139-42 , 16 A.2d 103, 104-06 (1940); Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.) (“It once was widespread practice for judges to summarize the evidence and the contentions of the parties for the jury.”). 16 objection during the defense closing argument, the error was harmless); see also Sanders, 497 P.3d at 1260 (applying a harmless error analysis to the improper sustaining of an objection to closing argument, but concluding that the

2025State v. Kessler, 453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983); see State v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 124-25 , 8 A. 544, 545 (1887); State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 139-42 , 16 A.2d 103, 104-06 (1940); Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.) (“It once was widespread practice for judges to summarize the evidence and the contentions of the parties for the jury.”). 16 objection during the defense closing argument, the error was harmless); see also Sanders, 497 P.3d at 1260 (applying a harmless error analysis to the improper sustaining of an objection to closing argument, but concluding that the

2025State v. Kessler, 453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983); see State v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 124-25 , 8 A. 544, 545 (1887); State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 139-42 , 16 A.2d 103, 104-06 (1940); Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.) (“It once was widespread practice for judges to summarize the evidence and the contentions of the parties for the jury.”). 16 objection during the defense closing argument, the error was harmless); see also Sanders, 497 P.3d at 1260 (applying a harmless error analysis to the improper sustaining of an objection to closing argument, but concluding that the

2025State v. Kessler, 453 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Me. 1983); see State v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 124-25 , 8 A. 544, 545 (1887); State v. Jones, 137 Me. 137, 139-42 , 16 A.2d 103, 104-06 (1940); Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 5-5 at 5-14 (2025 ed.) (“It once was widespread practice for judges to summarize the evidence and the contentions of the parties for the jury.”). 16 objection during the defense closing argument, the error was harmless); see also Sanders, 497 P.3d at 1260 (applying a harmless error analysis to the improper sustaining of an objection to closing argument, but concluding that the

2025See State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1985) (applying a harmless error analysis in a case involving an erroneous limitation on the right to present a closing argument); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 , 24 (2014) (“[E]ven assuming that Herring established that complete denial of summation amounts to structural error, it did not clearly establish that the restriction of summation also amounts to structural error.”); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 , 117 n.2 (1983) (stating that a violation of the right to counsel is “subject to harmless error analysis unless the deprivation, by its very nature