laches doctrine in Tennessee

2015“It requires an unreasonable delay that prejudices the party seeking to employ laches as a defense, and it depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.” Id. (citing Brister v. Estate of Brubaker, 336 S.W.2d 326, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960)).

2012As this court said in the case of Brister v. Brubaker’s Estate, 336 S.W.2d 326, 332 , 47 Tenn. App. 150, 162 (1960), “The determinative test as to laches, which may be available as a successful defense, is not the length of time that has elapsed, but whether, because of such lapse of time, the party relying on laches as a defense has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id.

2016Similarly, the doctrine of laches provides that “equity will not intervene on behalf of one who has delayed unreasonably in pursuing his rights.” Dennis Joslin Co., LLC v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

2015Thus, the doctrine of laches “requires more than mere delay.” Dennis Joslin Co., LLC v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

2014This Court recently explained the doctrine of laches as an affirmative defense to a claim: “Unreasonable delay in pursuing rights calls the equitable doctrine of laches into play to prevent assertion of stale claims.” Tennessee Pine Co. v. Via, No. W1999-00558-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 34411147 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2000) (citing Nunley v. Nunley, 925 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996)).

2014Id.

2022Doctrine of Laches Mr. Roberts next argues that the trial court erred when it declined to apply the doctrine of laches to Luna Law’s breach of contract claim. “[T]he application of the doctrine . . . lies within the discretion of the trial court[,] and it will not be reversed except -8- upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing John P. Saad & Sons, Inc. v. Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp., 715 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tenn. 1986)).

2012The application of the doctrine of laches “in the first instance lies within the discretion of the trial court and it will not be reversed except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2001“The two essential elements of laches are negligence and unexcused delay of the complainant in asserting his alleged claim....” Consumer Credit Union v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

2001“The two essential elements of laches are negligence and unexcused delay of the complainant in asserting his alleged claim....” Consumer Credit Union v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990).

2000No hard and fast rule for its applicable can be formulated.’” 187 S.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added).

1986No hard and fast rule for its application can be formulated.’ ” 187 S.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added).

2000But, in Nicholson v. Holt, 174 Tenn. 358, 366 , 125 S.W.2d 483, 486 (1939), this Court indicated that: “The doctrine of laches ... is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine.

2000But, in Nicholson v. Holt, 174 Tenn. 358, 366 , 125 S.W.2d 483, 486 (1939), this Court indicated that: “The doctrine of laches ... is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine.

2003Id. “[T]he determinative test as to laches, which may be available as a successful defense, is not the length of time that has elapsed, but whether, because of such lapse of time, the party relying on laches as a defense has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (quoting Brister v. Estate of Brubaker, 47 Tenn.App. 150 , 336 S.W.2d 326, 332 (I960)).

2003Id. “[T]he determinative test as to laches, which may be available as a successful defense, is not the length of time that has elapsed, but whether, because of such lapse of time, the party relying on laches as a defense has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (quoting Brister v. Estate of Brubaker, 47 Tenn.App. 150 , 336 S.W.2d 326, 332 (I960)).

2022Doctrine of Laches Mr. Roberts next argues that the trial court erred when it declined to apply the doctrine of laches to Luna Law’s breach of contract claim. “[T]he application of the doctrine . . . lies within the discretion of the trial court[,] and it will not be reversed except -8- upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing John P. Saad & Sons, Inc. v. Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp., 715 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tenn. 1986)).

2008In John P. Saad & Sons, Inc. v. Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp., 715 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. 1986), the Court held that, when a trial court applies the equitable doctrine of laches, a reviewing court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion.

2022“The essence of the defense [of laches] is that a party has unreasonably and prejudicially delayed the asserting of a claim.” Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 11 Tenn. Jur.

2022As the trial court explained in its final order, “[i]n the context of a claim for breach of an attorney’s fees contract, the attorney is entitled to recover the compensation agreed to by contract, provided it is fair at inception and entered in good faith.” See Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689, 694 (Tenn. 1998); Peoples Nat.

2019See e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Regel, 195 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014Crist v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 420 , 365 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (1963). 7 Moreover, the primary purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public from attorneys who do not comply with the Rules of Professional Responsibility.

2014Crist v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 420 , 365 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (1963). 7 Moreover, the primary purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public from attorneys who do not comply with the Rules of Professional Responsibility.

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014The Court of Appeals previously applied the doctrine of laches in Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140 , 344 S.W.2d 567, 571 (1960), but Berke is distinguishable because it was a statutory disciplinary proceeding brought by the Tennessee Bar Association, before the establishment of the current disciplinary system under Rule 9.

2014The Court of Appeals previously applied the doctrine of laches in Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140 , 344 S.W.2d 567, 571 (1960), but Berke is distinguishable because it was a statutory disciplinary proceeding brought by the Tennessee Bar Association, before the establishment of the current disciplinary system under Rule 9.

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2014See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Del.2007) (adopting the laches defense in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234, 240-44 (D.C.2005) (discussing delay as a mitigating factor in setting the appropriate sanction); In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ind.1993) (collecting cases and finding no occasion to determine whether laches applies in attorney disciplinary cases); In re Matney, 241 Kan. 783 , 740 P.2d 598, 605 (1987) (applying laches in an attorney disciplinary case); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Penn, 431 Md. 320 , 65 A.3d 125, 135 (2013) (rejecting l

2011In arguing that the doctrine of laches should not apply in this case, Mr. Burrow states that he first became aware “of the actual numerical results of the March 2[1], 1998 vote during the pendency of discovery in this matter [i.e., July 12, 2006].” While the “discovery rule” doctrine may apply “to alleviate the intolerable result of barring a cause of action by holding that it ‘accrued’ before the discovery of the injury or wrong,” see, e.g., Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tenn. 1982), even giving Mr. Burrow every reasonable inference in his favor, the record simply does not support hi

2011In arguing that the doctrine of laches should not apply in this case, Mr. Burrow states that he first became aware “of the actual numerical results of the March 2[1], 1998 vote during the pendency of discovery in this matter [i.e., July 12, 2006].” While the “discovery rule” doctrine may apply “to alleviate the intolerable result of barring a cause of action by holding that it ‘accrued’ before the discovery of the injury or wrong,” see, e.g., Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tenn.1982), even giving Mr. Burrow every reasonable inference in his favor, the record simply does not support his