subrogation claim in Florida

2005Co. v. Martin, 377 So.2d 827, 828-30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (holding that the trial court properly denied an insurer's subrogation claim from funds recovered by its insureds because the loss sustained exceeded the total recovery from all parties).

2004Co., 377 So.2d at 828, 830 (finding that the made whole rule applied to a subrogation clause providing: "This Company may require from the insured an assignment of all right of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by this Company" because this "subrogation clause does not appear to grant Farm Bureau any additional rights to those already existing under the common law rule of subrogation"); see also Wolfe v. Alfa Mut.

1933See Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 , 33 L.

1933See Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 , 33 L.

1979Since Rebozo obviously did not act as a mere "volunteer" in paying a judgment which had been entered of record against him, we hold that by doing so, he became equitably subrogated to the rights of both Mrs. Morejon [4] and the insured, Washwell, Inc., [5] against Royal for its bad faith refusal to settle, and to the claim of Washwell against Baldwin for its "malpractice" in failing to arrange for excess coverage. [6] This court has recently recognized such a subrogation claim in a similar situation in American Home Assurance Co. v. City of Opa Locka, 368 So.2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (Case no.

1968As stated in the opinion *18 in the case of Ulery v. Asphalt Paving, Inc., Fla.App. 1960, 119 So.2d 432 : "Subrogation, a creation of equity, is founded on the proposition of doing justice without regard to form, and was designed to afford relief where one is required to pay a legal obligation which ought to have been met, either wholly or partially, by another.

2024Moreover, the inchoate nature of the insurer’s subrogation claim, at the time section 627.714(4)’s amended version became effective, distinguishes this case from Hassen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 674 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996)—the case upon which the majority relies for the proposition that “the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.” Id. at 108 .

2024Moreover, the inchoate nature of the insurer’s subrogation claim, at the time section 627.714(4)’s amended version became effective, distinguishes this case from Hassen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 674 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996)—the case upon which the majority relies for the proposition that “the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.” Id. at 108 .

2015See, e.g., Gortz v. Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Sharpe, Roca, Fountain & Williams, 769 So.2d 484, 487-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that law firm could bring a subrogation claim in a third-party complaint before judgment was entered against it or payment was made).

2015The Third District Court of Appeal in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 476 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and Quinones v. Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 366 So.2d 854 ,-855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), held that the right of subrogation does not arise until the judgment in the main action is entered or payment has been made.

2009Compare Dominion, 754 So.2d at 855 (addressing whether the trial court erred by “dismissing the action with prejudice, holding that the complaint on its face established that the statute of limitations on a subrogation claim expired before the filing of the complaint”) with Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 407 (addressing whether “the trial court erred in finding that Metropolitan could bring a third-party action against Lucas”).

2009Compare Dominion, 754 So.2d at 855 (addressing whether the trial court erred by "dismissing the action with prejudice, holding that the complaint on its face established that the statute of limitations on a subrogation claim expired before the filing of the complaint") with Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 407 (addressing whether "the trial court erred in finding that Metropolitan could bring a third-party action against Lucas").

2009See Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Fla.2008) (“We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(ll)(c) to constitute an explicit exception, it would have been explicit. ...”).

2009See Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So.2d 1089, 1094 (Fla. 2008) ("We conclude that if the Legislature had intended for section 440.20(11)(c) to constitute an explicit exception, it would have been explicit....").

2009Compare Dominion, 754 So.2d at 855 (addressing whether the trial court erred by “dismissing the action with prejudice, holding that the complaint on its face established that the statute of limitations on a subrogation claim expired before the filing of the complaint”) with Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 407 (addressing whether “the trial court erred in finding that Metropolitan could bring a third-party action against Lucas”).

2009Compare Dominion, 754 So.2d at 855 (addressing whether the trial court erred by "dismissing the action with prejudice, holding that the complaint on its face established that the statute of limitations on a subrogation claim expired before the filing of the complaint") with Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 407 (addressing whether "the trial court erred in finding that Metropolitan could bring a third-party action against Lucas").

2009We have recognized that “the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002); see also Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla.2008) (repeating this quote). “[Wjords in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words.” State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680, 686 (Fla.2004).

2009We have recognized that “the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002); see also Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla.2008) (repeating this quote). “[Wjords in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words.” State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680, 686 (Fla.2004).

2009We have recognized that “the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002); see also Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla.2008) (repeating this quote). “[Wjords in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words.” State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680, 686 (Fla.2004).

2005The "made whole" rule was explained in the context of medical expense recovery in Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 675 So.2d 1382, 1384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996): The rule in Florida is that, at common law, an insurer does not have a right to subrogation, against its own insured, for medical expenses recovered by the insured from the tortfeasor, unless the insured collected all of his damages....

2004Whyel v. Smith, 101 Fla. 971 , 134 So. 552, 554 (1931)(quoting Sheldon on Subrogation (2d Ed.) at 373).

2004Whyel v. Smith, 101 Fla. 971 , 134 So. 552, 554 (1931)(quoting Sheldon on Subrogation (2d Ed.) at 373).

2004Co., 28 Cal.App.4th 533 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 661 (1994)("[a]lthough insurers may place subrogation clauses in their policies, those provisions typically are general and add nothing to the rights of subrogation arising by law") (citations omitted); Duncan v. Integon Gen.

2004Co., 28 Cal.App.4th 533 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 661 (1994)("[a]lthough insurers may place subrogation clauses in their policies, those provisions typically are general and add nothing to the rights of subrogation arising by law") (citations omitted); Duncan v. Integon Gen.

2004Co., 880 So.2d 1163, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2003)(finding that the made whole rule applies when a subrogation clause "simply states the fact that [the insurer] holds a general right of subrogation when the insured has a right to recover damages from a third party"); Sapiano v. Williamsburg Nat'l Ins.

2003See Doherty v. Songer, Inc., 195 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.1999); Spring Constr.

1999See also City of Tampa v. Nor ton, 681 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(right to distribution of proceeds is after funds are collected and the employees and employer either agree on the pro rata share due the employer or a court awards the pro rata share).

1999In Century Elevator Co. v. Spinos, 652 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the court noted that a tortfeasor who has notice of an employer’s subrogation claim settles with an employee only at the tort-feasor’s own risk, unless the employer is notified.

1998See Eastern, 508 So.2d at 1325 ("[w]here the relative positions of the parties are clearly fixed by terms of contracts, and enforcement of the contracts will not prejudicially affect the rights of innocent persons or otherwise work an injustice, there is no need to resort to equity").