subrogation claim in Connecticut

2018Our decision in Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Vaszil , supra, 279 Conn. at 32 , 900 A.2d 513 , also involved a subrogation claim by a landlord's insurer against his tenant in a multiunit residential building.

2018Our decision in Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Vaszil , supra, 279 Conn. at 32 , 900 A.2d 513 , also involved a subrogation claim by a landlord's insurer against his tenant in a multiunit residential building.

2002Chadwick v. CSI, LTD ., 629 A.2d 820 , 825-26 (N.H. 1993); Ralph Korte Construction Co. v. Springfield Mechanicals Co ., 369 N.E.2d 561 , 562 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977); St.

2002In Ralph Korte Construction Co. v. Springfield Mechanical Co ., 369 N.E.2d 561 (1977), the Illinois Appellate Court did not apply an exculpatory statutory provision similar to General Statutes § 52-572k , against a subrogation waiver.

2001Glenney Co. v. Bianco, 27 Conn. App. 199 , 201 (1992).

2000Glenney Co. v. Bianco , 27 Conn. App. 199 , 201 , 604 A.2d 1345 (1992).

2026The surety provides the creditor with a source of collateral or security for the debt of another, and the creditor may not be January 6, 2026 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 20 353 Conn. 845 JANUARY, 2026 19 Orlando v. Liburd we conclude that allowing an insurer’s subrogation claim to deplete a tortfeasor’s available liability cover- age and then requiring an injured insured to pursue the tortfeasor until he has established the tortfeasor’s insolvency is the type of inequitable result that the make whole doctrine is intended to prevent.

2010This was the analysis utilized by the court in Wasko v. Marietta, 269 Conn. 527 [ 849 A.2d 777 ] (2004), which determined that a social houseguest who negligently caused a fire was liable to the insurer [that] paid the claim for the insured loss.” In light of its conclusion that the status of the defendant was dispositive, the trial court did not address the defendant’s claim that it was inequitable, under the particular facts of this case, to allow a subrogation claim.

2010This was the analysis utilized by the court in Wasko v. Marietta, 269 Conn. 527 [ 849 A.2d 777 ] (2004), which determined that a social houseguest who negligently caused a fire was liable to the insurer [that] paid the claim for the insured loss.” In light of its conclusion that the status of the defendant was dispositive, the trial court did not address the defendant’s claim that it was inequitable, under the particular facts of this case, to allow a subrogation claim.

2010In its analysis, the court quoted from a Washington case, in which the court stated that “a tenant stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited puipose of defeating a subrogation claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 129 , quoting Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App. 951, 956 , 592 P.2d 688 , review denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1021 (1979).

2010In its analysis, the court quoted from a Washington case, in which the court stated that “a tenant stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited puipose of defeating a subrogation claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 129 , quoting Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App. 951, 956 , 592 P.2d 688 , review denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1021 (1979).

2010In its analysis, the court quoted from a Washington case, in which the court stated that "a tenant stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited purpose of defeating a subrogation claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 129 , 348 N.W.2d 832 , quoting Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 956 , 592 P.2d 688 , review denied, 92 Wash.2d 1021 , 1979 WL 71606 (1979).

2010In its analysis, the court quoted from a Washington case, in which the court stated that "a tenant stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited purpose of defeating a subrogation claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 129 , 348 N.W.2d 832 , quoting Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 956 , 592 P.2d 688 , review denied, 92 Wash.2d 1021 , 1979 WL 71606 (1979).

2006The association also relies on the per curiam opinion of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Kinney v. Leaman, 14 Mass. App. 926, 926-27, 436 N.E.2d 996 (1982), concluding that an assignee of an insurer’s subrogation claim had no rights against the Massachusetts Insurer’s Insolvency Fund because he merely was asserting an insurer’s barred claim.

2004“Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.” Celentano v. Oaks Condominium Assn., 265 Conn. 579, 588 , 830 A.2d 164 (2003).

2004“Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.” Celentano v. Oaks Condominium Assn., 265 Conn. 579, 588 , 830 A.2d 164 (2003).

2002Chadwick v. CSI, LTD ., 629 A.2d 820 , 825-26 (N.H. 1993); Ralph Korte Construction Co. v. Springfield Mechanicals Co ., 369 N.E.2d 561 , 562 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977); St.

2002The Vermont Supreme Court in Behr v. Hook , 787 A.2d 499 , 503 (Vt. 2001), upheld the application of a subrogation waiver as the shifting of loss to the insurance company, regardless of which party is at fault thus avoiding the prospect of extended litigation which would interfere with construction.

2001In Gurliacci v. Meyer , 218 Conn. 531 (1991), the trial court rejected a claim by the City of Stamford in a negligence action by its employee against a third party that it was entitled to recover from the third party the full salary paid to its employee pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.

1999The No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was enacted by the General Assembly on April 18, 1972, and required "owners of private passenger motor vehicles to provide security for the payment of basic reparations benefits and for residual liability." Gentile v. Altermatt , 169 Conn. 267 , 270 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S.Ct. 763 , 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976).

1999The No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was enacted by the General Assembly on April 18, 1972, and required "owners of private passenger motor vehicles to provide security for the payment of basic reparations benefits and for residual liability." Gentile v. Altermatt , 169 Conn. 267 , 270 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S.Ct. 763 , 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976).

1999The No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was enacted by the General Assembly on April 18, 1972, and required "owners of private passenger motor vehicles to provide security for the payment of basic reparations benefits and for residual liability." Gentile v. Altermatt , 169 Conn. 267 , 270 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S.Ct. 763 , 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976).

1999The No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was enacted by the General Assembly on April 18, 1972, and required "owners of private passenger motor vehicles to provide security for the payment of basic reparations benefits and for residual liability." Gentile v. Altermatt , 169 Conn. 267 , 270 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S.Ct. 763 , 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976).

1999The No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act was enacted by the General Assembly on April 18, 1972, and required "owners of private passenger motor vehicles to provide security for the payment of basic reparations benefits and for residual liability." Gentile v. Altermatt , 169 Conn. 267 , 270 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S.Ct. 763 , 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976).

1999The court stated that “[bjecause the Massachusetts workers’ compensation law defines a self-insured employer entitled to assert a subrogation claim as an ‘insurer,’ the Maine Guaranty Act likewise should treat a self-insured employer paying Massachusetts workers’ compensation as an insurer that is barred from recovering on a subrogation claim against [the Maine Insurance Guaranty Association].” Id., 1025 .

1996Under the doctrine of subrogation, "an insurer indemnifying an insured against loss occasioned by the wrongful act of a third person is ordinarily subrogated to the rights of the insured against the third person on the equitable principle that the ultimate loss should fall on the one who, in good conscience, ought to bear it." State v. Bloomfield Construction Co., Inc., 126 Conn. 349 , 356 , 11 A.2d 382 (1940).

1996Under the doctrine of subrogation, "an insurer indemnifying an insured against loss occasioned by the wrongful act of a third person is ordinarily subrogated to the rights of the insured against the third person on the equitable principle that the ultimate loss should fall on the one who, in good conscience, ought to bear it." State v. Bloomfield Construction Co., Inc., 126 Conn. 349 , 356 , 11 A.2d 382 (1940).

1996On this point, this case appears to be indistinguishable from Quire v. City of Stamford, 231 Conn. 370 , 650 A.2d 535 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that allowing an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits to the injured traveler to seek reimbursement by way of a subrogation claim is consistent with the requirement that only an injured traveler may recover damages under § 13a-149 .

1996On this point, this case appears to be indistinguishable from Quire v. City of Stamford, 231 Conn. 370 , 650 A.2d 535 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that allowing an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits to the injured traveler to seek reimbursement by way of a subrogation claim is consistent with the requirement that only an injured traveler may recover damages under § 13a-149 .

1996Co. v. Krueger, 486 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1971) (Hardware Dealers), in which, after making payment of medical expense benefits to its insured, the insurer attempted, in accordance with a subrogation clause in the insurance policy, to sue the tortfeasor in order to recover the payments it had made to its insured.

1993App.3d 35 , 526 N.E.2d 679 (1988), held that the insurer's destruction of the allegedly defective product, prior to the filing of a products liability action, subjected the insurer's subrogation claim to dismissal as a sanction for destruction of the defective product.

1992Co. v. Hertz Corp., 375 N.E.2d 115 (1978), the court held that an unlimited general release executed by the insured for consideration not specifically including an amount covering the insurer's subrogation interest did not bar a subsequent subrogation claim by the insurance company if the tortfeasor or tortfeasor's insurance company (as here) had knowledge of the subrogation interest prior to the release.

1992Seaman v. Climate Control Corporation, 181 Conn. 592, 601-602 , 436 A.2d 271 (1980).

1992Seaman v. Climate Control Corporation, 181 Conn. 592, 601-602 , 436 A.2d 271 (1980).

1991Co. v. Lewis, 16 Conn. Sup. 90 (C.P. 1948) The "modern codes of practice" (i.e. both as provided by 104 of the Connecticut Practice Book and as conducted in the industry) allow an insurance company to assert a subrogation claim in its own name.

1990In our objective to construe statutory language so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature, mindful of inherent statutory interrelationships, we consider statutes “as a whole, with a view toward reconciling their separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation; [and in doing so] the application, moreover, of common sense to the statutory language is not to be excluded.” LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 29 , 420 A.2d 905 (1979); Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 371 , 511 A.2d 336 (1986).

1990In our objective to construe statutory language so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature, mindful of inherent statutory interrelationships, we consider statutes “as a whole, with a view toward reconciling their separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation; [and in doing so] the application, moreover, of common sense to the statutory language is not to be excluded.” LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 29 , 420 A.2d 905 (1979); Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 371 , 511 A.2d 336 (1986).

1990In our objective to construe statutory language so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature, mindful of inherent statutory interrelationships, we consider statutes “as a whole, with a view toward reconciling their separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation; [and in doing so] the application, moreover, of common sense to the statutory language is not to be excluded.” LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 29 , 420 A.2d 905 (1979); Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 371 , 511 A.2d 336 (1986).

1990In our objective to construe statutory language so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature, mindful of inherent statutory interrelationships, we consider statutes “as a whole, with a view toward reconciling their separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation; [and in doing so] the application, moreover, of common sense to the statutory language is not to be excluded.” LaProvidenza v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 23, 29 , 420 A.2d 905 (1979); Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 371 , 511 A.2d 336 (1986).

1973Both parties relied on the recent holding of our Supreme Court in Berlinski v. Ovellette, 164 Conn. 482, 489 .

1938In Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510 , resort was had to the purely equitable doctrine of subrogation.