20 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kral v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2016See id. ¶38 Ten years later, in Kral v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 784 P.2d 759 , 760–61 (Colo. 1989), an insured party challenged the enforceability of (1) a subrogation clause that required the insured to reimburse the insurer in the event that the insured recovered funds from “another party” and (2) a release-trust agreement in which the insured agreed to hold fifteen percent of any monies received in her tort action in trust for the insurer. 1998In Kral, we held that a subrogation clause contained in an insurance policy and a release-trust agreement executed pursuant to the subrogation provision were enforceable only to the extent that they did not impair the ability of the insured to gain full compensation for any loss caused by the conduct of an uninsured motorist.' See Kral, 784 P.2d at 765-66 . | 2 | 4 |
County Workers Compensation Pool v. Davisgreen2 sentences2007Davis, 817 P.2d at 526 . 1996For example, in County Workers Compensation Pool v. Davis, supra, the supreme court held that if an injured employee’s tort claim against a third party is settled for an amount greater than the insurer’s subrogation claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and the insurer has not actively participated in the tort litigation, the insurer may be ordered to pay a reasonable share of the attorney fees and court costs incurred by the employee in the tort litigation. | 1 | 3 |
Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeisergreen2 sentences2021Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser , 247 P.3d 1022, 1027 ( Colo. 2011 ) ( " [Insurer's] subrogation interest ... effectively allowed it to stand in [the insured's] shoes with respect to that amount, and [the settlement of insurer's] subrogation interest was thereby an effective settlement with [the insured] of her interest in the [covered] amount." ) . 2021Id. ¶49 Thereafter, Yeiser sued Ferrellgas for breach of contract, and a jury returned a verdict of approximately $314,000. | 1 | 2 |
Tivolino Teller House, Inc. v. Fagangreen1 sentence2016Deference to Agency Advisory Opinion ¶ 27 Ybarra further contends that we should, and the district court failed to, defer to the advisory opinion of the Colorado Collection Agency Board (Board) which concludes that “insurance subrogation claims are ‘debt’ within the meaning of [the CFDCPA].” 2 We do not exclude the possibility that under different circumstances than those presented here, a subrogation claim could constitute a “debt” under the CFDCPA. 12 ¶ 28 “[W]e must give deference to the reasonable interpretations of the administrative agencies that are authorized to administer and enforce | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurancegreen1 sentence2016See id. ¶38 Ten years later, in Kral v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 784 P.2d 759 , 760–61 (Colo. 1989), an insured party challenged the enforceability of (1) a subrogation clause that required the insured to reimburse the insurer in the event that the insured recovered funds from “another party” and (2) a release-trust agreement in which the insured agreed to hold fifteen percent of any monies received in her tort action in trust for the insurer. | 1 | 1 |
Dubois v. Abrahamsongreen1 sentence2016Dubois v. Abrahamson, 214 P.3d 586, 588 (Colo. App. 2009).2 D. | 1 | 1 |
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.green1 sentence2016Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 360 (Colo. 2003) (“[I]f the legislature disapproves of our interpretation, it has the power to amend the statute to make its intention clear.”). | 1 | 1 |
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Goldengreen1 sentence2012See Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 132 (Colo.2005) ("Interest, in the common acceptance of the term, 'is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use, detention, or forbearance of money or its equivalent.'" (quoting in part Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 445 , 334 P.2d 740, 741 (1959))). 120 Further, although the subrogation claim extends to the "amount of the recovery . actually collected," the statute also precludes the workers' compensation provider from recovering "any sum in excess of the amount of compensation for which" it | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Currigangreen2 sentences2012See Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 132 (Colo.2005) ("Interest, in the common acceptance of the term, 'is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use, detention, or forbearance of money or its equivalent.'" (quoting in part Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 445 , 334 P.2d 740, 741 (1959))). 120 Further, although the subrogation claim extends to the "amount of the recovery . actually collected," the statute also precludes the workers' compensation provider from recovering "any sum in excess of the amount of compensation for which" it 2012See Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 132 (Colo.2005) ("Interest, in the common acceptance of the term, 'is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use, detention, or forbearance of money or its equivalent.'" (quoting in part Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 445 , 334 P.2d 740, 741 (1959))). 120 Further, although the subrogation claim extends to the "amount of the recovery . actually collected," the statute also precludes the workers' compensation provider from recovering "any sum in excess of the amount of compensation for which" it | 1 | 1 |
Volunteers of America v. Gardenswartzgreen2 sentences2012Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d at 1092 (Rice, J., dissenting). 2012Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d at 1092 (Rice, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Richards v. Sucklegreen1 sentence2009Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex.App.1994) (holding that because the investor taking assignment of the mortgage was found to have notice of the subrogation claim, subrogation was appropriate). | 1 | 1 |
Employers Casualty Company v. Wainwrightgreen2 sentences1988See Employers Casualty Co. v. Wainwright, 28 Colo.App. 292 , 473 P.2d 181 (1970). 1988See Employers Casualty Co. v. Wainwright, 28 Colo.App. 292 , 473 P.2d 181 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Relying on Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1979) and Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d ed. 1986), the court concluded that “[t]he ordinary meaning of ‘transaction’ necessarily implies some type of business dealing between parties.” Hawthorne, 140 F.3d at 1371 . 2016In so concluding, the opinion rejected the applicability of Hawthorne because “[u]nlike the FDCPA, there is nothing in the Act’s definition 13 of ‘debt’ that requires that the ‘transaction’ involve a contractual or consensual arrangement or the purchase or use of goods or services.” ¶ 31 But, as we concluded above, the ordinary meaning of “transaction” does require “some type of business dealing between parties.” Hawthorne, 140 F.3d at 1371 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Continental Divide Insurance Co. v. Western Skies Management, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 1148-49 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority v. Jorgensen
green
1 sentence2003In Jorgensen , the court recognized that, based on the totality of circumstances, a trial court deciding an insurer’s subrogation claim against proceeds of a third-party settlement “may determine whether the settlement was fair and reasonable with regard to the amounts designated as loss, of consortium and noneconomic [loss].” 992 P.2d at 1166 ; see also Rains v. Kolberg Mfg. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rains v. Kolberg Manufacturing Corp.
green
1 sentence2003Corp., 897 P.2d 845 (Colo.App.1994)(in deciding insurer’s subrogation claim, court should determine reasonableness of third-party settlement involving dismissal of injured worker’s claim and allocating entire payment to wife’s loss of consortium claim). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brown v. Globe Union, a Div. of Johnson Controls
green
2 sentences1998In Brown v. Globe Union, supra, the court concluded that, notwithstanding Colorado’s various contacts with the controversy, Restatement § 185 supported application of Kansas law to a subrogation claim against settlement proceeds received by a Colorado resident who had been paid workers’ compensation benefits under Kansas law. 1998The court discussed the rationale underlying Restatement § 185 and concluded that, in a dispute over subrogation rights, there were “strong reasons for applying the law of the state whose workers’ compensation law was invoked by the employee-claimant to recover workers’ compensation benefits.” Brown v. Globe Union, supra, 694 F.Supp. at 798 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Agee v. TRUSTEES OF PEN. BD. OF CUNNINGHAM FIRE PD
green
2 sentences1996And, in a class action suit involving several volunteer firefighters, Agee v. Trustees of Pension Board, 33 Colo.App. 268 , 518 P.2d 301 (1974), a division of this court held that when many persons have an interest in a fund that is enhanced or preserved in litigation sponsored by an individual, a court of equity will award attorney’s fees out of the fund. 1996And, in a class action suit involving several volunteer firefighters, Agee v. Trustees of Pension Board, 33 Colo.App. 268 , 518 P.2d 301 (1974), a division of this court held that when many persons have an interest in a fund that is enhanced or preserved in litigation sponsored by an individual, a court of equity will award attorney’s fees out of the fund. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Tate v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
green
1 sentence1994A. The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that, if Adams was eligible for PIP benefits, then Tate v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra, bars his workers’ compensation carrier from asserting a subrogation claim against the alleged tortfeasors. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
GRANITE STATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Dundas
green
2 sentences1989Relying on Granite State Insurance Co. v. Dundas, 34 Colo.App. 382 , 528 P.2d 961 (1974), it held that the subrogation clause and the release-trust agreement did not violate the public policy of this state because uninsured motorist protection was optional rather than mandatory and because section *762 10-4-609, 4 C.R.S. (1979 Supp.), 3 does not expressly prohibit subrogation. 1989Relying on Granite State Insurance Co. v. Dundas, 34 Colo.App. 382 , 528 P.2d 961 (1974), it held that the subrogation clause and the release-trust agreement did not violate the public policy of this state because uninsured motorist protection was optional rather than mandatory and because section *762 10-4-609, 4 C.R.S. (1979 Supp.), 3 does not expressly prohibit subrogation. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cone v. Eldridge
neutral
1 sentence1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Duncan v. Guillet
neutral
2 sentences1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . 1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Milner v. Eskridge
green
2 sentences1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . 1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Scott v. Gregory
green
2 sentences1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . 1931Scott v. Gregory, 71 Colo. 300 , 206 Pac. 574 ; Milner v. Eskridge, 62 Colo. 430 , 163 Pac. 1115 ; Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 Pac. 299 ; Cone v. Eldridge, 51 Colo. 564 , 119 Pac. 616 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.