Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
32 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BORLAND BY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERV. v. Chandlergreen2 sentences2017The laches doctrine ‚is founded upon considerations of time and injury.‛ Id. ¶ 17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚To successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.‛ Borland, 733 P.2d at 147 . ¶9 In regard to unreasonable delay, Mother claims that her action was reasonable because it was timely under the applicable statute of limitations. 2017The laches doctrine ‚is founded upon considerations of time and injury.‛ Id. ¶ 17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚To successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.‛ Borland, 733 P.2d at 147 . ¶9 In regard to unreasonable delay, Mother claims that her action was reasonable because it was timely under the applicable statute of limitations. | 4 | 5 |
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberggreen2 sentences2013In Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, we concluded that because the Association’s petition was filed three years after the district court’s reformation of the UEP Trust, all but one of the Association’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. 2010 UT 51, ¶ 1 , 238 P.3d 1054 . 2013In Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, we concluded that because the Association’s petition was filed three years after the district court’s reformation of the UEP Trust, all but one of the Association’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. 2010 UT 51, ¶ 1 , 238 P.3d 1054 . | 2 | 8 |
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hornegreen2 sentences2020At its essence, laches “is a negative equitable remedy which deprives one of some right or remedy to which he would otherwise be entitled, because his delay in seeking it has operated to the prejudice of another.” Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 37 , 289 P.3d 502 (cleaned up). ¶69 The language of the two-part laches test, as articulated by our supreme court, is broad. 2020At its essence, laches “is a negative equitable remedy which deprives one of some right or remedy to which he would otherwise be entitled, because his delay in seeking it has operated to the prejudice of another.” Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 37 , 289 P.3d 502 (cleaned up). ¶69 The language of the two-part laches test, as articulated by our supreme court, is broad. | 2 | 4 |
Anderson v. Domsgreen2 sentences2012The district court's ruling that the petition was barred by the common law doctrine of laches "presents mixed questions of law and fact." Johnson v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 22, ¶ 9 , 270 P.3d 556 ; see also Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ¶ 8 , 984 P.2d 392 (reversing application of laches where the factual findings did not show that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by the defendant's delay in pursuing his case). 2012The district court's ruling that the petition was barred by the common law doctrine of laches "presents mixed questions of law and fact." Johnson v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 22, ¶ 9 , 270 P.3d 556 ; see also Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ¶ 8 , 984 P.2d 392 (reversing application of laches where the factual findings did not show that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by the defendant's delay in pursuing his case). | 2 | 2 |
Veysey v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2019Thus, "to successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Veysey v. Nelson , 2017 UT App 77 , ¶ 8, 397 P.3d 846 (quotation simplified). 2019Thus, "to successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Veysey v. Nelson , 2017 UT App 77 , ¶ 8, 397 P.3d 846 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 4 |
Insight Assets, Inc. v. Fariasgreen2 sentences2020On that basis, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. ¶68 The doctrine of laches “has two elements: (1) a party’s lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence.” Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 19 , 321 P.3d 1021 (cleaned up). 2020On that basis, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. ¶68 The doctrine of laches “has two elements: (1) a party’s lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence.” Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 19 , 321 P.3d 1021 (cleaned up). | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2014Johnson, 2012 UT App 22, ¶ 28 , 270 P.3d 556 ; see also id. 124 & n. 6 (stating that Ms. Zoric does not challenge the district court's application of the doctrine of laches to bar her right to payments received by Mr. Johnson before she filed for the clarifying order). 36 . 2014Johnson, 2012 UT App 22, ¶ 28 , 270 P.3d 556 ; see also id. 124 & n. 6 (stating that Ms. Zoric does not challenge the district court's application of the doctrine of laches to bar her right to payments received by Mr. Johnson before she filed for the clarifying order). 36 . | 1 | 3 |
Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associatesgreen2 sentences2012Id. at 1260 . 2012Papamikolas cited an American Law Reports annotation 21 as the sole authority for these "factors" and disposed of the defendant's laches defense without further mention of "harm to the plaintiff," Id. at 1261 . 131 The Papanikolas notion of "harm to the plaintiff" is best understood not as a component of laches, but as part of a broader, equity-based inquiry that is particular to certain real property disputes. | 1 | 2 |
McFarland v. McFarlandgreen2 sentences2024Second, the party claiming laches must demonstrate that it “was prejudiced by that delay.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also Laches, Black’s 20221044-CA 6 2024 UT App 31 McFarland v. McFarland Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “laches” as “[t]he equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought”). ¶15 Nicole concedes that the first element of the laches test— unreasonable delay—is met here, given her eight-year delay in objecting to Bruce’s possess 2024We therefore affirm the district court’s determination that the equitable doctrine of laches barred Nicole’s claim to the Home, 20221044-CA 13 2024 UT App 31 McFarland v. McFarland and on that basis we affirm the court’s grant of Bruce’s Petition and its accompanying order awarding the Home to Bruce. | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Hallgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , Allen v. Hall , 2005 UT App 23 , ¶¶ 10-11, 107 P.3d 85 ("[Defendant] is deemed to have had notice of [plaintiff's] interest from the time of recording .... [Defendant's] notice of [plaintiff's] interest destroys any equitable ground upon which the court could quiet title in [defendant]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 2006 UT 70 , 148 P.3d 939 . 2019See, e.g. , Allen v. Hall , 2005 UT App 23 , ¶¶ 10-11, 107 P.3d 85 ("[Defendant] is deemed to have had notice of [plaintiff's] interest from the time of recording .... [Defendant's] notice of [plaintiff's] interest destroys any equitable ground upon which the court could quiet title in [defendant]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 2006 UT 70 , 148 P.3d 939 . | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Hallgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , Allen v. Hall , 2005 UT App 23 , ¶¶ 10-11, 107 P.3d 85 ("[Defendant] is deemed to have had notice of [plaintiff's] interest from the time of recording .... [Defendant's] notice of [plaintiff's] interest destroys any equitable ground upon which the court could quiet title in [defendant]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 2006 UT 70 , 148 P.3d 939 . 2019See, e.g. , Allen v. Hall , 2005 UT App 23 , ¶¶ 10-11, 107 P.3d 85 ("[Defendant] is deemed to have had notice of [plaintiff's] interest from the time of recording .... [Defendant's] notice of [plaintiff's] interest destroys any equitable ground upon which the court could quiet title in [defendant]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 2006 UT 70 , 148 P.3d 939 . | 1 | 1 |
| Valcarce v. Fitzgeraldgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2014See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."). 37 . | 1 | 1 |
| Petterson v. Ogden Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eggert v. Wasatch Energy Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Ward Mayergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Child v. Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. MacKgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKay v. McKaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beardall v. Beardallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stuber v. Stubergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons
green
2 sentences2012The district court found that a petition for extraordinary relief filed four years afer the October 3, 2006 decision of the Board at the original parole grant hearing constituted “an unreasonable delay in which to file the petition” and therefore the petition should be dismissed as untimely under the doctrine of laches. ¶3 In Renn, the Utah Supreme Court stated that while petitions filed under rule 65B(d), which was formerly rule 65B(e), “should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for fil 2012The district court found that a petition for extraordinary relief filed four years after the October 8, 2006 decision of the Board at the original parole grant hearing constituted "an unreasonable delay in which to file the petition" and therefore the petition should be dismissed as untimely under the doctrine of laches. 13 In Renn, the Utah Supreme Court stated that while petitions filed under rule 65B(d), which was formerly rule 65B(e), "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for fi | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Peterson v. Pierce
green
2 sentences2024“The application of laches to a particular set of facts and circumstances presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Peterson v. Pierce, 2019 UT App 48, ¶ 9 , 440 P.3d 833 (quotation simplified). 2024“The application of laches to a particular set of facts and circumstances presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Peterson v. Pierce, 2019 UT App 48, ¶ 9 , 440 P.3d 833 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Peeples v. Peeples
green
2 sentences2024Whether the court chose and applied the correct legal standard is a question of law “that we review for correctness.” Peeples v. Peeples, 2019 UT App 207, ¶ 11 , 456 P.3d 1159 . ¶11 As discussed below, our analysis on this point focuses on the court’s application of the doctrine of laches and, in particular, on its determination that Bruce was prejudiced by Nicole’s delay in asserting a right to possession of the Home. 2024Whether the court chose and applied the correct legal standard is a question of law “that we review for correctness.” Peeples v. Peeples, 2019 UT App 207, ¶ 11 , 456 P.3d 1159 . ¶11 As discussed below, our analysis on this point focuses on the court’s application of the doctrine of laches and, in particular, on its determination that Bruce was prejudiced by Nicole’s delay in asserting a right to possession of the Home. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Valdez v. Labor Commission
green
1 sentence2024Second, the party claiming laches must demonstrate that it “was prejudiced by that delay.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also Laches, Black’s 20221044-CA 6 2024 UT App 31 McFarland v. McFarland Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “laches” as “[t]he equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought”). ¶15 Nicole concedes that the first element of the laches test— unreasonable delay—is met here, given her eight-year delay in objecting to Bruce’s possess | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lewis v. U.S. Bank Trust
green
1 sentence2024In the Current Lawsuit, Lewis again raised a quiet title claim, arguing this time—under the doctrine of laches—that U.S. Bank and its predecessors in interest “unreasonably delayed enforcing their rights against the Property.” This claim was based on his factual allegations that “[f]rom July 2010, [U.S. Bank] or its claimed predecessors in interest could have taken action against the Property” but failed to do so until 2016. ¶20 Both claims concern the Property, were motivated by Lewis’s desire to prevent foreclosure of the Property, and concern 20220434-CA 8 2024 UT App 3 Lewis v. U.S. Bank T | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Estate of Price v. Hodkin
green
2 sentences2023Regardless of whether a statute of limitations applies, “the doctrine of laches may [still] apply in equity.” Estate of Price v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶ 15 , 447 P.3d 1285 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019). 20210794-CA 9 2023 UT App 35 2023Regardless of whether a statute of limitations applies, “the doctrine of laches may [still] apply in equity.” Estate of Price v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶ 15 , 447 P.3d 1285 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019). 20210794-CA 9 2023 UT App 35 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards
green
1 sentence2023Regardless of whether a statute of limitations applies, “the doctrine of laches may [still] apply in equity.” Estate of Price v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶ 15 , 447 P.3d 1285 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019). 20210794-CA 9 2023 UT App 35 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Harding Trust
green
1 sentence2023In her response, Robert’s ex-wife set forth nine separate affirmative defenses, including the allegation that Robert’s “claims are barred by the statute of limitations for objecting to and/or opposing the” writ of garnishment, “and by the doctrine of laches.” 20200808-CA 12 2023 UT App 81 In re Harding Trust Pretrial Motions ¶30 Following the filing of the two competing petitions and the responses, the litigation entered the discovery phase. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jensen v. Cannon
green
1 sentence2020However, because we affirm the court’s determination that Jensen did not establish her claims of fraudulent nondisclosure regarding the Option Agreement and the Riverton Corners property by clear and convincing evidence, we have no occasion to reach these other claims of error. 20190433-CA 13 2020 UT App 124 Jensen v. Cannon other than fraud. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Anderson v. Kriser
green
2 sentences2020I. ¶56 In the course of analyzing whether the district court properly dismissed Jensen’s claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, we are called upon to interpret our supreme court’s statements in Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66 , 266 P.3d 819 , and apply those statements to the facts of this case. 2020I. ¶56 In the course of analyzing whether the district court properly dismissed Jensen’s claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, we are called upon to interpret our supreme court’s statements in Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66 , 266 P.3d 819 , and apply those statements to the facts of this case. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Walker v. Walker
green
2 sentences2019Furthermore, because "Utah has abolished any formal distinction between law and equity," "the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been satisfied." 7 Veysey v. Nelson , 2017 UT App 77 , ¶ 7, 397 P.3d 846 (quotation simplified). ¶16 Utah courts have regularly considered the applicability of the doctrine of laches in cases concerning interests in real property. 8 See, e.g. , Insight Assets , 2013 UT 47 , ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 1021 (holding that laches barred a lender from asserting an inter 2019Furthermore, because "Utah has abolished any formal distinction between law and equity," "the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of limitation also applies and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been satisfied." 7 Veysey v. Nelson , 2017 UT App 77 , ¶ 7, 397 P.3d 846 (quotation simplified). ¶16 Utah courts have regularly considered the applicability of the doctrine of laches in cases concerning interests in real property. 8 See, e.g. , Insight Assets , 2013 UT 47 , ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 1021 (holding that laches barred a lender from asserting an inter | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Griffin v. Cutler
green
2 sentences2019ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶9 First, the Pierces contend that Peterson's claims were untimely and the district court erred in determining that her claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. 2 "The application of a statute of limitations is a legal determination, which we review for correctness." Griffin v. Cutler , 2014 UT App 251 , ¶ 14, 339 P.3d 100 . 2019ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶9 First, the Pierces contend that Peterson's claims were untimely and the district court erred in determining that her claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. 2 "The application of a statute of limitations is a legal determination, which we review for correctness." Griffin v. Cutler , 2014 UT App 251 , ¶ 14, 339 P.3d 100 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry
green
1 sentence2018"Laches has two elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the claimant and (2) an injury to the defendant because of the lack of diligence." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry , 802 P.2d 720 , 731 (Utah 1990). ¶46 We agree with the district court's determination that the laches defense does not apply. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Rights to the Use of Water
green
2 sentences2018For one thing, our supreme court has rejected a similar argument in Green River Canal Co. v. Olds , 2004 UT 106 , 110 P.3d 666 , and we are persuaded by the reasoning employed by the court there. 2018For one thing, our supreme court has rejected a similar argument in Green River Canal Co. v. Olds , 2004 UT 106 , 110 P.3d 666 , and we are persuaded by the reasoning employed by the court there. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Veysey v. Veysey
green
2 sentences2018“To successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.” Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 16 , 339 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified). 2018“To successfully assert a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.” Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 16 , 339 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fehr v. Stockton
green
1 sentence2018Accordingly, without opining on the merits of Fehr’s equitable claims or the application of the laches defense, we reverse the court’s dismissal of these claims. 20160996-CA 7 2018 UT App 136 Fehr v. Stockton arrangement described by Fehr “is void under the statute of frauds.” Without analysis, the district court agreed and concluded that the statute of frauds barred Fehr’s complaint. ¶16 Utah’s statute of frauds provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charg | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2017Whether laches applies is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 3 See John son v. Johnson, 2014 UT 21 , ¶ 8 & n.11, 330 P.3d 704 . 2017Whether laches applies is a question of law, which we review for correctness. 3 See John son v. Johnson, 2014 UT 21 , ¶ 8 & n.11, 330 P.3d 704 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015And second is the notion, recognized in authority outside of Utah, and which we hereby adopt as the law of this state, that an option clause must be exercised in a reasonable period of time. 8 This is consistent with the longstanding principle of good faith and fair dealing, which requires parties to act in ways that are "consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party," Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 43 , 104 P.3d 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted), and with the doctrine of laches, which can bar a plaintiff from prevail 2015And second is the notion, recognized in authority outside of Utah, and which we hereby adopt as the law of this state, that an option clause must be exercised in a reasonable period of time. 8 This is consistent with the longstanding principle of good faith and fair dealing, which requires parties to act in ways that are "consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party," Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 43 , 104 P.3d 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted), and with the doctrine of laches, which can bar a plaintiff from prevail | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| FMA Financial Corporation v. BUILD, INC green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wagner v. Baird green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Rugan v. Sabin green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Bogan v. Edinburgh American Land Mortg. Co. neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Patterson v. Hewitt green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Redfield v. Parks green | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.