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22 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clanton v. Hathorngreen2 sentences2010In Clanton v. Hathorn, 600 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss.1992), before addressing the appellant’s laches claim on the merits, the court opined as follows: The problem of laggardly landowners who ignore claims or encroachments over long periods of time has been addressed by the [L]egislature. 2002Clanton v. Hathorn, 600 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss.1992); West End Corp. v. Royals, 450 So.2d 420, 425 (Miss.1984). | 3 | 3 |
Nicholas v. Nicholasgreen2 sentences2012For the doctrine of laches to apply, the party asserting the defense must show “(1) delay in asserting a right or claim; (2) that the delay was not excusable; and (3) that there was undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted.” Id. (quoting Nicholas v. Nicholas, 841 So.2d 1208, 1212 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). ¶ 18. 2011“Laches requires the party seeking to assert the defense show: ‘(1) delay in asserting a right or claim; (2) that the delay was not excusable; and (3) that there was undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted.’ ” Nicholas v. Nicholas, 841 So.2d 1208, 1212 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citations omitted). ¶ 17. | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Mayergreen2 sentences2011Anticipating that Johnson might argue that the doctrine of laches bars the revocation of his certification nine years after the entry of his guilty plea, the Board makes the proactive argument that it does not bar the Board’s actions. “[T]he doctrine of laches ... prevents one from pursuing a claim after an inordinate and unjustified delay that works to the disadvantage of the responding party.” Aron v. Reid, 850 So.2d 108, 113 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Allen v. Mayer, 587 So.2d 255, 260 (Miss.1991)). 2002Allen v. Mayer, 587 So.2d 255, 260 (Miss.1991). ¶ 21. | 2 | 2 |
West End Corp. v. Royalsgreen2 sentences2002Clanton v. Hathorn, 600 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss.1992); West End Corp. v. Royals, 450 So.2d 420, 425 (Miss.1984). 2001Clanton v. Hathorn, 600 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss. 1992); West End Corp. v. Royals, 450 So.2d 420, 425 (Miss. 1984). | 2 | 2 |
Marks v. Toneygreen2 sentences1996Later this Court further explained the doctrine of laches in Marks v. Toney, 196 Miss. 572 , 18 So.2d 452, 453 (1944), holding: "It is a rule peculiar to and inherent in courts of equity; and it applies where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the appellant has by his conduct done that which might be fairly regarded as equivalent to a waiver of his remedy, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were to be afterwards asse 1996Later this Court further explained the doctrine of laches in Marks v. Toney, 196 Miss. 572 , 18 So.2d 452, 453 (1944), holding: "It is a rule peculiar to and inherent in courts of equity; and it applies where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the appellant has by his conduct done that which might be fairly regarded as equivalent to a waiver of his remedy, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were to be afterwards asse | 2 | 2 |
Aron v. Reidgreen2 sentences2012For the doctrine of laches to apply, the party asserting the defense must show “(1) delay in asserting a right or claim; (2) that the delay was not excusable; and (3) that there was undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted.” Id. (quoting Nicholas v. Nicholas, 841 So.2d 1208, 1212 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). ¶ 18. 2011Anticipating that Johnson might argue that the doctrine of laches bars the revocation of his certification nine years after the entry of his guilty plea, the Board makes the proactive argument that it does not bar the Board’s actions. “[T]he doctrine of laches ... prevents one from pursuing a claim after an inordinate and unjustified delay that works to the disadvantage of the responding party.” Aron v. Reid, 850 So.2d 108, 113 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Allen v. Mayer, 587 So.2d 255, 260 (Miss.1991)). | 1 | 2 |
Jeffrey Jack Stroh v. Nancy Jane Zehr Strohgreen1 sentence2024“Periodic alimony is awarded on the basis of need, generally in monthly installments.” Stroh v. Stroh, 221 So. 3d 399, 412 (¶44) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Greenlee v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2016The doctrine of laches .is simply inapplicable where a claim has not yet been barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Greenlee v. Mitchell, 607 So.2d 97, 111 (Miss.1992) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Allgood v. Allgoodgreen1 sentence2012The supreme court faced a similar situation in Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 423 (Miss.1985), where Aletha Allgood pled the doctrine of laches; however, the issue was never litigated or decided at the trial-court level. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Estate of Davisgreen1 sentence2011The doctrine of laches states: “equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.” In re Estate of Davis v. Stennis, 510 So.2d 798, 800 (Miss.1987). ¶ 16. | 1 | 1 |
Rubisoff v. Rubisoffgreen2 sentences2002Rubisoff v. Rubisoff, 242 Miss. 225, 234 , 133 So.2d 534, 536-37 (1961). ¶ 7. 2002Rubisoff v. Rubisoff, 242 Miss. 225, 234 , 133 So.2d 534, 536-37 (1961). ¶ 7. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Dillard
green
2 sentences2010The chancellor noted in his judgment that, absent a written agreement, the parties’ intent was determined by their conduct and found that “there was essentially a contract of employment at will *341 between the parties, initially based on Harris receiving a commission, as reflected by Griffith’s payment method, and then changed to a weekly salary.” The chancellor also held that the doctrine of laches applied, citing Hall v. Dillard, 739 So.2d 383 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), and that Harris had acquiesced in the salary. ¶ 9. 2007The chancellor noted in his judgment that, absent a written agreement, the parties’ intent was determined by their conduct and found that “there was essentially a contract of employment at will between the parties, initially based on Harris receiving a commission, as reflected by Griffith’s payment method, and then changed to a weekly salary.” The chancellor also held that the doctrine of laches applied, citing Hall v. Dillard, 739 So. 2d 383 (Miss. | 2 | 2007–2010 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2001Edmond asserts that he was denied proper revocation procedures when his parole was revoked in 1982, listing several sub-issues pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-27 ( 2000). 2001Edmond asserts that he was denied proper revocation procedures when his parole was revoked in 1982, listing several sub-issues pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-27 ( 2000). | 2 | 1999–2001 |
City of Jackson v. Alabama & v. Ry. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1994Co. case held that the state and its subdivisions could be subject to the doctrine of laches "where on account of lapse of time evidence is lost." 172 Miss. at 534 , 160 So. 602 . 1994Co. case held that the state and its subdivisions could be subject to the doctrine of laches "where on account of lapse of time evidence is lost." 172 Miss. at 534 , 160 So. 602 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Twin States Realty Co. v. Kilpatrick
green
2 sentences1970Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the case of Twin States Realty Co. v. Kilpatrick, 199 Miss. 545 , 24 So.2d 752 , 26 So.2d 356 (1946), relied upon by the appellant, is not controlling as in that case, which sustained the doctrine of laches, there was an adjudication that the right asserted was long delayed and came subsequent to a substantial investment by the defendant for the purchase of real property, and that it would be inequitable due to the passage of time and the loss of investment not to uphold laches. 1970Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the case of Twin States Realty Co. v. Kilpatrick, 199 Miss. 545 , 24 So.2d 752 , 26 So.2d 356 (1946), relied upon by the appellant, is not controlling as in that case, which sustained the doctrine of laches, there was an adjudication that the right asserted was long delayed and came subsequent to a substantial investment by the defendant for the purchase of real property, and that it would be inequitable due to the passage of time and the loss of investment not to uphold laches. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Sample v. Romine
green
2 sentences1947As to whether or not the doctrine of laches, the application of which is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor, as held in the case of Sample v. Romine, 193 Miss. 706 , 8 So. (2d) 257 , 9 So (2d) 643, 10 So. (2d) 346 , or the ten-year statute of limitations should be applied, becomes immaterial, in view of the conclusions hereinbefore stated, but we call attention in passing to Section 2289, Code 1930, Code 1942, Sec. 718, which provides:' “When a mortgagee, after condition broken, shall obtain the actual possession or receipt of the profits or rent of land embraced in his mortgage, t 1947As to whether or not the doctrine of laches, the application of which is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor, as held in the case of Sample v. Romine, 193 Miss. 706 , 8 So. (2d) 257 , 9 So (2d) 643, 10 So. (2d) 346 , or the ten-year statute of limitations should be applied, becomes immaterial, in view of the conclusions hereinbefore stated, but we call attention in passing to Section 2289, Code 1930, Code 1942, Sec. 718, which provides:' “When a mortgagee, after condition broken, shall obtain the actual possession or receipt of the profits or rent of land embraced in his mortgage, t | 1 | 1947–1947 |
State v. Woodruff
green
2 sentences1935State v. Woodruff et al., 170 Miss. 744 , 150 So. 760 ; Aetna Ins. 1935State v. Woodruff et al., 170 Miss. 744 , 150 So. 760 ; Aetna Ins. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Caruth v. Gillespie
green
2 sentences1922J. section 225, ]). 539, in discussing the question of the conveyance of property by a county, it is said : “Indeed, where no limitation, by statute or otherwise, is placed on the county board or court in the exercise of its judgment as to the consideration for a disposition of county property, nothing short of fraud,,or such gross inadequacy as will be equivalent to fraud, is sufficient to invalidate the order of the county board or court directing a conveyance; Mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient to establish fraud.” In Caruth v. Gillespie, 109 Miss. 679 , 68 So. 927 , it was 1922J. section 225, ]). 539, in discussing the question of the conveyance of property by a county, it is said : “Indeed, where no limitation, by statute or otherwise, is placed on the county board or court in the exercise of its judgment as to the consideration for a disposition of county property, nothing short of fraud,,or such gross inadequacy as will be equivalent to fraud, is sufficient to invalidate the order of the county board or court directing a conveyance; Mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient to establish fraud.” In Caruth v. Gillespie, 109 Miss. 679 , 68 So. 927 , it was | 1 | 1922–1922 |
State ex rel. Brown v. Town of Westport
neutral
2 sentences1922In the case of the State of Missouri ex rel. v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , which was a proceeding by the state in its governmental capacity against a municipality, the court applied the doctrine of laches to the state, and (in discussing the question said at page 595 of the official report ( 22 S. W. 890 ): “We do not think that this proceeding comes within the statute of limitations, nor are we disposed to place the result of our deliberations strictly on the ground of estoppel, but rather because of laches on the part of the state.” We are aware of what is said on this subject in 1922In the case of the State of Missouri ex rel. v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , which was a proceeding by the state in its governmental capacity against a municipality, the court applied the doctrine of laches to the state, and (in discussing the question said at page 595 of the official report ( 22 S. W. 890 ): “We do not think that this proceeding comes within the statute of limitations, nor are we disposed to place the result of our deliberations strictly on the ground of estoppel, but rather because of laches on the part of the state.” We are aware of what is said on this subject in | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Josselyn v. Stone
green
2 sentences1922In the case of the State of Missouri ex rel. v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , which was a proceeding by the state in its governmental capacity against a municipality, the court applied the doctrine of laches to the state, and (in discussing the question said at page 595 of the official report ( 22 S. W. 890 ): “We do not think that this proceeding comes within the statute of limitations, nor are we disposed to place the result of our deliberations strictly on the ground of estoppel, but rather because of laches on the part of the state.” We are aware of what is said on this subject in 1922In applying the doctrine of laches to the state in this case I realize that I am not in accord with the general rule here and elsewhere that ordinarily laches cannot be imputed to and invoked against the state, as held seventy years ago in Josselyn v. Stone & Mathews, 28 Miss. 753 , but I think an exception to this general rule may be made in an exceptional and remarkable case like the one before us. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Miller v. State
neutral
1 sentence1922In the case of the State of Missouri ex rel. v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , which was a proceeding by the state in its governmental capacity against a municipality, the court applied the doctrine of laches to the state, and (in discussing the question said at page 595 of the official report ( 22 S. W. 890 ): “We do not think that this proceeding comes within the statute of limitations, nor are we disposed to place the result of our deliberations strictly on the ground of estoppel, but rather because of laches on the part of the state.” We are aware of what is said on this subject in | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.