subrogation doctrine in Kansas

1997Fenly v. Revell, 170 Kan. 705, 708 , 228 P.2d 905 (1951), cited by the trial court, states that the doctrine of subrogation “is a creature of equity invented to prevent a failure of justice and is broad enough to include every instance in which one party is required to pay a debt for which another is primarily answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience ought to be discharged by the latter. [Citations omitted.]” The issue appears to be whether the subsequent settlement of the case, the Glaesmans’ release of their claims against Steinle, and their cancellation of the tide policy, all o

1997Fenly v. Revell, 170 Kan. 705, 708 , 228 P.2d 905 (1951), cited by the trial court, states that the doctrine of subrogation “is a creature of equity invented to prevent a failure of justice and is broad enough to include every instance in which one party is required to pay a debt for which another is primarily answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience ought to be discharged by the latter. [Citations omitted.]” The issue appears to be whether the subsequent settlement of the case, the Glaesmans’ release of their claims against Steinle, and their cancellation of the tide policy, all o

1979Co., 134 Kan. 769 , 8 P.2d 359 .) “When such loss is fully covered and paid the rule is otherwise, provided the policy of insurance contains a subrogation clause whereby the insurer succeeds to rights of the insured.

1979Co., 134 Kan. 769 , 8 P.2d 359 .) “When such loss is fully covered and paid the rule is otherwise, provided the policy of insurance contains a subrogation clause whereby the insurer succeeds to rights of the insured.

2006In their discussion of the collateral source rule, a number of plaintiffs’ citations are to Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003), which was modified on rehearing (after plaintiffs’ brief was filed) by Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005).

2006In their discussion of the collateral source rule, a number of plaintiffs’ citations are to Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003), which was modified on rehearing (after plaintiffs’ brief was filed) by Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005).

2006In their discussion of the collateral source rule, a number of plaintiffs’ citations are to Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003), which was modified on rehearing (after plaintiffs’ brief was filed) by Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005).

2006In their discussion of the collateral source rule, a number of plaintiffs’ citations are to Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003), which was modified on rehearing (after plaintiffs’ brief was filed) by Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005).

2005Our Supreme Court determined that the loan company’s successors were entitled to recover under the doctrine of subrogation. 119 Kan. at 359-61 .

2004Thus, the court held that KFC could not maintain a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor defendants. 245 Kan. at 509 .

2004The court found this argument to be “circular and somewhat self-defeating” given the statutory language involved. 91 Or.

2004The Court of Appeals extended the holding of Bartee in Maston v. Harper, 18 Kan.

2004The Maston court concluded that an uninsured motorist carrier may pursue a subrogation claim against the insured of an insolvent insurer when: “(1) the damages owed by the insured exceed the insured’s coverage with tire insolvent carrier; and (2) the uninsured motorist carrier seeks to subrogate the insured only for the amount *905 by which the damages exceed the insolvent carrier’s coverage.” 18 Kan.

2003Joiner, 709 So. 2d at 1216-17 .

2003Joiner, 709 So. 2d at 1216-17 .

1998Also, “[i]n another suit, which was consolidated with Steinle’s claim, Chicago Title sued Steinle and her husband, Ervyl Steinle, under a subrogation clause in the title insurance policy to recover monies it expended to satisfy a claim by a third party under the title insurance policy.” 24 Kan.

1995Shelter cites Bardwell , where this court held that K.S.A. 40-3113a is not applicable where an insurer is entitled to duplicative PIP benefits based on a contractual setoff provision instead of through a subrogation claim. 15 Kan.

1994Peck v. Dill, 581 So. 2d 800, 802-05 (Ala. 1991) (relying on Hamrick v. Hospital Service Corp., 110 R.I. 634 , 296 A.2d 15 [1974]).

1994Peck v. Dill, 581 So. 2d 800, 802-05 (Ala. 1991) (relying on Hamrick v. Hospital Service Corp., 110 R.I. 634 , 296 A.2d 15 [1974]).

1988The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that Universal could assert a subrogation claim against Koehn ( 12 Kan.

1988App. 2d 215 , 738 P.2d 466 [1987]).

1985Co., 131 Kan. 628 , 293 Pac. 402 (1930), the court held that under the “union mortgage clause,” where it appears that the insurance company is not liable to the mortgagor and owner to whom the policy was issued, but is liable to the mortgagee, the insurance company upon payment of the amount of its policy is entitled to be fully subrogated to the security held by the mortgagee to the extent of the amount paid by it in accordance with the subrogation clause set forth in the mortgage clause attached to its policy.

1985Co., 131 Kan. 628 , 293 Pac. 402 (1930), the court held that under the “union mortgage clause,” where it appears that the insurance company is not liable to the mortgagor and owner to whom the policy was issued, but is liable to the mortgagee, the insurance company upon payment of the amount of its policy is entitled to be fully subrogated to the security held by the mortgagee to the extent of the amount paid by it in accordance with the subrogation clause set forth in the mortgage clause attached to its policy.

1979Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176 , 152 P.2d 836 (1944), the court discussed the rules applicable to situations in which an insurance policy contains a subrogation clause.

1979Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176 , 152 P.2d 836 (1944), the court discussed the rules applicable to situations in which an insurance policy contains a subrogation clause.

1944Hume v. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300 , 133 P. 2d 162 .

1944Hume v. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300 , 133 P. 2d 162 .

1937In U. S. Casualty Company v. State Highway Dept., 155 S. C. 77, 151 S. E. 887 , the statute involved was substantially the same as our G.

1901Rep. 187 ; Yaple v. Stephens, 36 id. 680 , 14 Pac. 222 ; Hofman v. Demple, 52 id. 756, 35 Pac. 803 ; Farm Land Co. v. Elsbree, 55 id. 562, 40 Pac. 906 ; Armstead v. Neptune, 56 id. 750, 44 Pac. 998 .) There are no intervening liens or encumbrances, and •therefore this is a clear case for the application of the •doctrine of subrogation.

1901Rep. 187 ; Yaple v. Stephens, 36 id. 680 , 14 Pac. 222 ; Hofman v. Demple, 52 id. 756, 35 Pac. 803 ; Farm Land Co. v. Elsbree, 55 id. 562, 40 Pac. 906 ; Armstead v. Neptune, 56 id. 750, 44 Pac. 998 .) There are no intervening liens or encumbrances, and •therefore this is a clear case for the application of the •doctrine of subrogation.

1901(Richards v. Griffith, 92 Cal. 493 , 28 Pac. 484 , 27 Am.

1901(Richards v. Griffith, 92 Cal. 493 , 28 Pac. 484 , 27 Am.

1896Eq. 234; Coe v. Railway Co., 31 id. 136; Building Association v. Thompson, 32 id. 133 ; Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mich. 81 ; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 39 Iowa, 657 ; Wormer v. Agricultural Works, 62 id. 699 .)’ The doctrine of subrogation, in equity, requires : (1) That the person seeking its benefit must have paid the. debt due to a third party before he can be substituted to that party’s rights ; (2) that in doing this he must not act as a mere volunteer, but' on compulsion, to save himself from loss by reason of a superior lien or claim on' the part of the other person to whom he pays the debt.

1896Eq. 234; Coe v. Railway Co., 31 id. 136; Building Association v. Thompson, 32 id. 133 ; Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mich. 81 ; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 39 Iowa, 657 ; Wormer v. Agricultural Works, 62 id. 699 .)’ The doctrine of subrogation, in equity, requires : (1) That the person seeking its benefit must have paid the. debt due to a third party before he can be substituted to that party’s rights ; (2) that in doing this he must not act as a mere volunteer, but' on compulsion, to save himself from loss by reason of a superior lien or claim on' the part of the other person to whom he pays the debt.

1896Eq. 234; Coe v. Railway Co., 31 id. 136; Building Association v. Thompson, 32 id. 133 ; Kitchell v. Mudgett, 37 Mich. 81 ; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 39 Iowa, 657 ; Wormer v. Agricultural Works, 62 id. 699 .)’ The doctrine of subrogation, in equity, requires : (1) That the person seeking its benefit must have paid the. debt due to a third party before he can be substituted to that party’s rights ; (2) that in doing this he must not act as a mere volunteer, but' on compulsion, to save himself from loss by reason of a superior lien or claim on' the part of the other person to whom he pays the debt.

1885(Sheldon on Subrogation, § 44; Wilkinson v. Babbitt, 4 Dillon, 208; Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 13 Wall. 517 ; Guckenheimer v. Angevine, 81 N. Y. 394 .) According to tbe unchallenged findings of the jury, the alteration of the mortgage by the plaintiff was not inadvertently made, nor was it done for the purpose of carrying out the intention and understanding of all the parties thereto, but was evidently made by plaintiff solely to advance his own interest at the expense of the defendants.

1885(Sheldon on Subrogation, § 44; Wilkinson v. Babbitt, 4 Dillon, 208; Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 13 Wall. 517 ; Guckenheimer v. Angevine, 81 N. Y. 394 .) According to tbe unchallenged findings of the jury, the alteration of the mortgage by the plaintiff was not inadvertently made, nor was it done for the purpose of carrying out the intention and understanding of all the parties thereto, but was evidently made by plaintiff solely to advance his own interest at the expense of the defendants.