laches doctrine in Nebraska

2022ZOOK Cite as 312 Neb. 128 insurance proceeds were intended to be paid to someone other than himself, yet he failed to rectify his unjust enrichment; (4) failing to apply the doctrine of laches; (5) establishing a constructive trust; and (6) finding that Marshall’s negligence and proximate cause did not absolve Jerry of liability.

2015Twin City’s Equitable Defenses Twin City assigns that the district court erred in finding that it was liable for the award because the doctrine of judi- cial estoppel precluded Cleaver-Brooks from claiming Twin City was responsible and because Cleaver-Brooks’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. (a) Judicial Estoppel Twin City argues that because Cleaver-Brooks, through the attorney retained by American, represented to the compensa- tion court that American’s coverage of the plant started in 1992, the doctrine of judicial estoppel now prevents Cleaver- Brooks and American from asserting

2015Twin City’s Equitable Defenses Twin City assigns that the district court erred in finding that it was liable for the award because the doctrine of judi- cial estoppel precluded Cleaver-Brooks from claiming Twin City was responsible and because Cleaver-Brooks’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. (a) Judicial Estoppel Twin City argues that because Cleaver-Brooks, through the attorney retained by American, represented to the compensa- tion court that American’s coverage of the plant started in 1992, the doctrine of judicial estoppel now prevents Cleaver- Brooks and American from asserting

2015Twin City’s Equitable Defenses Twin City assigns that the district court erred in finding that it was liable for the award because the doctrine of judi- cial estoppel precluded Cleaver-Brooks from claiming Twin City was responsible and because Cleaver-Brooks’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. (a) Judicial Estoppel Twin City argues that because Cleaver-Brooks, through the attorney retained by American, represented to the compensa- tion court that American’s coverage of the plant started in 1992, the doctrine of judicial estoppel now prevents Cleaver- Brooks and American from asserting

2015Twin City’s Equitable Defenses Twin City assigns that the district court erred in finding that it was liable for the award because the doctrine of judi- cial estoppel precluded Cleaver-Brooks from claiming Twin City was responsible and because Cleaver-Brooks’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. (a) Judicial Estoppel Twin City argues that because Cleaver-Brooks, through the attorney retained by American, represented to the compensa- tion court that American’s coverage of the plant started in 1992, the doctrine of judicial estoppel now prevents Cleaver- Brooks and American from asserting

1994See, Kracl v. Loseke, 236 Neb. 290 , 461 N.W.2d 67 (1990); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 236 Neb. 225 , 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990).

1994See, Kracl v. Loseke, 236 Neb. 290 , 461 N.W.2d 67 (1990); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 236 Neb. 225 , 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990).

1990See, Griffin v. Avery, supra; Board v. Board, supra; Perteet v. Sumner, supra; Mask v. Mask, supra. Lastly, we must consider the argument that the application for credit must be refused under the doctrine of laches.

1987Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 219 Neb. 478 , 364 N.W.2d 14 (1985).

1987Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 219 Neb. 478 , 364 N.W.2d 14 (1985).

1979With the exception of copies of the two decrees of divorce, a matrimonial certificate, and a stipulation in which the dates of the divorce, remarriage, and subsequent divorce appear, no evidence was introduced. *654 “Laches does not, like limitation, grow out of the mere passage of time; but it is founded upon the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced - an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the parties.” Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 .

1979With the exception of copies of the two decrees of divorce, a matrimonial certificate, and a stipulation in which the dates of the divorce, remarriage, and subsequent divorce appear, no evidence was introduced. *654 “Laches does not, like limitation, grow out of the mere passage of time; but it is founded upon the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced - an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the parties.” Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 .

1976Swanson Petroleum Corp. v. Cumberland, 184 Neb. 323 , 167 N. W. 2d 391 (1969), repeats some of that language and the facts establish some elements of waiver or laches, but the holding is consistent with theories discussed in the following paragraphs.

1976Swanson Petroleum Corp. v. Cumberland, 184 Neb. 323 , 167 N. W. 2d 391 (1969), repeats some of that language and the facts establish some elements of waiver or laches, but the holding is consistent with theories discussed in the following paragraphs.

1933In State v. Several Parcels of Land, 80 Neb. 11 , (on rehearing vacating the opinion of that case in 78 Neb. 703 ) Judge Letton, while not basing his conclusion entirely upon the doctrine of laches, in his opinion says: “Further, the defendant is plainly guilty of laches.

1933In State v. Several Parcels of Land, 80 Neb. 11 , (on rehearing vacating the opinion of that case in 78 Neb. 703 ) Judge Letton, while not basing his conclusion entirely upon the doctrine of laches, in his opinion says: “Further, the defendant is plainly guilty of laches.

1910Hawley v. Von Lanken, 75 Neb. 597 , is cited.