laches doctrine in Oregon

2001“The harm or prejudice to a defendant necessary to the laches defense can be * * * a disadvantageous change in position,” Rise v. Steckel, 59 Or App 675, 685 , 652 P2d 364 , rev den 294 Or 212 , 656 P2d 943 (1982), “making it inequitable to afford the relief sought against a party asserting laches,” Hanns, 246 Or at 305 .

1986Hanns, 246 Or at 309 .

2025Instead, plaintiffs argue, it should be viewed as a declaratory judgment action for which there is no other appropriate or otherwise available relief, such that, under Doyle v. City of Medford, 271 Or App 458, 464 , 351 P3d 768 , rev den, 358 Or 248 (2015), the general residual 10-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.140 applies. 574 Kramer v. Conatser was entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on ORS 12.050.

2025Instead, plaintiffs argue, it should be viewed as a declaratory judgment action for which there is no other appropriate or otherwise available relief, such that, under Doyle v. City of Medford, 271 Or App 458, 464 , 351 P3d 768 , rev den, 358 Or 248 (2015), the general residual 10-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.140 applies. 574 Kramer v. Conatser was entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on ORS 12.050.

1986Others include Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6 , 725 P2d 886 (1986) (challenge to ballot title under ORS 249.910(1) must be brought within 60 days after preliminary petitions for a ballot title have been approved by Secretary of State; time limit found by looking to other expressions of legislative policy on similiar issues), and State ex rel Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or 711, 717 , 688 P2d 1303 (1984) (mandamus action brought to challenge ballot title forestalled by application of the doctrine of laches).

1986Others include Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6 , 725 P2d 886 (1986) (challenge to ballot title under ORS 249.910(1) must be brought within 60 days after preliminary petitions for a ballot title have been approved by Secretary of State; time limit found by looking to other expressions of legislative policy on similiar issues), and State ex rel Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or 711, 717 , 688 P2d 1303 (1984) (mandamus action brought to challenge ballot title forestalled by application of the doctrine of laches).

2018In order to prevail on a laches defense, the Trust must prove: "(1) [the claimant] delayed asserting [his] claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all relevant facts (and laches does not start to run until such *44 knowledge is shown to exist), (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to [the other party] that it would be inequitable for the court to grant relief." Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans , 301 Or. 407 , 419, 723 P.2d 996 (1986).

2018In order to prevail on a laches defense, the Trust must prove: "(1) [the claimant] delayed asserting [his] claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all relevant facts (and laches does not start to run until such *44 knowledge is shown to exist), (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to [the other party] that it would be inequitable for the court to grant relief." Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans , 301 Or. 407 , 419, 723 P.2d 996 (1986).

2009Menard and Menard, 180 Or App 181, 185 , 42 P3d 359 (2002).

2009Menard and Menard, 180 Or App 181, 185 , 42 P3d 359 (2002).

1986Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or. 711, 717 , 688 P.2d 1303 (1984) (mandamus action brought to challenge ballot title forestalled by application of the doctrine of laches).

1986Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or. 711, 717 , 688 P.2d 1303 (1984) (mandamus action brought to challenge ballot title forestalled by application of the doctrine of laches).

2016ORS 36.620(2) provides that a “court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate,” but ORS 36.620(3) provides that “[a]n arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled.” In Livingston v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, 234 Or App 137, 145 , 227 P3d 796 (2010), we held that the issue of waiver or estoppel is a “condition precedent to arbitrability,” because it is “procedural” in nature, rather than a “substantive defense to arbitrability that grows out of the controversy itself.” The same

2016ORS 36.620(2) provides that a “court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate,” but ORS 36.620(3) provides that “[a]n arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled.” In Livingston v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, 234 Or App 137, 145 , 227 P3d 796 (2010), we held that the issue of waiver or estoppel is a “condition precedent to arbitrability,” because it is “procedural” in nature, rather than a “substantive defense to arbitrability that grows out of the controversy itself.” The same

2016Yeager also argues that by declining to resolve whether the doctrine of laches barred Yeager’s two surviving challenges to Fort Knox's use of his name and likeness, the district court violated our mandate, This argument fails because in our order dismissing all but two of Yeager’s claims, we remanded the case for "further proceedings consistent with the analysis herein.” Yeager, 602 Fed.Appx. at 432 .

2013G., the Supreme Court explained that the trial court had dismissed J’s petition to set aside the adoption based on Multnomah County Supplemental Local Rule 8.012(2), which requires in part that “[m]otions not settled or reset within 5 months of filing” be “automatically dismissed” and on the doctrine of laches as applied to J’s delay of approximately 18 months in pursuing her motion after she had filed it. 348 Or at 530 .

2011The laches inquiry depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and “will not be ‘applied mechanically to every situation’ merely because a party has acted with neglect.” Hilterbrand v. Carter, 175 Or App 335, 343 , 27 P3d 1086 (2001) (citation omitted).

2011The laches inquiry depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and “will not be ‘applied mechanically to every situation’ merely because a party has acted with neglect.” Hilterbrand v. Carter, 175 Or App 335, 343 , 27 P3d 1086 (2001) (citation omitted).

2011Myers v. Weems, 128 Or App 444, 446 , 876 P2d 861 , rev den, 320 Or 271 (1994).

2011Myers v. Weems, 128 Or App 444, 446 , 876 P2d 861 , rev den, 320 Or 271 (1994).

2003Governor Kitzhaber and Justice Balmer (hereinafter the State) answered and asserted various affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, a laches defense, an assertion that the “separate-vote” requirement interpretation found in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250 , 959 P2d 49 (1998) (and on which plaintiffs relied), was not *4 retroactive, an assertion that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the actions, an assertion that the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the subject of plaintiffs’ actions, and an assertion that it would violate the doctrine of separat

2003Governor Kitzhaber and Justice Balmer (hereinafter the State) answered and asserted various affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, a laches defense, an assertion that the “separate-vote” requirement interpretation found in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250 , 959 P2d 49 (1998) (and on which plaintiffs relied), was not *4 retroactive, an assertion that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the actions, an assertion that the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the subject of plaintiffs’ actions, and an assertion that it would violate the doctrine of separat

1993Statutes of limitations for analogous actions at law are relevant to “define a presumptively reasonable period within which one is not guilty of laches.” Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 309 Or 37, 42 , 785 P2d 340 (1990), cert den 498 US 829 (1991).

1993Statutes of limitations for analogous actions at law are relevant to “define a presumptively reasonable period within which one is not guilty of laches.” Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 309 Or 37, 42 , 785 P2d 340 (1990), cert den 498 US 829 (1991).

1993Statutes of limitations for analogous actions at law are relevant to “define a presumptively reasonable period within which one is not guilty of laches.” Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 309 Or 37, 42 , 785 P2d 340 (1990), cert den 498 US 829 (1991).

1978In support of its first point, defendant relies on Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or. 619 , 552 P.2d 533 (1976), and Brooks v. Smith, 27 Or.

1978In support of its first point, defendant relies on Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or. 619 , 552 P.2d 533 (1976), and Brooks v. Smith, 27 Or.

1978In support of its first point, defendant relies on Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or. 619 , 552 P.2d 533 (1976), and Brooks v. Smith, 27 Or.

1978In support of its first point, defendant relies on Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or 619 , 552 P2d 533 (1976), and Brooks v. Smith, 27 Or App 441 , 556 P2d 696 (1976).

1975Council v. Klamath Co., 23 Or App 653 , 544 P2d 190 (1975), that the plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of laches.

1975Council v. Klamath Co., 23 Or App 653 , 544 P2d 190 (1975), that the plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of laches.

1971NOTES [1] Defendants cite Schroeder et ux v. Toedtmeier et al., 184 Or. 561, 582 , 200 P.2d 606, 615 (1948), as holding that "all that is required of a party who is put on inquiry is good faith and reasonable care in following up the inquiry." In that case, however, as in this case, defendants failed to sustain the burden of proving that they had discharged that duty. [2] The only authorities cited by defendants to the contrary consist of statutes and cases recognizing the duty of the owner of property to pay such taxes and to keep the tax collector informed of his name and address (ORS 312.21

1971NOTES [1] Defendants cite Schroeder et ux v. Toedtmeier et al., 184 Or. 561, 582 , 200 P.2d 606, 615 (1948), as holding that "all that is required of a party who is put on inquiry is good faith and reasonable care in following up the inquiry." In that case, however, as in this case, defendants failed to sustain the burden of proving that they had discharged that duty. [2] The only authorities cited by defendants to the contrary consist of statutes and cases recognizing the duty of the owner of property to pay such taxes and to keep the tax collector informed of his name and address (ORS 312.21

1970(See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. State Tax Com., 216 Or 605, 613 , 340 P2d 960 (1959), where the court construed the word “taxpayer,” found in ORS 321.225 and held that *227 there the word was intended to refer to all persons coining within the provisions of the act whether their taxes were paid or not.) II Is the plaintiffs’ complaint in its second cause of action, relating to the legality of the Bus and Bus Equipment Fund, barred by the doctrine of laches ?

1970(See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. State Tax Com., 216 Or 605, 613 , 340 P2d 960 (1959), where the court construed the word “taxpayer,” found in ORS 321.225 and held that *227 there the word was intended to refer to all persons coining within the provisions of the act whether their taxes were paid or not.) II Is the plaintiffs’ complaint in its second cause of action, relating to the legality of the Bus and Bus Equipment Fund, barred by the doctrine of laches ?

1967Brusco v. Brusco, 1965, 241 Or 550 , 407 P2d 645 ; 27 Am Jur2d, Equity, § 169.

1967Brusco v. Brusco, 1965, 241 Or 550 , 407 P2d 645 ; 27 Am Jur2d, Equity, § 169.

1967Although no mechanical or inflexible test has been devised for the application of the doctrine of laches, Mclver v. Norman, 1949, 187 Or 516, at 544 , 205 P2d 137 , 213 P2d 144 , 13 ALK2d 749, all the cases hold that long delay which causes serious harm or detriment to the other party will bar the action.

1967Although no mechanical or inflexible test has been devised for the application of the doctrine of laches, Mclver v. Norman, 1949, 187 Or 516, at 544 , 205 P2d 137 , 213 P2d 144 , 13 ALK2d 749, all the cases hold that long delay which causes serious harm or detriment to the other party will bar the action.

1964Soriano v. United States, supra, 352 U.S. 270 , 77 S.Ct. 269 ." In the recent case of Schwartz v. Heyden Chem.

1964Soriano v. United States, supra, 352 U.S. 270 , 77 S.Ct. 269 ." In the recent case of Schwartz v. Heyden Chem.

1959Tanous v. Johnston, 113 Or 343 , 232 P 793 ; 3 CJ p 710.

1959Tanous v. Johnston, 113 Or 343 , 232 P 793 ; 3 CJ p 710.

1944Arant v. Lane, supra; Duncan Townsite Company v. Lane, supra; Duke v. Turner, 204 U. S. 623 , 51 L.