harmless error in Minnesota

2008As we noted in Juarez , we were "clarify[ing]” the standard for harmless error. 572 N.W.2d at 291 .

2003ORDER Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED (1) that the petition of T.J.C. for further review of the decision of the court of appeals be, and the same is, granted; (2) that the decision of the court of appeals be, and the same is, reversed for reconsideration of the harmless error analysis; and (3) that the case is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with the harmless error standard articulated in State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286 (Minn.1997): whether the adjudication of delinquency was surely unattributable to the error.

2015Even if the third ground were considered "objected to” and reviewed under the harmless-error test set forth in State v. Caron for more serious misconduct, the prosecutor’s conduct here is harmless. 300 Minn. 123, 127 , 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (1974) ("[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct this court has required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming.”).

2015Even if the third ground were considered "objected to” and reviewed under the harmless-error test set forth in State v. Caron for more serious misconduct, the prosecutor’s conduct here is harmless. 300 Minn. 123, 127 , 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (1974) ("[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct this court has required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming.”).

2026The district court relied on appellant’s 2 Because the third prong of the plain-error standard “is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis,” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011), even if I applied the harmless-error standard, appellant’s argument would likewise fail.

2024See State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 2011) (“Under the harmless error standard, a defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted)).

2016See State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Minn. 2004) (stating that appellate courts evaluate the erroneous omission of a jury instruction under a harmless error analysis).

2015Under the harmless error test, if “beyond a reasonable doubt the [error] did not have a significant impact on the verdict, reversal is not warranted.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2024For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we have utilized a harmless- error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 150 (Minn. 2012).

2016When reviewing objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we utilize a harmless-error test, “the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012).3 In cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct, “we require certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before we affirm.” Id. at 150 .

2015If a defendant has preserved an objection at trial, this court applies a harmless-error test to a prosecutorial-misconduct argument that “varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389-90 (Minn. 2007) (citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 , 299 n.4 (2006)).

2010“For objeeted-to prosecutorial misconduct, we have utilized a harmless error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Minn.2007) (noting that it has not been determined whether the two-tiered approach articulated in State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127-28 , 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (1974) “should continue to apply to cases involving objected-to prosecutorial misconduct” (quoting State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.2006))); see also State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn.2005).

2015A. Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in excluding the evidence, and applying the harmless-error test to the. exclusion, we “must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict ‘if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.’” State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 90 (Minn.2001) (quoting State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994)).

2015A. Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in excluding the evidence, and applying the harmless-error test to the exclusion, we “must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict ‘if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.’ ” State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 90 (Minn. 2001) (quoting State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994)).

2011The harmless-error inquiry requires an appellate court to “examine all relevant factors to determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not have a significant impact on the verdict.” State v. Shoop, 441 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn.1989).

2001In applying the harmless error test, we examine all relevant factors to determine “whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not have a significant impact on the verdict.” Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 481 .

2015If a defendant has preserved an objection at trial, this court applies a harmless-error test to a prosecutorial-misconduct argument that “varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389-90 (Minn. 2007) (citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 , 299 n.4 (2006)).

2015Huffman’s attorney objected to this statement, and the district court overruled the objection, explaining that the statement involved permissible “hyperbole.” When analyzing objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a harmless error test that “varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Minn. 2007).

2015Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 224 ; see also Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 317 (stating that “we have found the error to be harmless only where several factors weigh in that direction” and the harmless error conclusion was reinforced by the strength of the evidence of guilt).

2015Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 224 ; see also Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 317 (stating that “we have found the error to be harmless only where several factors weigh in that direction” and the harmless error conclusion was reinforced by the strength of the evidence of guilt).

2004To determine whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial because of a violation of a right to confront witnesses, we conduct a harmless-error analysis that considers "`the importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.'" Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 910 (quoting State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn.1995) (qu

2004To determine whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial because of a violation of a right to confront witnesses, we conduct a harmless-error analysis that considers “ ‘the importance of the witnesses] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimo^ ny of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’ ” Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 910 (quoting State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn.1995)

2016State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn.2009), Peltier made a timely objection to Dr. Hudson’s testimony, and therefore the harmless-error standard applies. .Id.

2011See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn.2009) (explaining that if a defendant objects to the admission of evidence at trial, the admission of that evidence is reviewed under the harmless error standard).

2013However, “it is well settled that violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to [a harmless error] analysis.” State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn.2005).

2011In applying the harmless-error standard, appellate courts “consider the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defense.” State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn.2005).

2015“A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). “[W]hen an erroneous jury instruction eliminates a required element of the crime this type of error is not harmless beyond a reasonable 4 doubt.” State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 479 (Minn. 2006).

2014See State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 364 (Minn. 2011).

2012State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 713 (Minn.2003).

2009State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 718 (Minn.2003).

2015Applying the harmless-error test to an assumed violation of the Con-fronfation Clause, we must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2015Applying the harmless-error test to an assumed violation of the Con-fronfation Clause, we must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2015Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 224 ; see also Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 317 (stating that “we have found the error to be harmless only where several factors weigh in that direction” and the harmless error conclusion was reinforced by the strength of the evidence of guilt).

2015Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 224 ; see also Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 317 (stating that “we have found the error to be harmless only where several factors weigh in that direction” and the harmless error conclusion was reinforced by the strength of the evidence of guilt).

2025“Unlike a harmless error analysis, the defendant generally bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the third plain error factor.” State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583-84 (Minn. 2007).

2012State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583-84 (Minn.2007).

2019See, e.g. , id. (noting that where "the facts relevant to trustworthiness are undisputed and the applicability of the residual [hearsay] exception arises in the context of a harmless error *295 analysis, it is appropriate for us to determine admissibility of the statements").

2011Under the harmless error standard, a defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.’ ” State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 568 (Minn.2008) (quoting State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn.2006)).

2003In State v. Richards , we held that the deprivation of the right of self-representation is not subject to a harmless error analysis and overturned Richards' conviction because the district court's refusal to let Richards proceed pro se was "clearly erroneous." 456 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn.1990) (hereinafter " Richards I ").

2003In State v. Richards, we held that the deprivation of the right of self-representation is not subject to a harmless error analysis and overturned Richards’ conviction because the district court’s refusal to let Richards proceed pro se was “clearly erroneous.” 456 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn.1990) (hereinafter “Richards /”).

2016“If a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is determined to be erroneous, and the error reaches the level of a constitutional error, such as denying the defendant the right to present a defense, 7 [the] standard of review is whether the exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Richardson, 670 N.W.2d at 277 (quotations omitted).

2012Id. at 382 ; see also State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn.2003) (explaining that the harmless error standard controls the court’s review of alleged violations of defendant’s due process right to present a defense).

2016State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Minn. 2006).

2015Chau-vin, 723 N.W.2d at 30 ; see also Minn. R.Crim.

2015See State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 658 (Minn. 2011) (referring to the harmless-error standard as the “less onerous standard” as compared to the plain-error standard). 8 usually this means an error that violates or contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 261 (Minn. 2014).

2015See State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 658 (Minn.2011) (referring to the harmless-error standard as the “less onerous standard” as compared to the plain-error standard). .

2015Applying the harmless-error test to an assumed violation of the Con-fronfation Clause, we must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)).

2015Applying the harmless-error test to an assumed violation of the Confrontation Clause, we must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross- examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 867 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

2006See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 448-52 (Minn.2006) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially) (stating that “Blakely articulated a significant new rule of law, that it is still in its infancy, and ultimately, * * * it is the United States Supreme Court that is best suited to guide the continued development of this new rule.”); see also Washington v. Recuenco, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2551, 2553 , - L.Ed.2d- (2006) (holding that failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error and that the objected-to Blakely error was subject to a harmless-error analysis, cit

2006See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 448-52 (Minn.2006) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially) (stating that “Blakely articulated a significant new rule of law, that it is still in its infancy, and ultimately, * * * it is the United States Supreme Court that is best suited to guide the continued development of this new rule.”); see also Washington v. Recuenco, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2551, 2553 , - L.Ed.2d- (2006) (holding that failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error and that the objected-to Blakely error was subject to a harmless-error analysis, cit