62 North Carolina opinions name it 4 courts 1943–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MMR HOLDINGS, LLC v. City of Charlottegreen2 sentences2021App. 208, 209-10 , 558 S.E.2d 197, 198 (2001) (describing the equitable doctrine of laches as an “affirmative defense”). 2021App. 208, 209-10 , 558 S.E.2d 197, 198 (2001) (describing the equitable doctrine of laches as an “affirmative defense”). | 6 | 20 |
Taylor v. City of Raleighgreen2 sentences2018The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that “[s]ince proceedings for declaratory relief have much in common with equitable proceedings, the equitable doctrine of laches has been applied in such proceedings.” Taylor v. Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608 , 622–623, 227 S.E.2d 576 , 584–585 (1976). 2018The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that “[s]ince proceedings for declaratory relief have much in common with equitable proceedings, the equitable doctrine of laches has been applied in such proceedings.” Taylor v. Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608 , 622–623, 227 S.E.2d 576 , 584–585 (1976). | 6 | 10 |
Teachey v. . Gurleygreen2 sentences2010Therefore, the statute of limitations immediately begins to run and the ten-year statute applies, unless sooner barred under the doctrine of laches.” Teachey, 214 N.C. at 293-94 . 2009See Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 294 , 199 S.E. 83, 88 (1938) (“In equity, where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim, the doctrine of laches will be applied.”). | 6 | 10 |
Builders Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, NC, Inc. v. Gaineygreen2 sentences1985As stated in Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 271 , 192 S.E. 2d 449, 456 (1972): “. . . where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim, the doctrine of laches will be applied. 1985As stated in Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 271 , 192 S.E. 2d 449, 456 (1972): “. . . where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim, the doctrine of laches will be applied. | 3 | 3 |
Costin v. Shellgreen2 sentences2022We disagree. ¶ 25 Under the doctrine of laches, a showing is required that (1) the party against whom the doctrine is charged “negligently failed to assert an enforceable right within a reasonable period of time, . . . and (2) that the propounder of the doctrine was prejudiced by the delay in bringing the action.” Costin v. Shell, 53 N.C. 2022We disagree. ¶ 25 Under the doctrine of laches, a showing is required that (1) the party against whom the doctrine is charged “negligently failed to assert an enforceable right within a reasonable period of time, . . . and (2) that the propounder of the doctrine was prejudiced by the delay in bringing the action.” Costin v. Shell, 53 N.C. | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. North Carolina Department of Cultural Resourcesgreen2 sentences2026“The prejudice element of the laches doctrine refers to whether a defendant has been prejudiced in its ability to defend against the plaintiff’s claims by the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Johnson, 223 N.C. 2026“The prejudice element of the laches doctrine refers to whether a defendant has been prejudiced in its ability to defend against the plaintiff’s claims by the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Johnson, 223 N.C. | 1 | 3 |
Cieszko v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2019See Cieszko v. Clark, 92 N.C. 2019See Cieszko v. Clark, 92 N.C. | 1 | 3 |
Farley v. Hollergreen2 sentences2018App. 130 , 132–33, 647 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2007) (“[L]aches depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . the delay must be shown to be unreasonable and must have worked to the disadvantage, injury or prejudice of the person seeking to invoke the doctrine of laches[.]”). 2013Farley v. Holler, 185 N.C. | 1 | 3 |
Stratton v. Royal Bank of Canadagreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Taylor v. Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608 , 622–23, 227 S.E.2d 576 , 584–85 (1976) (“Since proceedings for declaratory relief have much in common with equitable proceedings, the equitable doctrine of laches has been applied in such proceedings.”); Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N.C. 2014Unjust Enrichment {76} Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment is barred by the doctrine of laches, asserting, again, that Plaintiff could have discovered the conduct in question many years ago through exercise of reasonable diligence. {77} “Laches is an equitable doctrine ‘designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 7 The fact that the statute of limitations for a fraud claim is three years, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(9), whereas the statute of limitations for a UDTP claim is four years, N.C.G.S. § 75-1 | 1 | 3 |
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.green1 sentence2014E. 2d. 979, 997, 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1977 (2014) (internal citations omitted). -17- Because estoppel and laches constitute separate and distinct equitable defenses, we decline to assume that the trial court, without mentioning the doctrine of laches, applied that doctrine in reaching its conclusion that defendant was estopped from seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of NCgreen2 sentences2009Laches is an equitable remedy that is applied “where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim[.]” Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 357 N.C. 170, 181 , 581 S.E.2d 415, 424 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hat delay will constitute laches depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2009Laches is an equitable remedy that is applied “where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim[.]” Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 357 N.C. 170, 181 , 581 S.E.2d 415, 424 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hat delay will constitute laches depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Robins v. Town of Hillsboroughgreen2 sentences2007The standard of review from an order allowing summary judgment is well-established: “We review a trial court’s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a ‘genuine issue of material fact’ and whether either party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196 , 639 S.E.2d. 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496 , 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). 2007The standard of review from an order allowing summary judgment is well-established: “We review a trial court’s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a ‘genuine issue of material fact’ and whether either party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196 , 639 S.E.2d. 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496 , 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Summey v. Barkergreen2 sentences2007The standard of review from an order allowing summary judgment is well-established: “We review a trial court’s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a ‘genuine issue of material fact’ and whether either party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196 , 639 S.E.2d. 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496 , 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). 2007The standard of review from an order allowing summary judgment is well-established: “We review a trial court’s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a ‘genuine issue of material fact’ and whether either party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196 , 639 S.E.2d. 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496 , 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Coppersmith v. . Uptongreen2 sentences2003Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548 , 46 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1948) (quoting U.S. v. Mack , 295 U.S. 480 (1935)) (“The doctrine of laches . . . is ordinarily regarded as an equitable defense, and it has been held that the plea is not tenable in a court of law and on a legal demand, ‘the court being governed by the statute of limitations.’”) {321} Laches is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the party who pleads it. 2003Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548 , 46 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1948) (quoting U.S. v. Mack , 295 U.S. 480 (1935)) (“The doctrine of laches . . . is ordinarily regarded as an equitable defense, and it has been held that the plea is not tenable in a court of law and on a legal demand, ‘the court being governed by the statute of limitations.’”) {321} Laches is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the party who pleads it. | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Diazgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rape v. Lyerlygreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacKall v. Casileargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cater v. Barker
green
2 sentences2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). 2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. MacK
green
2 sentences2003Coppersmith v. Upton, 228 N.C. 545, 548 , 46 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1948) (quoting U.S. v. Mack , 295 U.S. 480 (1935)) (“The doctrine of laches . . . is ordinarily regarded as an equitable defense, and it has been held that the plea is not tenable in a court of law and on a legal demand, ‘the court being governed by the statute of limitations.’”) {321} Laches is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the party who pleads it. 1948Tur., p. 339, Sec. 49; U. S. v. Mack, 295 U. S., 480 , 19 L. | 2 | 1948–2003 |
Gordon v. Gordon
green
1 sentence2019In fact, the rule states that such errors may be corrected 'at any time.' " Gordon , 119 N.C. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Baars v. Campbell University, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018In deciding which statute of limitations should be applied to a declaratory judgment claim, the Court must be “guided by the principle that the statute of limitations is not determined by the remedy sought, but by the substantive right asserted by plaintiffs.” Baars v. Campbell Univ., Inc., 148 N.C. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Napowsa v. Langston
green
2 sentences2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. 2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cater v. Barker
green
1 sentence2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State of Michigan v. Pruitt
green
2 sentences2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. 2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carroll v. Sears Roebuck & Co.
neutral
1 sentence2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carter v. Hucks-Folliss
neutral
1 sentence2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Larsen v. Sedberry
green
2 sentences2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. 2015Gen.Stat. § 1-47, see State of Michigan v. Pruitt, 94 N.C.App. 713 , 714, 380 S.E.2d 809 , 810 (1989), but contends the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar recovery of child support owed from 1 April 2004 until 26 March 2011, "thereby denying plaintiff $33,600.00 in accrued child support that was owing during the relevant period of the statute of limitations." Plaintiff cites Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C.App. 14 , 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989), and Larsen v. Sedberry, 54 N.C.App. 166 , 282 S.E.2d 551 (1981), in support of her argument. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Irby v. Freese
green
1 sentence2015Plaintiff’s failure to litigate the equitable distribution action in a timely manner must have “resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties” that unreasonably prejudiced Defendant, in order to dismiss Plaintiff’s action under the doctrine of laches.2 See id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cater v. Barker
neutral
1 sentence2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County
green
2 sentences2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). 2015"We [have] previously held, 'laches is an equitable defense and is not available in an action at law.' When a '[p]laintiff's claims are legal in nature, not equitable[,]' laches cannot support judgment for the defendant." Cater v. Barker, 172 N.C.App. 441 , 448, 617 S.E.2d 113 , 118 (2005) (quoting City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, 132 N.C.App. 533 , 537, 513 S.E.2d 335 , 338, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 350 N.C. 826 , 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999) *517 (internal citations omitted)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 357 , 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Whitacre P'Ship, 358 N.C. at 13 , 591 S.E.2d at 879 . 2014Whitacre P'Ship, 358 N.C. at 13 , 591 S.E.2d at 879 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Town of Cameron v. Woodell
green
1 sentence2007Town of Cameron v. Wadell, 150 N.C. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Abernethy v. Town of Boone Board of Adjustment
green
1 sentence2003Abernethy v. Town of Boone Bd. of Adjustment, 109 N.C. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Tepper v. Hoch green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Allen v. City of Burlington Board of Adjustment green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Gill v. Gill green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Willis green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Deering v. United States green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Cox v. Watkins green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.