subrogation doctrine in Alabama

2024The subrogee can have no greater rights.' Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So. 2d 946 , 958 n.5 (Ala. 1991).

2014The subrogee can have no greater rights.’” Trott v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So.2d 81, 87 (Ala.2007) (quoting Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So.2d 946 , 958 n. 5 (Ala.1991)).

2006That is the real doctrine of subrogation.’ ” Brooks , 599 So.2d at 1165—66 (quoting Federal Land Bank, 253 Ala. at 62 , 42 So.2d at 836 ).

2006That is the real doctrine of subrogation.’ ” Brooks , 599 So.2d at 1165—66 (quoting Federal Land Bank, 253 Ala. at 62 , 42 So.2d at 836 ).

1999While the "made whole" rule introduced in Powell appeared in a setting other than an insurer's subrogation claim against the alleged tortfeasor, it was subsequently applied in that setting in Complete Health, Inc. v. White, 638 So.2d 784 (Ala. 1994).

1999However, in Complete Health, Inc. v. White, 638 So.2d 784 (Ala.1994), the supreme court expanded the "made-whole" rule and applied it to an insurer's subrogation claim against an alleged tortfeasor.

1990One of those ERISA cases is Pfefferle v. Solomon, 718 F.Supp. 1413 (E.D.Wis.1989), which cited several other cases.

1990One of those ERISA cases is Pfefferle v. Solomon , 718 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D.Wis. 1989), which cited several other cases.

1932The appeal is from a decree sustaining the demurrer of defendant Lena Mae Brunson to the bill as last amended, which proceeds for relief upon the theory of the equitable doctrine of subrogation, and in support of which counsel cite Motes v. Robertson, 133 Ala. 630 , 32 So. 225 ; Faulk v. Calloway, 123 Ala. 325 , 26 So. 504 ; Allen v. Caylor, 120 Ala. 251 , 24 So. 512 , 74 Am.

1925And the rule is well settled that “the purchaser of an equity of redemption upon paying off prior mortgages is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagees paid off, the mortgages paid being considered part of the purchaser’s title to the premises.” 37 Cyc. 452; Faulk v. Calloway, 123 Ala. 325, 331 , 26 So. 504 .

1877On the general doctrine of subrogation, see Furnold v. Bank of Mo., 44 Mo. 336 ; Toulmin v. Hamilton, 7 Ala. 362 ; Ohio Life Ins.

1874Toulmin v. Hamilton, 7 Ala. 362 ; Troy v. Smith & Shields, 33 Ala. 469 ; Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns.

1877Co. v. Ledyard, 8 Ala. 866 ; Troy v. Smith & Shields, 33 Ala. 469 ; Phillips v. Thompson, 2 Johns.

1874Toulmin v. Hamilton, 7 Ala. 362 ; Troy v. Smith & Shields, 33 Ala. 469 ; Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns.

2009The court then reasoned that a subrogation clause in the policy at issue, “when applied to settlement with or recovery from tort- feasors other than the uninsured motorist is invalid and contrary to the intent of the uninsured motorist statute.” 54 Ala.App. at 346-47 , 308 So.2d at 257-58 .

2009The court then reasoned that a subrogation clause in the policy at issue, “when applied to settlement with or recovery from tort- feasors other than the uninsured motorist is invalid and contrary to the intent of the uninsured motorist statute.” 54 Ala.App. at 346-47 , 308 So.2d at 257-58 .

2006That is the real doctrine of subrogation.'" Brooks, 599 So.2d at 1165 -66 (quoting Federal Land Bank, 253 Ala. at 62 , 42 So.2d at 836 ).

2006That is the real doctrine of subrogation.’ ” Brooks , 599 So.2d at 1165—66 (quoting Federal Land Bank, 253 Ala. at 62 , 42 So.2d at 836 ).

2003We concluded in Miller III that the trial court erred in finding that no portion of the employee's settlement should be attributed to future medical expenses and in denying the employer's subrogation claim on that basis; we reversed that judgment and mandated on remand that the trial court, in the words of the main opinion, "reconsider the evidence in the record regarding future medical expenses and apportion a part of the settlement as future medical expenses." 829 So.2d at 781 . 1 On remand from this court after Miller III , the trial court entered a new judgment on September 26, 2002.

2003Therefore, the compensation carrier has no cause of action against the injured worker because there is no recovery of [that] award as a matter of law.” Garrett, 882 S.W.2d at 193 .

2002Co. v. Madewell, 736 So.2d 1107 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999). *780 "On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing in August 1999 `to determine, using equitable principles applicable to subrogation rights, which part of [the employee's] settlement with the third party is attributable to future medical expenses.' The trial court, relying upon Powell, 581 So.2d at 774 , found that the employee's $400,000 settlement with the third-party defendant did not `equitably or fully compensate [the employee] for the injuries he sustained on November 10, 1994,' and that `no portion of the $400,000.00 settlement is

1999See, also, Sharpley v. Sonoco Products Co., 581 So.2d 792 (Ala.1990); McKleroy v. Wilson, 581 So.2d 796, 798 (Ala.1990); Peck v. Dill, 581 So.2d 800 (Ala.1991).

1991The court reasoned that "as a matter of equity and public policy a parent in the discharge of his duty to care for his child can bind that child, even though a minor, to a subrogation clause of a medical service contract." Hamrick, 110 R.I. at 636 , 296 A.2d at 17 .

1991The court reasoned that "as a matter of equity and public policy a parent in the discharge of his duty to care for his child can bind that child, even though a minor, to a subrogation clause of a medical service contract." Hamrick, 110 R.I. at 636 , 296 A.2d at 17 .

1990The Garrity court stated, "We hold that because the contract here contains no language to the contrary, the normal rule of subrogation applies and the subrogee has no right to share in the fund recovered from the tort-feasor until the subrogor is made whole." Garrity, 77 Wis.2d at 546-47 , 253 N.W.2d at 516 .

1990The Garrity court stated, "We hold that because the contract here contains no language to the contrary, the normal rule of subrogation applies and the subrogee has no right to share in the fund recovered from the tort-feasor until the subrogor is made whole." Garrity, 77 Wis.2d at 546-47 , 253 N.W.2d at 516 .

1989The court noted: "We are of the opinion that the Fund is excused from paying claims if the ultimate beneficiary is an insurance company." 9 Mass. App. at 486, 402 N.E.2d at 109 .

1984Blue Cross relies on Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Williams , 365 So.2d 315 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978), and Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Anderson , 48 Ala. App. 172 , 263 So.2d 149 (1972), for the proposition that express contractual provisions for subrogation between the insured and the insurer are valid.

1984Blue Cross relies on Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Williams , 365 So.2d 315 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978), and Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Anderson , 48 Ala. App. 172 , 263 So.2d 149 (1972), for the proposition that express contractual provisions for subrogation between the insured and the insurer are valid.

1984Blue Cross relies on Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Williams , 365 So.2d 315 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978), and Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Anderson , 48 Ala. App. 172 , 263 So.2d 149 (1972), for the proposition that express contractual provisions for subrogation between the insured and the insurer are valid.

1979In City of Birmingham v. Walker , 267 Ala. 150 , 101 So.2d 250 (1958), this Court noted that [t]he general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.

1979In City of Birmingham v. Walker , 267 Ala. 150 , 101 So.2d 250 (1958), this Court noted that [t]he general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.