harmless error in New York

2024C. "[E]very error of law (save, perhaps, one of sheerest technicality) is, ipso facto, deemed to be prejudicial and to require a reversal, unless that error can be found to have been rendered harmless by the weight and the nature of the other proof" ( People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]). "[U]nless the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error" ( id. ).

2024C. "[E]very error of law (save, perhaps, one of sheerest technicality) is, ipso facto, deemed to be prejudicial and to require a reversal, unless that error can be found to have been rendered harmless by the weight and the nature of the other proof" ( People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]). "[U]nless the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error" ( id. ).

2024Applying a harmless error analysis to guilty pleas is a challenging exercise because a guilty plea "simply reflects the fact that for some reason, sufficient to the defendant," that defendant decided to waive his or her trial rights ( People v Grant , 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]).

2024Applying a harmless error analysis to guilty pleas is a challenging exercise because a guilty plea "simply reflects the fact that for some reason, sufficient to the defendant," that defendant decided to waive his or her trial rights ( People v Grant , 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]).

2018Harmless error review "requires an appellate court to assess the quantum and nature of the People's proof of guilt independent of erroneously admitted evidence and the causal effect, if any, that the introduction of that evidence had on the factfinder's verdict" ( People v Wells , 21 NY3d 716 , 718 [2013]; e.g.

2015As a general rule, the harmless error doctrine “cannot be used to uphold a guilty plea that is entered after the improper denial of a suppression motion” (People v Wells, 21 NY3d 716, 717-718 [2013]).

2012Even if the Court should decide the present case based on a harmless error analysis, as the majority proposes, the People did not prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (Deck v Missouri, 544 US at 635 , quoting Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 [1967] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2005An alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to a harmless error analysis (see Chapman v California, 386 US 18 [1967]; People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265 [1995]).

2004It follows that, if the defendant does not consent to the concession, he is effectively deprived of a fair trial, and the harmless error analysis does not apply to errors of that magnitude (see People v Felder, 47 NY2d 287, 295 [1979]).

1995In People v Felder ( 47 NY2d 287, 295 ), the Court of Appeals held that: "Harmless error analysis is not, however, available in all instances of constitutional error.

2021"Harmless error analysis proceeds in two stages" ( People v Johnson , 57 NY2d 969, 970 ).

2020However, under our test for harmless error as it is ordinarily applied, "unless the proof of [a] defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error" ( People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d at 241 ; accord People v Johnson , 57 NY2d 969, 970 [1982]).

1996Harmless error analysis does not apply to this violation (see, CPL 310.30; see also, People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760; People v Ali, 196 AD2d 544, 545 ).

1995Harmless error analysis is not appropriate (see, People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759 ; People v Feliciano, 209 AD2d 634 ).

2012The harmless error test for a constitutional violation is not met here, because it cannot be said that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s verdict” (People v Douglas, 4 NY3d 777, 779 [2005]; see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 240-241 [1975]).

2012The harmless error test for a constitutional violation is not met here, because it cannot be said that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s verdict” (People v Douglas, 4 NY3d 777, 779 [2005]; see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 240-241 [1975]).

2025As to the propriety of employing our interest of justice jurisdiction to take corrective action in this case, the majority's reliance upon the above-referenced facts lends to the apparent conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced by the procedure; in other words, a harmless error analysis, albeit without explicit reference ( see People v Tenace , 229 AD3d 908, 911 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Heidrich , 226 AD3d 1096, 1099 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 927 [2024]; People v Flores , 153 AD3d 182, 193-195 [2d Dept 2017], affd 32 NY3d 1087 [2018]).

2025Beyond the fact that this argument is contrary to the People's concession that if the jury was anonymous in this case it would necessitate a new trial, the claim has no merit as it seemingly invokes a harmless error analysis that this Court has rejected with respect to the use of an anonymous jury ( see People v Heidrich , 226 AD3d at 1099; see also People v Flores, 153 AD3d at 193-195 ).

2016The People further conceded at oral argument that defendant invoked his constitutional and limited statutory right to counsel in response to those warnings and that, under the circumstances of this case, valid grounds existed to suppress his post-invocation statements and evidence related to the DRE, second breathalyzer and blood tests (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [a] [1]; People v Higgins, 124 AD3d 929, 931-932 [2015]; People v Mora-Hernandez, 77 AD3d 531, 531 [2010]). 2 The erroneous admission of this evidence is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine, and such an error is con

2015Instead, it is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine for constitutional violations” (People v Lopez, 16 NY3d at 386 ; see People v Dashnaw, 85 AD3d 1389, 1391 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]).

2014Instead it is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine for constitutional violations (see People v Lopez, 16 NY3d at 386-387 ; People v Krom, 61 NY2d 187, 201 [1984]).

2014Instead it is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine for constitutional violations (see People v Lopez, 16 NY3d at 386-387 ; People v Krom, 61 NY2d 187, 201 [1984]).

2021People v Flower , 173 AD3d 1449 , 1456 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 931 [2019]; People v Dashnaw , 85 AD3d 1389, 1393 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]; People v Murphy , 79 AD3d 1451, 1453 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 862 [2011]; but see People v Knowles , 42 AD3d 662, 664 [2007]). [FN4] Rather, any such constitutional error is subject to a harmless error analysis ( see People v Peguero-Sanchez , 29 NY3d 965, 967 [2017]; People v Murphy , 79 AD3d at 1453 ; People v Hunt , 18 AD3d at 892 ), which requires this Court to consider whether there was overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt and whe

2016The People further conceded at oral argument that defendant invoked his constitutional and limited statutory right to counsel in response to those warnings and that, under the circumstances of this case, valid grounds existed to suppress his post-invocation statements and evidence related to the DRE, second breathalyzer and blood tests (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [a] [1]; People v Higgins, 124 AD3d 929, 931-932 [2015]; People v Mora-Hernandez, 77 AD3d 531, 531 [2010]). 2 The erroneous admission of this evidence is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine, and such an error is con

2019As to defense counsel's alleged failure to preserve defendant's challenge to Lewis' testimony regarding the jail assault, "failure to object to this harmless error, without more, 'was not so serious as to compromise defendant's right to a fair trial' and did not constitute ineffective assistance" ( People v Every , 146 AD3d 1157, 1165-1166 [2017], affd 29 NY3d 1103 [2017], quoting People v Gunney , 13 AD3d 980, 983 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2019As to defense counsel's alleged failure to preserve defendant's challenge to Lewis' testimony regarding the jail assault, "failure to object to this harmless error, without more, 'was not so serious as to compromise defendant's right to a fair trial' and did not constitute ineffective assistance" ( People v Every , 146 AD3d 1157, 1165-1166 [2017], affd 29 NY3d 1103 [2017], quoting People v Gunney , 13 AD3d 980, 983 [2004], lv denied 5 NY3d 789 [2005]).

2017New York "refuse[s] to apply the harmless error doctrine in cases involving substantiated claims of ineffective assistance" ( People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 714 [1998]).

2017Instead, the majority focuses on the alleged deficiencies of the performance of defendant's retained trial counsel, noting that the Court of Appeals has stated that it has "refused to apply the harmless error doctrine in cases involving substantiated claims of ineffective assistance" ( People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 714 [1998]).

2023Under the applicable harmless error standard, we cannot say that this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Clyde, 18 NY3d at 153-154 ; see also People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237-238 [1975]).

2017However, some jury-related errors are subject to a harmless error analysis, such as Sandoval violations ( see People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421, 424 ), failing to swear jurors immediately upon their selection rather that just before preliminary instructions ( see People v Quinones, 18 AD3d 330, 331 ), revealing the defendant in shackles to the jury ( see People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 148 ), and making mistakes in substantively charging the jury ( see e.g., People v Robinson, 1 AD3d 985, 986-987 ).

2016The deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights is of constitutional dimension and is not subject to a harmless error analysis (see People v Hilliard, 73 NY2d 584, 587 [1989]).

2016The deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights is of constitutional dimension and is not subject to a harmless error analysis ( see People v Hilliard , 73 NY2d 584, 587 [1989]).

2021People v Flower , 173 AD3d 1449 , 1456 [2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 931 [2019]; People v Dashnaw , 85 AD3d 1389, 1393 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]; People v Murphy , 79 AD3d 1451, 1453 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 862 [2011]; but see People v Knowles , 42 AD3d 662, 664 [2007]). [FN4] Rather, any such constitutional error is subject to a harmless error analysis ( see People v Peguero-Sanchez , 29 NY3d 965, 967 [2017]; People v Murphy , 79 AD3d at 1453 ; People v Hunt , 18 AD3d at 892 ), which requires this Court to consider whether there was overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt and whe

2016The People further conceded at oral argument that defendant invoked his constitutional and limited statutory right to counsel in response to those warnings and that, under the circumstances of this case, valid grounds existed to suppress his post-invocation statements and evidence related to the DRE, second breathalyzer and blood tests (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [a] [1]; People v Higgins, 124 AD3d 929, 931-932 [2015]; People v Mora-Hernandez, 77 AD3d 531, 531 [2010]). 2 The erroneous admission of this evidence is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine, and such an error is con

2000The harmless error analysis is inapplicable to cases where the nature of the Rosario violation is a complete failure to deliver the materials, the rationale being that the relevancy of Rosario material should be determined by defense counsel, not by the prosecutor or the courts (see, People v Jones, 70 NY2d 547, 550-553 ; People v Perez, 65 NY2d 154 , 160).

2000Under Rosario, the People are required to “supply defense counsel with all of the nonconfidential pretrial statements, recorded or written, of a prosecution witness that relate to the subject matter of his or her trial testimony” (People v Giordano, 274 AD2d 748, 749 ) and the failure to do so is not subject to a harmless error analysis (see, People v Jones, 70 NY2d 547 ).

2011(Wardlaw, 6 NY3d at 559 .) However, the Court dispensed with automatic remand for a de novo hearing where “it is clear, beyond reasonable doubt, that the outcome of the suppression hearing [at which the violation occurred] could not have affected the outcome of the trial.” (Wardlaw, 6 NY3d at 558 .) Thus, the Court held that deprivation of counsel at a pretrial hearing was subject to a harmless error analysis. {Id. at 559 [remedy to which a defendant is entitled depends on what impact if any, the tainted proceeding had on the case as a whole], citing People v Wicks, 76 NY2d 128 [1990] [harmles

2003In that regard, we have refused to apply the harmless error doctrine in cases involving substantiated claims of ineffective assistance” (People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 714 ; cf. People v Wicks, 76 NY2d 128, 130-131 , rearg denied 76 NY2d 773 ).

2011People v West, 81 NY2d at 373 ; People v Krom, 61 NY2d 187, 201 [1984]; People v Flecha, 60 NY2d 766, 767 [1983]; People v Sanders, 56 NY2d 51, 66-67 [1982]; People v Rogers, 48 NY2d at 174 ).

2001(People v Hilliard, 73 NY2d 584 [1989]; People v Sanders, 56 NY2d 51 [1982].) However, the Rogers holding (supra) is not dispositive to the issue herein. 18 NYCRR 432.2, in its pertinent part, in establishing the responsibilities of the child protective service in the Department of Social Services requires under subdivision (b) (3) (ii) (a) a “face-to-face” interview with the subject of the report and family members of such subjects, including children named in the report.

2007Although the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, a new trial is nevertheless required because, as the Court of Appeals has held, the unjustified closure of the courtroom during testimony at a criminal trial is not subject to the harmless error rule (see People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 415 [1979], cert denied 444 US 946 [1979]).

1989Thus, the defendant’s conviction is reversed as no prejudice need be demonstrated, and the harmless error doctrine is not applicable to this error (see, People v Jones, supra).

1993Harmless error analysis is inapplicable because Supreme Court deprived defendant of his fundamental due process right to a fair and just hearing (see, People v Darby, supra; People v Mullen, supra) and his constitutional right to counsel at trial (see, People v Hilliard, 73 NY2d 584 ; People v Hodge, 53 NY2d 313, 320 ; People v Felder, 47 NY2d 287 ; People v Margan, 157 AD2d 64, 69 ; see also, Glasser v United States, 315 US 60, 76 ).

1990However, the court in Wicks (supra) stated that the defendant’s right to counsel at trial was "too fundamental” to permit application of the harmless error doctrine (People v Wicks, supra, at 132 , quoting Glasser v United States, 315 US 60, 76 , supra).

1992In People v Moore ( 71 NY2d 684 ), the Court of Appeals held that a Trial Judge’s submission of copies of part of the indictment to the jury was subject to the harmless error analysis, if indeed it was error.

1992The Court of Appeals in People v Moore (supra) also distinguished cases involving the submission of a statute to the jury without the defendant’s consent, which held the harmless error analysis inapplicable (see, People v Nimmons, 72 NY2d 830 ; People v Sanders, 70 NY2d 837 ).

2023Harmless error analysis is inapplicable, and the error is per se reversible ( see People v Torres , 72 NY2d at 1008-1009 ; People v Gray , 143 AD3d at 910 ).

2016The harmless error analysis is inapplicable, and the error is per se reversible (see People v Torres, 72 NY2d at 1008-1009 ).

2020Alternatively, even if the infringement of the defendant's right to present a defense could somehow be construed as something less than a deprivation of his right to a fair trial—a difficult conclusion to reach in light of prior cases describing the right to present a defense as "one of the minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585, quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Hall , 160 AD3d 210 , 213; People v Bradley , 99 AD3d at 936 )—the error is, at the very least, subject to constitutional harmless error analysis ( see Crane v Kentucky

1990Although I agree with Justice Wallach that the defendant’s conviction should be reversed, I disagree with his opinion that a harmless error analysis is applicable to defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to call witnesses in his behalf (Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 [1973]; People v Foy, 32 NY2d 473, 478 [1973]; People v Boone, 78 AD2d 461, 465 [1st Dept 1981]; CPL 60.15 [1]).