subrogation claim in West Virginia

1999In making the decision in Arnold , this Court reasoned that “‘[t]o establish an artificial rule which would provide an insurer with the right to sit back and permit its insured to proceed with an action, expecting to share in the avails of that proceeding without the burden of any of the expense, occurs to us to be anomalous.’ ” Id., 183 W.Va. at 33-34 , 393 S.E.2d at 671-72 , (quoting Klacik v. Kovacs, 111 N.J.Super. 307, 312 , 268 A.2d 305, 308 (1970) and citing Bell v. Federal Kemper Ins.

1999In making the decision in Arnold , this Court reasoned that “‘[t]o establish an artificial rule which would provide an insurer with the right to sit back and permit its insured to proceed with an action, expecting to share in the avails of that proceeding without the burden of any of the expense, occurs to us to be anomalous.’ ” Id., 183 W.Va. at 33-34 , 393 S.E.2d at 671-72 , (quoting Klacik v. Kovacs, 111 N.J.Super. 307, 312 , 268 A.2d 305, 308 (1970) and citing Bell v. Federal Kemper Ins.

1998We have consequently deferred to the Legislature in the formulation of the intricacies of the workers compensation system. 8 For instance, prior to the enactment of West Virginia Code § 23-2A-1 in 1990, this Court explained its refusal to recognize a subrogation claim in the absence of a specific subrogation statute, as follows: “We have traditionally stated that our workers’ compensation system is entirely a statutory creature and for this reason we feel that judicial intrusion into the statutory framework, particularly on so complex an issue, is unwarranted.” National Fruit Product Co., Inc.

1998We have consequently deferred to the Legislature in the formulation of the intricacies of the workers compensation system. 8 For instance, prior to the enactment of West Virginia Code § 23-2A-1 in 1990, this Court explained its refusal to recognize a subrogation claim in the absence of a specific subrogation statute, as follows: “We have traditionally stated that our workers’ compensation system is entirely a statutory creature and for this reason we feel that judicial intrusion into the statutory framework, particularly on so complex an issue, is unwarranted.” National Fruit Product Co., Inc.

1994For example, in Southern Pacific Transport Co. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 480 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.Ct.App.1972), the court found there was sufficient notice where "[t]he evidence shows that Southern Pacific had knowledge of the fact that State Farm had paid its insured's claim and was subrogated to the claim in that amount.

1994For example, in Southern Pacific Transport Co. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 480 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.Ct.App.1972), the court found there was sufficient notice where “[t]he evidence shows that Southern Pacific had knowledge of the fact that State Farm had paid its insured’s claim and was subrogated to the claim in that amount.

2013Accord Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Bennett, 199 W.Va. 236, 241 , 483 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1997). 3 Syllabus point 3 of Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Arnold, 183 W.Va. 31 , 393 S.E.2d 669 (1990), makes clear: When an automobile insurer is reimbursed, under a subrogation clause in the insurance contract, for benefits paid to a covered person that such person has then successfully (continued...) 3 II.

2013Accord Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Bennett, 199 W.Va. 236, 241 , 483 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1997). 3 Syllabus point 3 of Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Arnold, 183 W.Va. 31 , 393 S.E.2d 669 (1990), makes clear: When an automobile insurer is reimbursed, under a subrogation clause in the insurance contract, for benefits paid to a covered person that such person has then successfully (continued...) 3 II.

2015Co., 388 Md. 690, 713-14 , 882 A.2d 801, 814-15 (2005).

2015Co., 388 Md. 690, 713-14 , 882 A.2d 801, 814-15 (2005).

2013Accord Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Bennett, 199 W.Va. 236, 241 , 483 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1997). 3 Syllabus point 3 of Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Arnold, 183 W.Va. 31 , 393 S.E.2d 669 (1990), makes clear: When an automobile insurer is reimbursed, under a subrogation clause in the insurance contract, for benefits paid to a covered person that such person has then successfully (continued...) 3 II.

2013Accord Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Bennett, 199 W.Va. 236, 241 , 483 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1997). 3 Syllabus point 3 of Federal Kemper Insurance Company v. Arnold, 183 W.Va. 31 , 393 S.E.2d 669 (1990), makes clear: When an automobile insurer is reimbursed, under a subrogation clause in the insurance contract, for benefits paid to a covered person that such person has then successfully (continued...) 3 II.

2013Accord Anderson v. Wood, 204 W.Va. 558, 564 , 514 S.E.2d 408, 414 (1999). .

2013Accord Anderson v. Wood, 204 W.Va. 558, 564 , 514 S.E.2d 408, 414 (1999). .

2005In Newman v. Kay, 57 W.Va. 98, 112 , 49 S.E. 926, 931 (1905), we said: One of the best definitions of the term obiter dictum is said to be that given by Folger, J., in Rohrbach v. Germania Fire Ins.

2005In Newman v. Kay, 57 W.Va. 98, 112 , 49 S.E. 926, 931 (1905), we said: One of the best definitions of the term obiter dictum is said to be that given by Folger, J., in Rohrbach v. Germania Fire Ins.

2001Corp., 267 Ga. 646, 647 , 482 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1997) ("[N]early every appellate court that has considered the question has recognized that unless an insurance policy contains a provision to the contrary, an insurer’s right to recover under a subrogation clause of an insurance policy requires that the insured must have been fully compensated for the loss covered by the policy.”) (citation omitted).

2001Corp., 267 Ga. 646, 647 , 482 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1997) ("[N]early every appellate court that has considered the question has recognized that unless an insurance policy contains a provision to the contrary, an insurer’s right to recover under a subrogation clause of an insurance policy requires that the insured must have been fully compensated for the loss covered by the policy.”) (citation omitted).

2001Accord Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir.1997); District No. 1 — Pac.

1997The made-whole rule has been interpreted in insurance cases to mean that “[u]nder general principles of equity, in the absence of statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, an insured *449 must be fully compensated for injuries or losses sustained (made whole) before the subrogation rights of an insurance carrier arise.” Wine v. Globe American Casualty Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Ky.1996). 10 “The equitable principle underlying the made-whole rule in insurance subrogation cases is that the burden of loss should rest on the party paid to assume the risk (the insurer) and not

1997The made-whole rule has been interpreted in insurance cases to mean that “[u]nder general principles of equity, in the absence of statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, an insured *449 must be fully compensated for injuries or losses sustained (made whole) before the subrogation rights of an insurance carrier arise.” Wine v. Globe American Casualty Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Ky.1996). 10 “The equitable principle underlying the made-whole rule in insurance subrogation cases is that the burden of loss should rest on the party paid to assume the risk (the insurer) and not

1997The made-whole rule has been interpreted in insurance cases to mean that “[u]nder general principles of equity, in the absence of statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, an insured *449 must be fully compensated for injuries or losses sustained (made whole) before the subrogation rights of an insurance carrier arise.” Wine v. Globe American Casualty Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Ky.1996). 10 “The equitable principle underlying the made-whole rule in insurance subrogation cases is that the burden of loss should rest on the party paid to assume the risk (the insurer) and not

1997The made-whole rule has been interpreted in insurance cases to mean that “[u]nder general principles of equity, in the absence of statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, an insured *449 must be fully compensated for injuries or losses sustained (made whole) before the subrogation rights of an insurance carrier arise.” Wine v. Globe American Casualty Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Ky.1996). 10 “The equitable principle underlying the made-whole rule in insurance subrogation cases is that the burden of loss should rest on the party paid to assume the risk (the insurer) and not

1997While it is true that Nationwide places the initial burden of payment of a subrogation claim on a liability carrier who has timely knowledge of the claim or should have known of the claim, we also indicated in Nationwide that “[t]here may be an occasion where the insured who is represented by counsel participated in some fraudulent scheme against the subrogation carrier that would require that general priority to be reversed.” Nationwide, 191 W.Va. at 247 , 445 S.E.2d at 188.

1997Provident relies on language from a footnote in Nationwide wherein we indicated “[n]otification can come from the insurance carrier claiming subrogation or from the insured who has received the payments which are subject to the subrogation claim.” Nationwide, 191 W.Va. at 247 n. 5, 445 S.E.2d at 188 n. 5.

1931See generally on the modern doctrine of subrogation, Huggins v. Fitzpatrick, 102 W.