36 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Human Resources v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2020See Mitchell, 232 Ga. App. at 217 (1) (defendant father could not assert laches in defense of action for paternity, reimbursement of past assistance for child, and future child support). 2. 2020See Mitchell, 232 Ga. App. at 217 (1) (defendant father could not assert laches in defense 7 of action for paternity, reimbursement of past assistance for child, and future child support). (b) Authority to award back child support. | 2 | 2 |
Hall v. Trubeygreen2 sentences2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba 2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba | 2 | 2 |
Heard v. Hartgreen2 sentences2014See Heard, 241 Ga. App. at 443 . 4. 2014See Heard, 241 Ga. App. at 443 . 4. | 2 | 2 |
Wallace v. Mizegreen2 sentences1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. 1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. | 2 | 2 |
McGhee v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2009See McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731, 732 ( 492 SE2d 893 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds, Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 749, n. 20 ( 524 SE2d 464 ) (1999). 2009See McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731, 732 ( 492 SE2d 893 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds, Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 749, n. 20 ( 524 SE2d 464 ) (1999). | 1 | 2 |
Whittle v. Nottinghamgreen2 sentences1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. 1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. Davisgreen2 sentences2025See Davis v. Davis, 310 Ga. App. 512, 516 ( 713 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which considers, among other things, the length of the delay, the sufficiency of the excuse, and whether the defendant has shown prejudice). 2025See Davis v. Davis, 310 Ga. App. 512, 516 ( 713 SE2d 694 ) (2011) (question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which considers, among other things, the length of the delay, the sufficiency of the excuse, and whether the defendant has shown prejudice). | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Fishergreen2 sentences2023See Parker v. Fisher, 207 Ga. 3, 6 ( 59 SE2d 715 ) (1950) (“Equity will relieve against mutual mistake, but only at the instance of a complainant who moves with reasonable diligence. 2023See Parker v. Fisher, 207 Ga. 3, 6 ( 59 SE2d 715 ) (1950) (“Equity will relieve against mutual mistake, but only at the instance of a complainant who moves with reasonable diligence. | 1 | 1 |
Rhone v. Boldengreen2 sentences2023The doctrine of laches is codified in two statutes: (i) OCGA § 9-3-3, which provides, in relevant part, that “courts of equity may interpose an equitable bar whenever, from the lapse of time and laches of the complainant, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights”; and (ii) OCGA § 23-1-25, which provides: “Equity gives no relief to one whose long delay renders the ascertainment of the truth difficult, even when no legal limitation bars the right.” “Under the doctrine of laches, a party is barred from receiving equitable relief when he has unreasonably delayed in seek 2023The doctrine of laches is codified in two statutes: (i) OCGA § 9-3-3, which provides, in relevant part, that “courts of equity may interpose an equitable bar whenever, from the lapse of time and laches of the complainant, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights”; and (ii) OCGA § 23-1-25, which provides: “Equity gives no relief to one whose long delay renders the ascertainment of the truth difficult, even when no legal limitation bars the right.” “Under the doctrine of laches, a party is barred from receiving equitable relief when he has unreasonably delayed in seek | 1 | 1 |
King v. Bakergreen2 sentences2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba 2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba | 1 | 1 |
Plyman v. Glynn Countygreen2 sentences2012See Plyman v. Glynn County, 276 Ga. 426, 427 ( 578 SE2d 124 ) (2003). 2. 2012See Plyman v. Glynn County, 276 Ga. 426, 427 ( 578 SE2d 124 ) (2003). 2. | 1 | 1 |
McCreary v. Martingreen2 sentences2012On August 12, 2010, Appellants filed their petition for judicial review, which contained a request for a temporary restraining order, and a separate petition for a stay of the Governor’s order; the Governor and Attorney General were served the next day. 4 Although a case challenging the removal of elected officers has some of the same policy considerations which mandate that election contest cases be addressed with dispatch, see McCreary v. Martin, 281 Ga. 668, 669 ( 642 SE2d 80 ) (2007), the Appellants were required by OCGA § 45-10-4 to proceed under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, 2012On August 12, 2010, Appellants filed their petition for judicial review, which contained a request for a temporary restraining order, and a separate petition for a stay of the Governor’s order; the Governor and Attorney General were served the next day. 4 Although a case challenging the removal of elected officers has some of the same policy considerations which mandate that election contest cases be addressed with dispatch, see McCreary v. Martin, 281 Ga. 668, 669 ( 642 SE2d 80 ) (2007), the Appellants were required by OCGA § 45-10-4 to proceed under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, | 1 | 1 |
Bishop v. Pattongreen1 sentence2011Accord Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. at 605 (“The first factor [that guides the trial court in deciding whether to grant an interlocutory injunction] — substantial threat of irreparable injury if an interlocutory injunction is not entered — is the most important one, given that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo temporarily to allow the parties and the court time to try the case in an orderly manner.”). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia State Licensing Board for Residential & General Contractors v. Allengreen2 sentences2011The trial court was entitled to accept that explanation and reject the laches defense. (c) Finally, the appellants contend that an interlocutory injunction was not available because “[t]he only appropriate purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case.” Ga. State Licensing Bd. for Residential & General Contractors v. Allen, 286 Ga. 811, 818 ( 692 SE2d 343 ) (2010). 2011The trial court was entitled to accept that explanation and reject the laches defense. (c) Finally, the appellants contend that an interlocutory injunction was not available because “[t]he only appropriate purpose for granting an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case.” Ga. State Licensing Bd. for Residential & General Contractors v. Allen, 286 Ga. 811, 818 ( 692 SE2d 343 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Latham v. Fowlergreen2 sentences2009Hayes, supra, 251 Ga. at 581-582 ; Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691-693 ( 16 SE2d 591 ) (1941); VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50 ( 635 SE2d 758 ) (2006). 2009Hayes, supra, 251 Ga. at 581-582 ; Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691-693 ( 16 SE2d 591 ) (1941); VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50 ( 635 SE2d 758 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass'n, Inc.green2 sentences2009See McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731, 732 ( 492 SE2d 893 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds, Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 749, n. 20 ( 524 SE2d 464 ) (1999). 2009See McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731, 732 ( 492 SE2d 893 ) (1997), overruled on other grounds, Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745, 749, n. 20 ( 524 SE2d 464 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoegreen2 sentences1998Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoe, 205 Ga. 619, 621 (1) ( 54 SE2d 629 ) (1949). 1998Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoe, 205 Ga. 619, 621 (1) ( 54 SE2d 629 ) (1949). | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Aycockgreen2 sentences1998Even though laches operates independently of any statute of limitation, “ ‘courts of equity usually act in obedience and in analogy to the statutes of [limitation], in cases where it would not be unjust and inequitable to do so.’ ” Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 666 (1) ( 34 SE2d 895 ) (1945). 1998Even though laches operates independently of any statute of limitation, “ ‘courts of equity usually act in obedience and in analogy to the statutes of [limitation], in cases where it would not be unjust and inequitable to do so.’ ” Cooper v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 666 (1) ( 34 SE2d 895 ) (1945). | 1 | 1 |
Virgil v. Kapplingreen2 sentences1992(E)ven if the doctrine of laches could be invoked in a suit at law, it could not be invoked during the period during which a statute of limitation would be applicable.’ ” Virgil v. Kapplin, 187 Ga. App. 206, 208 (4) ( 369 SE2d 808 ). 1992(E)ven if the doctrine of laches could be invoked in a suit at law, it could not be invoked during the period during which a statute of limitation would be applicable.’ ” Virgil v. Kapplin, 187 Ga. App. 206, 208 (4) ( 369 SE2d 808 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Helmsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Torok v. Mizegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Griggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bird v. Trapnellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacoby v. Jacobygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spearman v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allstate Insurance v. Austingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Irvin v. Callawaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sellers v. Coxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Young v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Varellas v. Varellasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Epps v. Eppsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bradygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daniels v. Tearneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonand v. Sims
green
2 sentences1941As to the application of the equitable doctrine to reduce such a statutory period, if the facts and circumstances show laches, it was held in McDonald v. Sims, 3 Ga. 383 , that “courts of equity usually act in obedience and in analogy to the statutes of limitations, in eases where it would not be unjust and inequitable to do so.” (Italics ours.) On a petition to cancel deeds as a cloud on title to land, where by analogy a seven-year period of limitation was applied, this court held: “The true owner of land out of possession must seasonably apply to a court of equity for the cancellation of a d 1941As to the application of the equitable doctrine to reduce such a statutory period, if the facts and circumstances show laches, it was held in McDonald v. Sims , 3 Ga. 383 , that "courts of equity usually act in obedience and in analogy to the statutes of limitations, in cases where it would not be unjust and inequitable to do so." (Italics ours.) On a petition to cancel deeds as a cloud on title to land, where by analogy a seven-year period of limitation was applied, this court held: "The true owner of land out of possession must seasonably apply to a court of equity for the cancellation of a | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Keaton v. Greenwood
green
2 sentences1941On the other hand, in cases of implied or constructive trusts, founded on fraud, “where the party claims title to the property in his own right, and is sought to be converted into a trustee by operation of law, the statute begins to run in his favor from the time of his possession, . . for the reason that his possession never was the possession of the alleged cestui, que trust.” Keaton v. Greenwood, 8 Ga. 97, 103 . 1941On the other hand, in cases of implied or constructive trusts, founded on fraud, "where the party claims title to the property in his own right, and is sought to be converted into a trustee by operation of law, the statute beings to run in his favor from the time of his possession, . . for the reason that his possession never was the possession of the alleged cestui que trust." Keaton v. Greenwood , 8 Ga. 97 , 103 . | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Stonecypher v. Coleman
green
2 sentences1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. 1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Eller v. McMillan
green
2 sentences1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. 1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Harris v. Neuman
green
2 sentences1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. 1941See, in this connection, Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403 (2), 411 ( 131 S. E. 75 ); Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 161 ( 138 S. E. 62 ); Eller v. McMillan, 174 Ga. 729 (2, 3), 733 ( 163 S. E. 910 ); Harris v. Neuman, 179 Ga. 879 (2), 883 ( 177 S. E. 698 ). (a) However, the defendant insists that even though a period of limitations may have been fixed by statute, this time should be reduced by the equitable doctrine of laches (Code, §§ 3-712, 3-713, 37-119), and that the present suit is so debarred. | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Collier v. State
green
2 sentences2022Moreover, given the concern the State raised in Collier about 26 “long-delayed out-of-time appeal motions brought in the trial court,” id. at 370 , we acknowledged that motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts were “not directly barred by the application of any statute of limitation” and considered whether the common-law doctrine of laches (also known as “prejudicial delay”) could apply to the proceedings to bar a convicted defendant from obtaining relief, id. at 375 . 2022Moreover, given the concern the State raised in Collier about 26 “long-delayed out-of-time appeal motions brought in the trial court,” id. at 370 , we acknowledged that motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts were “not directly barred by the application of any statute of limitation” and considered whether the common-law doctrine of laches (also known as “prejudicial delay”) could apply to the proceedings to bar a convicted defendant from obtaining relief, id. at 375 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Schoicket v. State
green
1 sentence2022The majority opinion concluded that the State could “raise the defense of ‘prejudicial delay’ to out-of-time appeal motions filed in the trial court,” id. at 370 , and further noted that the State could argue “and the trial court [could] consider the time periods, factors, and other criteria set out in the most analogous limitation and laches provisions—those found in the Habeas Corpus Act—in determining whether the State’s defense has merit and the defendant’s motion should be dismissed,” id. at 375 .9 Four Justices 9 It is notable that the absence of a time limitation for the trial court out | 1 | 2022–2022 |
WYNDHAM LAKES HOMEOWNERS ASS'N v. Gray
green
2 sentences2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba 2018The same failure of proof precludes a finding of waiver, which "is essentially a matter of intent based upon full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation." Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Gray , 303 Ga. App. 45 , 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010) (punctuation omitted). 19 See Hall , 269 Ga. at 197-200 (1), 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998) (reversing trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief ba | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Vatacs Group, Inc. v. Homeside Lending, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Hayes, supra, 251 Ga. at 581-582 ; Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691-693 ( 16 SE2d 591 ) (1941); VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50 ( 635 SE2d 758 ) (2006). 2009Hayes, supra, 251 Ga. at 581-582 ; Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691-693 ( 16 SE2d 591 ) (1941); VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50 ( 635 SE2d 758 ) (2006). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hayes v. Howell
green
1 sentence2009Hayes, supra, 251 Ga. at 581-582 ; Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691-693 ( 16 SE2d 591 ) (1941); VATACS Group v. HomeSide Lending, 281 Ga. 50 ( 635 SE2d 758 ) (2006). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Addis v. Smith
green
1 sentence1994Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. *802 894, 895 (1) ( 178 SE2d 191 ) (1970). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Brown v. State neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Holmes v. Kenyon green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Alley v. Alley green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Burkhart v. City of Fitzgerald neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Williams v. Porter green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Ellis green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Grant v. Hart green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| In re the Disbarment of Elliott green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.