laches doctrine in Alabama

2016Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc.; supra; Classic elements of undue prejudice, for purposes of determining the applicability of the doctrine of laches, include the unavailability of witnesses, changed- personnel, and the loss of pertinent records.

1989Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., supra. Classic elements of undue prejudice, for purposes of determining the applicability of the doctrine of laches, include the unavailability of witnesses, changed personnel, and the loss of pertinent records.

1957Both of these cases quote the following statement from Banks v. Mobley, 4 Ala.App. 510, 513 , 58 So. 745, 746 , concerning the doctrine of laches as it is applied to mandamus proceedings: “ * * * and where the relator has slept upon his rights for an unreasonable length of time, and the legal right is doubtful because of the application of the doctrine of laches, the facts having become obscured and the performance of the act required necessitating the determination of disputed questions, the court may properly exercise a discretion in refusing the application, taking into consideration the st

1957Both of these cases quote the following statement from Banks v. Mobley, 4 Ala.App. 510, 513 , 58 So. 745, 746 , concerning the doctrine of laches as it is applied to mandamus proceedings: “ * * * and where the relator has slept upon his rights for an unreasonable length of time, and the legal right is doubtful because of the application of the doctrine of laches, the facts having become obscured and the performance of the act required necessitating the determination of disputed questions, the court may properly exercise a discretion in refusing the application, taking into consideration the st

2004Wilkerson v. Wilkerson , 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox , 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r , 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

2004Wilkerson v. Wilkerson , 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox , 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r , 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

2004Wilkerson v. Wilkerson , 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox , 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r , 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

1989Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie’s Adm’r, 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

2004Wilkerson v. Wilkerson , 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox , 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r , 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

2004Wilkerson v. Wilkerson , 230 Ala. 567 , 161 So. 820 (1935); Roach v. Cox , 160 Ala. 425 , 49 So. 578 (1909); McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r , 32 Ala. 75 (1858).

1989As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1988As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayóla v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1976Smith Lumber Co., where the mortgagor waited nine years before filing his bill, this court said: “ * * * The statutory period of 2 years within which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and while, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will * * * never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time ‘as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.’ * * * yy In

1976Smith Lumber Co., where the mortgagor waited nine years before filing his bill, this court said: “ * * * The statutory period of 2 years within which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and while, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will * * * never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time ‘as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.’ * * * yy In

1953The statutory period of 2 years within which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and while, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will, as we have already said, never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time ‘as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.’ Ponder v. Cheeves, 90 Ala. 117 , 7 So. 512 ; Stephenson v. Harris, 153 Ala. 462 , 45 So. 196 .

1912The statutory period of 2 years Avithin which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and Avhile, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will, as we have already said, never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time “as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.”— Ponder v. Cheeves, 90 Ala. 117 , 7 South. 512 ; Stephenson v. Harris, 153 Ala. 462 , 45 South.

2017Id.” Elliott v. Navistar, Inc., 65 So.3d 379, 386 (Ala. 2010). “‘[T]he applicability of the doctrine of laches is “dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances” of each case,’ and .., ‘[t]he applicability of the doctrine is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” ’ Horton v. Kimbrell, 819 So.2d 601, 606 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Dear v. Peek, 261 Ala. 137, 141 , 73 So.2d 358, 361 (1954), and Wallace v. Hardee’s of Oxford, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 374, 377 (M.D.

2014We first note that “[t]he applicability of the doctrine of laches is ‘dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances’ of each case,” and that “[t]he applicability of the doctrine is ‘committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Horton v. Kimbrell, 819 So.2d 601, 606 (Ala.2001) (quoting Dear v. Peek, 261 Ala. 137, 141 , 73 So.2d 358, 361 (1954), and Wallace v. Hardee’s of Oxford, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 374, 377 (M.D.Ala. 1995)). “[T]he person asserting the defense of laches [must] show (1) that the claimant delayed in asserting his or her right, (2) that the delay was inexcusable,

2013“Classic elements of undue prejudice, for purposes of determining the applicability of the doctrine of laches, include the unavailability of witnesses, changed personnel, and the loss of pertinent records.” Grubbs, 542 So.2d at 929 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir.1982)).

2007Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc. , 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , [ 668 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir. 1982)].

1996However, "[l]aches cannot be founded simply on a lapse of time; to bar an action, laches requires either delay with notice of the existence of a right that results in a disadvantage to another, or delay which effects *Page 767 a change in circumstances such that the controversy can no longer be determined with reasonable accuracy. [ Davis v. Thomaston , 420 So.2d 82 (Ala. 1982).]" Jones v. Braggs , 637 So.2d 1356 , 1359 (Ala.Civ.App. 1994). " 'The burden of showing the existence of circumstances, changed conditions, prejudice, or injustices amounting to laches, rests upon him who duly invokes

1994In calculating the timeliness of an action to reform a deed, "[t]he statute of limitations . . . does not begin to run until the party's right of possession or title is questioned." Davis v. Thomaston , 420 So.2d 82 , 84 (Ala. 1982).

1989As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1988As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayóla v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1989As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1988As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayóla v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1989As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1988As the court noted, in regard to the operation of laches, in Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936, 937, fn. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), the requirements of Mayóla v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 913 , 101 S.Ct. 1986 , 68 L.Ed.2d 303 (1981), must be met in order for a petition for habeas corpus to be dismissed under the doctrine of laches.

1988Smith Lumber Co. v. Barnes , 259 Ala. 164 , 66 So.2d 77 (1953), and the 20-year rule of repose or prescription, see Boshell v. Keith , 418 So.2d 89 (Ala. 1982).

1983Boshell v. Keith, 418 So.2d 89 (Ala.1982).

1949In Folmar v. Brantley, 238 Ala. 681 , 193 So. 122 , the petition was for mandamus to compel the court of county commissioners to file .condemnation for an easement for a highway appropriated by the coupty, after fourteen years from "the time it was appropriated, showed no excuse for the delay, approving and applying the following principle taken from Banks v. Mobley, 4 Ala.App. 510 , 58 So. 745 : “And where the relator had slept upon his rights for an unreasonable length of time, and' the legal right is doubtful because of the application of the doctrine of laches, the facts having become obsc

1949In Folmar v. Brantley, 238 Ala. 681 , 193 So. 122 , the petition was for mandamus to compel the court of county commissioners to file .condemnation for an easement for a highway appropriated by the coupty, after fourteen years from "the time it was appropriated, showed no excuse for the delay, approving and applying the following principle taken from Banks v. Mobley, 4 Ala.App. 510 , 58 So. 745 : “And where the relator had slept upon his rights for an unreasonable length of time, and' the legal right is doubtful because of the application of the doctrine of laches, the facts having become obsc

1953The statutory period of 2 years within which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and while, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will, as we have already said, never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time ‘as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.’ Ponder v. Cheeves, 90 Ala. 117 , 7 So. 512 ; Stephenson v. Harris, 153 Ala. 462 , 45 So. 196 .

1953The statutory period of 2 years within which land may be redeemed furnishes, by analogy, the rule for ordinary cases of this character; and while, in the application of the doctrine of laches, courts of equity will be guided largely by the facts of each particular case, and they will, as we have already said, never come to the relief of him who, with a full knowledge of all of the facts, has acquiesced for such a period of time ‘as affords cogent evidence of a waiver and abandonment of the right.’ Ponder v. Cheeves, 90 Ala. 117 , 7 So. 512 ; Stephenson v. Harris, 153 Ala. 462 , 45 So. 196 .