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29 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1926–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greer v. Arrozgreen2 sentences2023See id. at 766 (doctrine of laches “bars claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to reverse a previous course of action”). 2023In general, the doctrine of laches “bars claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to reverse a previous course of action.” Greer v. Arroz, 330 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Denison v. McCanngreen2 sentences2025Id. (quoting Denison v. McCann, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Ky. 1946)). 2023During the first round of litigation in this 61 Denison v. McCann, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Ky. 1946). 62 CR 8.03 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”). 28 case, the Bruners argued in t | 3 | 3 |
City of Paducah v. Gillispiegreen2 sentences2021City of Paducah v. Gillispie, 273 Ky. 101 , 115 S.W.2d 574, 575 (1938) (citations omitted). 2020The doctrine of laches is “based on the injustice that might or will result from the enforcement of a neglected right.” City of Paducah v. Gillispie, 115 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1938) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Wellington Corp.green2 sentences2021Appellant directs our attention to Plaza Condominium Association, Inc. v. Wellington Corporation, 920 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1996), wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the doctrine of laches “serves to bar claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to reverse a previous course of action.” (Citation omitted.) She asserts that the facts of the instant proceeding are precisely of the type envisioned by Plaza Condominium Association, as Appellee unreasonably delayed its collection efforts resultin 2019The doctrine of laches “serves to bar claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to 4 reverse a previous course of action.” Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Wellington Corp., 920 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
Hardwick's Ex'r v. Westgreen1 sentence2026The doctrine of laches “serves to bar claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to reverse a previous course of action.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 494 (Ky. 2011). “[F]or a plea of laches to be available it must be shown that the delay in bringing an action or otherwise asserting a right, caused the other party to change his position and that his rights have been prejudiced.” Hardwick’s Ex’r v. West, 168 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Ky. 1943). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Brian Keith Mooregreen1 sentence2026The doctrine of laches “serves to bar claims in circumstances where a party engages in unreasonable delay to the prejudice of others rendering it inequitable to allow that party to reverse a previous course of action.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 494 (Ky. 2011). “[F]or a plea of laches to be available it must be shown that the delay in bringing an action or otherwise asserting a right, caused the other party to change his position and that his rights have been prejudiced.” Hardwick’s Ex’r v. West, 168 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Ky. 1943). | 1 | 1 |
Combs v. Combsgreen1 sentence2026David is unable to meet this burden. -15- “[M]aintenance payments are vested from the entry of a decree and ordinarily can be modified only upon the entry of a subsequent order[.]” Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Ky. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Woodson v. Woodsongreen1 sentence2021See Woodson, 338 S.W.3d at 263 (despite the showings which are statutorily required to modify maintenance and “the compelling need for finality in all divorce cases[,] . . . the statute [KRS 403.250] does not divest trial judges of the discretion to decide when modification outweighs the virtue of finality in seeking fairness and equity in what many times may be dire consequences and complicated options.”). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Trustees v. Attorney General of the Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2019As a preliminary matter, Westerfield argues that the doctrine of laches bars the relief sought by KACDL because KACDL “failed to assert [their] rights within a reasonable period of time after the passage of SB 3, causing prejudice and disruption to the electoral process.” Laches “in its general definition is laxness; an unreasonable delay in asserting a right. 15 See Bd ofTrs. v. Att’y Gen., 132 S.W.3d 770, 776-78 (Ky. 2003) (questioning its ability to strike down a law based on the General Assembly’s failure to comply with KRS 6.350, which requires a bill to receive an actuarial analysis in c | 1 | 1 |
Holloway Ready Mix Co. v. Monfortgreen1 sentence2012“The defense of laches requires a showing that the party knew his rights and did not attempt to enforce them until the condition of the party who set up the defense has been so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state.” Holloway Ready Mix Co. v. Monfort, 474 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Ky.1968). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1994See Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 837 S.W.2d 902 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Badger v. Badgergreen2 sentences1941See Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87 , 17 L. 1941See Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87 , 17 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Glock's Admr. v. Weikel
neutral
2 sentences1946J. 212; Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 .” The same principles have been adopted by other courts of last resort: notably, the Supreme Court of the United States. 1946J. 212; Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 .” The same principles have been adopted by other courts of last resort: notably, the Supreme Court of the United States. | 3 | 1938–1946 |
Klineline v. Head
green
2 sentences1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . 1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . | 3 | 1930–1944 |
Halstead v. Grinnan
green
2 sentences1954In Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 246 S.W.2d 981, 986 , we quoted with approval the following language of Mr. Justice Brewer from Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U. S. 412 , 14 S.Ct. 641, 643 , 38 L.Ed. 495 : (The defense of laches) “ * * * prevents the breaking up of relations and situations long acquiesced in, and thus induces confidence in the stability of what is, and a willingness to improve property in possession; and at the same time it certainly works in furtherance of justice, for so strong is the desire of every man to have the full enjoyment of all that is his, when a party comes into court 1954In Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 246 S.W.2d 981, 986 , we quoted with approval the following language of Mr. Justice Brewer from Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U. S. 412 , 14 S.Ct. 641, 643 , 38 L.Ed. 495 : (The defense of laches) “ * * * prevents the breaking up of relations and situations long acquiesced in, and thus induces confidence in the stability of what is, and a willingness to improve property in possession; and at the same time it certainly works in furtherance of justice, for so strong is the desire of every man to have the full enjoyment of all that is his, when a party comes into court | 2 | 1951–1954 |
Kendall v. Mussman
green
1 sentence2025Id. (quoting Denison v. McCann, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Ky. 1946)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fightmaster v. Leffler
green
1 sentence1988Fightmaster v. Leffler, Ky.App., 556 S.W.2d 180 (1977). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Drury v. Drury
green
1 sentence1954In Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 246 S.W.2d 981, 986 , we quoted with approval the following language of Mr. Justice Brewer from Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U. S. 412 , 14 S.Ct. 641, 643 , 38 L.Ed. 495 : (The defense of laches) “ * * * prevents the breaking up of relations and situations long acquiesced in, and thus induces confidence in the stability of what is, and a willingness to improve property in possession; and at the same time it certainly works in furtherance of justice, for so strong is the desire of every man to have the full enjoyment of all that is his, when a party comes into court | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Phillips v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . 1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Culton v. Asher
green
2 sentences1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . 1944Glock’s Adm’r v. Weikel, 149 Ky. 170 , 147 S. W. 897 ; Culton et al. v. Asher et al., 149 Ky. 659 , 149 S. W. 946 ; Klineline v. Head et al., 205 Ky. 644 , 266 S. W. 370 ; Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323 , 171 S. W. 2d 458 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Preston v. Jeffers
neutral
1 sentence1940Preston v. Jeffers, 179 Ky. 384 , 200 S W. 654. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Chapman v. County of Douglas
green
2 sentences1938Ed. 949 ), and it is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches (Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 355 , 2 S. Ct. 62 , 27 L. 1938Ed. 949 ), and it is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches (Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 355 , 2 S. Ct. 62 , 27 L. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Duke v. Turner
neutral
2 sentences1938Ed. 378 ; Duke v. Turner, 204 U. S. 623, 628 , 27 S. Ct. 316 , 51 L. 1938Ed. 378 ; Duke v. Turner, 204 U. S. 623, 628 , 27 S. Ct. 316 , 51 L. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Johnson v. Fetter
green
2 sentences1932Going much further, section 2519 qualifies the limitations established by section 2515 by this proviso: “* * * But no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.” The principle and interpretation of the two sections are considered in Eversole & Co. v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Co., 160 Ky. 477 , 169 S. W. 846 ; and Johnson v. Fetter, 224 Ky. 788 , 7 S. W. (2d) 241 . 1932Going much further, section 2519 qualifies the limitations established by section 2515 by this proviso: “* * * But no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.” The principle and interpretation of the two sections are considered in Eversole & Co. v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Co., 160 Ky. 477 , 169 S. W. 846 ; and Johnson v. Fetter, 224 Ky. 788 , 7 S. W. (2d) 241 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Eversole & Co. v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Going much further, section 2519 qualifies the limitations established by section 2515 by this proviso: “* * * But no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.” The principle and interpretation of the two sections are considered in Eversole & Co. v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Co., 160 Ky. 477 , 169 S. W. 846 ; and Johnson v. Fetter, 224 Ky. 788 , 7 S. W. (2d) 241 . 1932Going much further, section 2519 qualifies the limitations established by section 2515 by this proviso: “* * * But no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.” The principle and interpretation of the two sections are considered in Eversole & Co. v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Co., 160 Ky. 477 , 169 S. W. 846 ; and Johnson v. Fetter, 224 Ky. 788 , 7 S. W. (2d) 241 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Medley v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1932The dominant facts show an unreasonable delay on Riley’s part to do that which in law a man is obliged or in duty bound to do (Medley v. Johnson, 200 Ky. 689 , 255 S. W. 532 ), sufficient to bring the case as to him within the equitable doctrine of laches, the elements of which are not identical with those of an estoppel or waiver. 1932The dominant facts show an unreasonable delay on Riley’s part to do that which in law a man is obliged or in duty bound to do (Medley v. Johnson, 200 Ky. 689 , 255 S. W. 532 ), sufficient to bring the case as to him within the equitable doctrine of laches, the elements of which are not identical with those of an estoppel or waiver. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Kellar v. Williams
neutral
1 sentence1931Keller v. Williams, supra. In these easesj the defendant resisted recovery by invoking also the equitable doctrine of laches — a principle, like limitations of actions, dictated by experience and found to be a salutary policy. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Deposit Bank v. Fayette National Bank
neutral
2 sentences1926The case of Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette National Bank, 90 Ky. 10 , 13 S. W. 339 , cited by appellee is not in conflict with these views. 1926The case of Deposit Bank of Georgetown v. Fayette National Bank, 90 Ky. 10 , 13 S. W. 339 , cited by appellee is not in conflict with these views. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.