laches doctrine in Indiana

2010Laches Finally, the State argues that the Employees' claims are barred under the equitable doctrine of laches, which is "'negleet for an unreasonable length of time, under cireumstances permitting dili-genee, to do what in law should have been done'" In re Paternity of P.W.J., 846 N.E.2d 752, 759 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Knaus v. York, 586 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind.Ct.App.1992)).

2000Knaus v. York, 586 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind.Ct.App.l992)(doctrine of laches “simply does not apply to child support cases”); In re Marriage of Truax, 522 N.E.2d 402, 407 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (despite eight years having elapsed before parent brought case for arrearages, this court would not attribute parent’s delay to children).

1992“In order for the doctrine of laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1) that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief, and 2) that the State has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id.

1992"In order for the doctrine of laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1) that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief, and 2) that the State has been prejudiced by the delay." Id.

2001See id. "[Blefore the petitioner's claim for relief may be denied, based on the doctrine of laches, the State must affirmatively plead the defense in its responsive pleading." Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 711 (Ind.1984); see also Ind. Trial Rule 8(C).

1988Fisher also contends that the court erred in granting the State's motion to re-open the evidence on the laches issue when the deputy prosecutor alleged that at the time of the first hearing he was unaware of the ruling in Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705 , and consequently, he did not present evidence to support the laches defense.

2015“An independent action is subject to the doctrine of laches, and its remedy is extremely limited.” Id. [10] The third method is also pursuant to the savings clause of Trial Rule 60(B), which goes on to provide, “This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action . . . for fraud upon the court.” “This method invokes the inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment if procured by fraud on the court.” Id. at 357 . [11] Because M.M.’s motion for relief from judgment was filed almost two years after the adoption decree was issued, the motion was clearly untimely

2015“An independent action is subject to the doctrine of laches, and its remedy is extremely limited.” Id. [10] The third method is also pursuant to the savings clause of Trial Rule 60(B), which goes on to provide, “This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action . . . for fraud upon the court.” “This method invokes the inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment if procured by fraud on the court.” Id. at 357 . [11] Because M.M.’s motion for relief from judgment was filed almost two years after the adoption decree was issued, the motion was clearly untimely

2020Laches [11] The equitable doctrine of laches “operates to bar consideration of the merits of a claim or right of one who has neglected for an unreasonable time, under circumstances permitting due diligence, to do what in law should have been done.” Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

2017Laches The equitable doctrine of laches “operates to bar consideration of the merits of a claim or right of one who has neglected for an unreasonable time, under circumstances permitting due diligence, to do what in law should have been done.” Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

1999Marriage of Moser, In re, 469 N.E.2d 762, 766 (Ind.Ct.

1999Marriage of Moser, In re, 469 N.E.2d 762, 766 (Ind.Ct.

2025While this argument is an accurate statement of the doctrine of laches generally, see Foster, 235 N.E.3d at 1256; SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 728–32; Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120–23, it ignores our precedent on the doctrine of laches in the PCR context, see Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120 ; Stewart, 548 N.E.2d at 1176–77.

2019See, e.g., SMDfund, Inc., 831 N.E.2d at 731 (holding plaintiffs’ claim that airport authority was improperly constituted brought seventeen years after its formation was barred by doctrine of laches).

2025While this argument is an accurate statement of the doctrine of laches generally, see Foster, 235 N.E.3d at 1256; SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 728–32; Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120–23, it ignores our precedent on the doctrine of laches in the PCR context, see Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120 ; Stewart, 548 N.E.2d at 1176–77.

2025While this argument is an accurate statement of the doctrine of laches generally, see Foster, 235 N.E.3d at 1256; SMDfund, 831 N.E.2d at 728–32; Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120–23, it ignores our precedent on the doctrine of laches in the PCR context, see Armstrong, 747 N.E.2d at 1120 ; Stewart, 548 N.E.2d at 1176–77.

1986See e.g., Gregory v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 464 , Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705 , Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 , Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 , Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488 .

1986Accord: Badelle v. State (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 844, 845 , (eleven year delay in bringing post-conviction relief proceeding warrants inference defendant was put on inquiry, facts included 360 day prison sentence); Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 (burglary conviction and incarceration put defendant on inquiry as to means of relief or appeal, thus inference of unreasonable delay proper); Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 {conviction for exerting unauthorized control over vehicle and one year sentence with other circumstances sufficient to imply unreas

1982Criss v. Bitzegaio, supra at 1224-1225, where the Court concluded “defendants presented no evidence in support of their allegations” that plaintiff’s action to obtain an undivided one-third interest in land by virtue of a resulting trust was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches, or the statute of frauds.

1982Criss, 420 N.E.2d at 1224-25 (where the court concluded “defendants presented no evidence in support of their allegations” the plaintiff’s action to obtain an undivided one-third interest in land by virtue of a resulting trust was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches, or the statute of frauds).

2012“Despite this structured test, ‘[t]here is no fixed or definite rule for the application of the doctrine of laches.’” Id. at 1012-13 (quoting Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 215 Ind. 672, 686 , 22 N.E.2d 832, 839 (1939)).

2012“Despite this structured test, ‘[t]here is no fixed or definite rule for the application of the doctrine of laches.’” Id. at 1012-13 (quoting Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 215 Ind. 672, 686 , 22 N.E.2d 832, 839 (1939)).

2012Doctrine of Laches Thomas alternatively contends that even if the BMV did provide him with timely notice of his status as an HTV, the ten-year suspension of his driving privileges should be barred by the doctrine of laches. “ ‘The question of laches is one to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion.’ ” Ind. Real Estate Comm’n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (quoting Simon v. City of Auburn, Ind., Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 519 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Ind.Ct.App.1988)). “ ‘For a decision to be reversed on appeal, an abuse of discretion must be clearly demonstr

2010Ind. Real Estate Comm'n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

2001See id. "[Blefore the petitioner's claim for relief may be denied, based on the doctrine of laches, the State must affirmatively plead the defense in its responsive pleading." Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 711 (Ind.1984); see also Ind. Trial Rule 8(C).

2000This Court has defined laches as “ ‘ “neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done.” ’ ” Williams v. State, 716 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind.1999) (quoting Perry v. State, 512 N.E.2d 841, 842 (Ind.1987) (quoting in turn Frazier v. State, 263 Ind. 614, 616-17 , 335 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1975))).

1987In its findings on the first post-conviction petition, the court cited Morrison, 466 N.E.2d 783 , and found "[dJefendant's loss of driving privileges and subsequent finding as a habitual traffic offender are sufficient reason to cause a person believing himself wronged to make inquiry." In its findings on one of the companion petitions, the court further found that "[dlJefen-dant was not aware of any procedure to challenge his conviction and never considered the possibility or desirability of such action until early in 1982." The court also found "[the burden of proof is upon the Defendant to

1986Accord: Badelle v. State (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 844, 845 , (eleven year delay in bringing post-conviction relief proceeding warrants inference defendant was put on inquiry, facts included 360 day prison sentence); Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 (burglary conviction and incarceration put defendant on inquiry as to means of relief or appeal, thus inference of unreasonable delay proper); Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 {conviction for exerting unauthorized control over vehicle and one year sentence with other circumstances sufficient to imply unreas

1986Although Lindsey's broad language could be read to foreclose the laches defense to advisement of right to counsel claims, a more narrow reading views the decision as supporting the general rule stated in Frazier, 335 N.E.2d 623 , that mere passage of time, ie., lack of due diligence, will not provide the basis for laches absent a showing of prejudice to the State.

1986Gipson v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 992, 998 ; Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614 , 335 N.E.2d 623, 624 . 2 In both cases here, the State established all three elements of the laches defense by a preponderance of the evidence to the court's satisfaction, and substantial evidence of probative value supports the trial courts' findings in each case, in my opinion.

1986See e.g., Gregory v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 464 , Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705 , Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 , Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 , Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488 .

1985See Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1879 ; Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488 ; Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 788 ; Ray v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 ; Boykins v. State (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 765 .

2025Furthermore, Justice Massa’s concurrence in Humphrey primarily focused on the unreasonable delay prong of the PCR laches inquiry; he did not discuss what constitutes prejudice for laches generally or for PCR laches specifically, other than citing to Armstrong and the proposition that “prejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-prosecution.” Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 690–93.

2017Discussion and Decision “The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681 (Ind. 2017).

1986See e.g., Gregory v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 464 , Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705 , Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 , Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 , Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488 .

1984Gregory v. State, (1984) Ind., 463 N.E.2d 464 ; Morrison v. State, (1984) Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 ; Mottern v. State, (1984) Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488 .

2023Stated differently, laches “‘is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus acting as a bar in a court of equity.’” Thompson v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1002 , 1005–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Douglas v. State, 634 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied. [13] The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff’s claim if a defendant establishes the following three elements of l

2020See Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (State prejudiced by ten-year delay because certain witnesses could not be located), trans. denied; and see Balderas v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1141, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (State prejudiced by twelve-year delay because the physical evidence of the crime had been destroyed or returned).