laches doctrine in Florida

2002See generally McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366, 1368 (Fla.1997) (noting that, in collateral criminal proceedings, "the doctrine of laches has been applied to bar a... proceeding when, from the face of the petition, it is obvious that the state has been manifestly prejudiced and no reason *558 for an extraordinary delay has been provided").

2000See McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1997) (recognizing that, where death sentence had been reduced to life imprisonment on direct appeal in this Court, predecessor rule 9.140(j)(3)(B) applied to petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, but denying petition under doctrine of laches).

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2002See Bartz v. State, 740 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

2015The elements of common law laches are (1) “conduct on the part of the defendant . . . giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made”; (2) “the plaintiff, having knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct, and having been afforded the opportunity to institute suit, is guilty of not asserting his rights by suit”; (3) “lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant that plaintiff will assert the right on which he bases his suit”; and (4) “injury or prejudice to the defendant in event relief is accorded to the plaintiff, or in the event suit is held not to be barred.” Van Meter v. Ke

2015The elements of common law laches are (1) “conduct on the part of the defendant ... giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made”; (2) “the plaintiff, having knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct, and having been afforded the opportunity to institute suit, is guilty of not asserting his rights by suit”; (3) “lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant that plaintiff will assert the right on which he bases his suit”; and (4) “injury or prejudice to the defendant in event relief is accorded to the plaintiff, or in the event suit is held not to be barred.” Van Meter v. Kels

2009However, the “ ‘[application of the doctrine [of laches] often involves factual issues that are not properly resolved without an evidentiary hearing.’ ” Wilson v. State, 868 So.2d 654, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (first alternation in original) (quoting Love v. State, 814 So.2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)); see also Omasta v. State, 805 So.2d 846, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that evidentiary hearing was required to *725 determine whether postconviction motion was barred by the doctrine of laches).

2002See Love, 814 So.2d at 476 .

2006See Strong v. State, 851 So.2d 758, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366 (Fla. 1997).

2005See Strong v. State, 851 So.2d 758, 759-60 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 860 So.2d 978 (Fla.2003).

2003See Bashlor v. Wainwright, 374 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see also Nava v. State, 652 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

2001Compare Nava v. State, 652 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(permitting belated review of 1989 order where State failed to prove laches and specific prejudice to bar delayed belated review).

1999See Brumby, 647 So.2d at 331 (action seeking enforcement of 1969 final judgment which required payment of permanent alimony not barred by laches); Gardiner v. Gardiner, 705 So.2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(enforcement action filed sixteen years after dissolution seeking alimony arrearage not precluded by doctrine of laches); cf. Dean v. Dean, 665 So.2d 244, 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(father prejudiced by mother's thirty-year delay in seeking enforcement of child support obligations where father assumed large financial obligations over thirty-year period which he would not have otherwise incurr

1999See Brumby v. Brumby, 647 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Frazier v. Frazier, 616 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

1987In Armour v. Allen, 377 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), a case fundamentally identical to the one at bar, we reversed the trial court’s ruling that the mother’s claim for child support arrearages was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches.

1985See Armour v. Allen, 377 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). [2] Absent a reviewable record of all the material evidence in the present case we may not, in my opinion, find that the circumstances recited by the trial court do or do not constitute a laches defense permitting cancellation of the $29,000 arrearage here.

2025Thorman v. Holley, 86 So. 3d 1199 , 1202–03 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing Sun Cruz Casinos, L.L.C. v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 844 So. 2d 681 , 684–85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2013Thorman v. Holley, 86 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

2011Compare Epstein v. Epstein, 915 So.2d 1272,1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“He who has acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness will appeal in vain to a court of conscience.” (quoting Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168, 172 (D.Ct.Mich.1914))) with Garcia v. Guerra, 738 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“Laches is effective to bar enforcement when there has been a substantial and inexcusable delay in enforcing the claim to arrears of support and the delay has prejudiced the defendant or led him to change his position to such an extent tha

2010In its eleven-page amended opinion, the circuit court determined that the magistrate should have ruled in favor of Ms. Carter on the laches defense as well as the defense of estoppel. 4 The circuit court stated that the “record shows that Monroe County was aware of the downstairs enclosure by 1983, apparently levied taxes upon it, and then took absolutely no action whatsoever to enforce against the property.” Citing Garcia v. Guerra, 738 So.2d 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the court determined that Ms. Carter’s claim of laches was sufficiently proven in the proceedings before the magistrate. *957 Th

2007See generally Radiation, Inc. v. Campbell, 200 So.2d 192, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) ("[R]ecognizing that in courts of equity there is no such thing as a statute of limitations but rather that the court is governed by the doctrine of laches, [but noting] the Florida Supreme Court nevertheless held an equity action could be barred by applying the statute of limitations.") (citing Grable v. Nunez, 64 So.2d 154 (Fla.1953)); Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 870 (Fla.1961) ("A statute of limitation may, of course, be employed as a guide in an equity action in connection with a careful consideration of all

1967Further, in Grable v. Nunez, Fla. 1953, 64 So.2d 154 , while recognizing that in courts of equity there is no such thing as a statute of limitations but rather that the court is governed by the doctrine of laches, the Florida Supreme Court nevertheless held an equity action could be barred by applying the statute of limitations.

1999See Brumby, 647 So.2d at 331 (action seeking enforcement of 1969 final judgment which required payment of permanent alimony not barred by laches); Gardiner v. Gardiner, 705 So.2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(enforcement action filed sixteen years after dissolution seeking alimony arrearage not precluded by doctrine of laches); cf. Dean v. Dean, 665 So.2d 244, 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(father prejudiced by mother's thirty-year delay in seeking enforcement of child support obligations where father assumed large financial obligations over thirty-year period which he would not have otherwise incurr

1999This court used a four-part test for laches which was drawn from a Florida Supreme Court decision which applied the laches doctrine in a real estate context. [1] The wife points out that under Dean , one element that the defendant husband must show is "[l]ack of knowledge on the defendant's part that the plaintiff will assert the right on which he/she basis the suit...." Dean, 665 So.2d at 247 .

1994Compare, Robinson v. State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services on Behalf of Robinson, 473 So.2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. den., Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Robinson, 478 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1985) (the court held that the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to allow the former husband to raise the defense of laches as a bar to enforcement of child support arrearages) with Newman v. Newman, 459 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. den., Newman v. Newman, 466 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (the court rejected the former husband's argument that the doctrine of laches should bar

1991And while the child’s emancipation due to reaching the age of majority is a circumstance to be considered, see Robinson v. HRS, supra, the support arrearage may still be enforced by judgment and collected.

1992See generally Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson, 468 So.2d 266, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA) (laches is based upon an unreasonable delay in asserting a known right which causes undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted), review denied, 482 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1985); see also Van Meter v. Kelsey, 91 So.2d 327, 331 (Fla. 1956); Bethea v. Langford, 45 So.2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1950).

1965As to when the doctrine of laches will be applied to bar a claim see Bethea v. Langford, Fla. 1950, 45 So.2d 496 , which indicates that laches is based not upon the number of years which have elapsed between the accruing of rights and the assertion of them, but upon unreasonable delay in enforcing a right, coupled with a disadvantage to the person against whom the right is sought to be asserted.

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2025See Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corp., 112 So. 841, 845 (Fla. 1927) (noting that when "structures or objects are put upon lands below high-water mark . . . any substantial encroachment upon the rights of others may be remedied . . . in due course of law at the instance of proper parties, but the rights of individuals to remedy may be waived by undue delay or laches").

2025See Thilloy v. Ciccone-Capri, 289 So. 3d 18 , 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding, in part, that the trial court erred in not considering a former husband’s laches defense to arrearages); see generally Kane v. Kane, 247 So. 3d 57, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (recognizing that the due process considerations of notice and opportunity to be heard apply in family law civil contempt proceedings brought pursuant to rule 12.615(b)).

2025See Fla. Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1986) (relying on Fla. Bar v. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700, 705-06 (Fla. 1978)).6 6 Mr. Vanderburg argues that the mortgagee failed to preserve its arguments regarding whether Mr. Vanderburg presented sufficient evidence of each element of the laches defense.

2025See Fla. Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1986) (relying on Fla. Bar v. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700, 705-06 (Fla. 1978)).6 6 Mr. Vanderburg argues that the mortgagee failed to preserve its arguments regarding whether Mr. Vanderburg presented sufficient evidence of each element of the laches defense.

2024See, e.g., Reid v. Est. of Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“[I]t is not our function to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, but simply to determine whether there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial court.”). 8.

2016Beyer v. City of Marathon, 197 So.3d 563 (Fla 3d DCA 2013) (“Beyer II”).

2011Compare Epstein v. Epstein, 915 So.2d 1272,1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“He who has acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness will appeal in vain to a court of conscience.” (quoting Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168, 172 (D.Ct.Mich.1914))) with Garcia v. Guerra, 738 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“Laches is effective to bar enforcement when there has been a substantial and inexcusable delay in enforcing the claim to arrears of support and the delay has prejudiced the defendant or led him to change his position to such an extent tha

2011Compare Epstein v. Epstein, 915 So.2d 1272,1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“He who has acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness will appeal in vain to a court of conscience.” (quoting Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168, 172 (D.Ct.Mich.1914))) with Garcia v. Guerra, 738 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“Laches is effective to bar enforcement when there has been a substantial and inexcusable delay in enforcing the claim to arrears of support and the delay has prejudiced the defendant or led him to change his position to such an extent tha