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11 Arkansas opinions name it 1 courts 1922–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chaffe Bro. v. Oliver
neutral
2 sentences1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. 1932In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. | 2 | 1932–1965 |
Cohn v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. 1932In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. | 2 | 1932–1965 |
Neff v. Elder
green
2 sentences1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. 1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. | 2 | 1932–1965 |
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co.
green
2 sentences1965In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Co., 108 Ark. 555 , 158 S. W. 1082 , this Court discussed at some length the equitable doctrine of subrogation, saying: “The doctrine of subrogation is an equitable one, having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice between the parties without regard to form, and its purpose and object is the prevention of injustice. 1965In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Co., 108 Ark. 555 , 158 S. W. 1082 , this Court discussed at some length the equitable doctrine of subrogation, saying: “The doctrine of subrogation is an equitable one, having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice between the parties without regard to form, and its purpose and object is the prevention of injustice. | 2 | 1925–1965 |
Daves v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2011Co., 302 Ark. 242 , 788 S.W.2d 733 (1990) (noting that in a disagreement between insurance companies over subrogation payments, one company is permitted to notify the other, by letter, of its intent to assert a subrogation claim). 2011Co., 302 Ark. 242 , 788 S.W.2d 733 (1990) (noting that in a disagreement between insurance companies over subrogation payments, one company is permitted to notify the other, by letter, of its intent to assert a subrogation claim). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Bing
green
1 sentence1996Co. v. Bing, 305 Ark. 280 , 808 S.W.2d 204 (1991), involved a subrogation claim for medical payments made by the claimant’s automobile insurance carrier; such claims are governed by a different statute, and this case is not relevant to the interpretation of § 11-9-410. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Sharp
neutral
2 sentences1996In Continental Casualty Co. v. Sharp, 312 Ark. 286 , 849 S.W.2d 481 (1993), we reversed the trial court’s award to Sharp of an attorney’s fee from the insurance carrier’s subrogation claim, because Sharp’s attorney had already collected a full one-third attorney’s fee from the gross amount of the judgment. 1996In Continental Casualty Co. v. Sharp, 312 Ark. 286 , 849 S.W.2d 481 (1993), we reversed the trial court’s award to Sharp of an attorney’s fee from the insurance carrier’s subrogation claim, because Sharp’s attorney had already collected a full one-third attorney’s fee from the gross amount of the judgment. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Transit Homes, Inc. v. Bellamy
green
2 sentences1993The next to last paragraph of the opinion in Transit Homes, Inc. v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453 , 671 S.W.2d 153 (1984), might be read to conflict with our earlier cases although it involves credit on a subrogation claim. 1993The next to last paragraph of the opinion in Transit Homes, Inc. v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453 , 671 S.W.2d 153 (1984), might be read to conflict with our earlier cases although it involves credit on a subrogation claim. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Cleaveland v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence1969So long as subrogation, as applied to this medical pay provision, serves to bar double recovery, it should be upheld.” In Cleaveland v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, 169 A. 2d 446 , though the question of an independent action on a subrogation claim was not involved, the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the general rule as follows: “The cases and text writers generally take the position that where third parties, who may be liable to an insured for a loss, effect a settlement with the latter and obtain a release from all liability with knowledge of the fact that an insurer has alr | 1 | 1969–1969 |
DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co. of Chicago, Ill.
green
1 sentence1969In DeCespedes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company of Chicago, Illinois (Florida), 193 So. 2d 224 , the court said: “The plaintiffs argue that the subrogation clause amounts to an attempt to assign a claim for personal injuries, such an assignment being invalid under the common law and not expressly sanctioned by statute. * * * “The concept of subrogation is distinct from that of a mere assignment. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Commonwealth Building and Loan Ass'n v. Martin
green
2 sentences1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. 1965Therefore no rule can be laid down for its universal application, and whether it is applicable or not depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises, and is subject to that most ancient maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Martin, 185 Ark. 858 , 49 S. W. 2d 1046 , Justice Butler said: “In many cases it has been our policy to apply the doctrine of subrogation, where by so doing the ends of justice will be met (Chaffee v. Oliver, 39 Ark. 531 ; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376 ; Neff v. Elder, 84 Ark. 277 , 105 S. W. 260 , 120 Am. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Jansen v. Perrin
neutral
2 sentences1950In Home Insurance Co. v. Lack, 196 Ark. 888 , 120 S. W. 2d 355 , in speaking of the extent of the doctrine of subrogation, we said: “As a general rule any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid even indirectly for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default of another, will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person' against the wrongdoer or defaulter.” In Jansen v. Perrin, 179 Ark. 927 , 19 S. W. 2d 1105 , we applied subrogation in a matter involving real estate; and the principle of subrogation, recognized in our cases as to real estate, has 1950In Home Insurance Co. v. Lack, 196 Ark. 888 , 120 S. W. 2d 355 , in speaking of the extent of the doctrine of subrogation, we said: “As a general rule any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid even indirectly for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default of another, will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person' against the wrongdoer or defaulter.” In Jansen v. Perrin, 179 Ark. 927 , 19 S. W. 2d 1105 , we applied subrogation in a matter involving real estate; and the principle of subrogation, recognized in our cases as to real estate, has | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Ellis-Jones Drug Co. v. Coker
neutral
2 sentences1950In 60 Corpus Juris 790, in the discussion of subrogati >n, this appears: “A purchaser of chattels, encumbered by a deed A trust, on being compelled to discharge the lien in order to protect his interest, is not a mere volunteer, and is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the trust deed. ’ ’ The Mississippi case of Ellis-Jones Drug Co. v. Coker, 156 Miss. 775 , 125 So. 826 , 127 So. 283 , fully supports the quoted text. 1950In 60 Corpus Juris 790, in the discussion of subrogati >n, this appears: “A purchaser of chattels, encumbered by a deed A trust, on being compelled to discharge the lien in order to protect his interest, is not a mere volunteer, and is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the trust deed. ’ ’ The Mississippi case of Ellis-Jones Drug Co. v. Coker, 156 Miss. 775 , 125 So. 826 , 127 So. 283 , fully supports the quoted text. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Home Insurance Co. v. Lack
green
2 sentences1950In Home Insurance Co. v. Lack, 196 Ark. 888 , 120 S. W. 2d 355 , in speaking of the extent of the doctrine of subrogation, we said: “As a general rule any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid even indirectly for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default of another, will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person' against the wrongdoer or defaulter.” In Jansen v. Perrin, 179 Ark. 927 , 19 S. W. 2d 1105 , we applied subrogation in a matter involving real estate; and the principle of subrogation, recognized in our cases as to real estate, has 1950In Home Insurance Co. v. Lack, 196 Ark. 888 , 120 S. W. 2d 355 , in speaking of the extent of the doctrine of subrogation, we said: “As a general rule any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has paid even indirectly for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default of another, will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person' against the wrongdoer or defaulter.” In Jansen v. Perrin, 179 Ark. 927 , 19 S. W. 2d 1105 , we applied subrogation in a matter involving real estate; and the principle of subrogation, recognized in our cases as to real estate, has | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Rodman v. Sanders
green
1 sentence1939It is as follows: ‘One who advances money to pay off an incumbrance on realty, at. the instance either of the owner of the property or the holder of the incumbrance, either on the express understanding or under circumstances from which an understanding will be implied, that the advance made is to be secured by a first lien on the property, is not a mere volunteer; and, in the event the new security is, for any reason, not a first lien on the property, the holder of such security, if not chargeable with culpable and inexcusable neglect, will be subrogated to the rights of the prior incumbrancer | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Marks v. Baum Bldg. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1939It is as follows: ‘One who advances money to pay off an incumbrance on realty, at. the instance either of the owner of the property or the holder of the incumbrance, either on the express understanding or under circumstances from which an understanding will be implied, that the advance made is to be secured by a first lien on the property, is not a mere volunteer; and, in the event the new security is, for any reason, not a first lien on the property, the holder of such security, if not chargeable with culpable and inexcusable neglect, will be subrogated to the rights of the prior incumbrancer 1939It is as follows: ‘One who advances money to pay off an incumbrance on realty, at. the instance either of the owner of the property or the holder of the incumbrance, either on the express understanding or under circumstances from which an understanding will be implied, that the advance made is to be secured by a first lien on the property, is not a mere volunteer; and, in the event the new security is, for any reason, not a first lien on the property, the holder of such security, if not chargeable with culpable and inexcusable neglect, will be subrogated to the rights of the prior incumbrancer | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Little Red River Levee District No. 2 v. Thomas
green
1 sentence1926The facts set forth in the complaints therefore show three distinct grounds of equity jurisdiction; first, to prevent a .multiplicity of suits, and to give plaintiffs an adequate remedy (Redbud Realty Co. v. South, 153 Ark. 381 ; Little River Levee District v. Thomas, 154 Ark. 328 ); second, to give the plain tiffs the bénefit of the equitable .doctrine of subrogation (Wilson v. White, 82 Ark. 407 ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napolcon Hill Cotton Co., 180 Ark. 555 ; Cowling v. Britt, 114 Ark. 176 ); and, third, the proper distribution of the funds held in trust by J. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Wilson v. White
neutral
1 sentence1926The facts set forth in the complaints therefore show three distinct grounds of equity jurisdiction; first, to prevent a .multiplicity of suits, and to give plaintiffs an adequate remedy (Redbud Realty Co. v. South, 153 Ark. 381 ; Little River Levee District v. Thomas, 154 Ark. 328 ); second, to give the plain tiffs the bénefit of the equitable .doctrine of subrogation (Wilson v. White, 82 Ark. 407 ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napolcon Hill Cotton Co., 180 Ark. 555 ; Cowling v. Britt, 114 Ark. 176 ); and, third, the proper distribution of the funds held in trust by J. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Blevins v. Rogers
neutral
1 sentence1925We also cite the ease of Blevins v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 258 , in support of the conclusion reached by us. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Hudson v. Union & Mercantile Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1922In Hudson v. Union & Mercantile Trust Co., 148 Ark. 249 , it was held that, under the doctrine of subrogation, one lending money to an insane woman to buy land may have a lien thereon for the amount of such purchase money. 1922In Hudson v. Union & Mercantile Trust Co., 148 Ark. 249 , it was held that, under the doctrine of subrogation, one lending money to an insane woman to buy land may have a lien thereon for the amount of such purchase money. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.