subrogation claim in Oklahoma

2017Co. , 1991 OK 84 , 816 P.2d 1135 and Robertson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar Co ., 1992 OK 113 , 836 P.2d 1294 .

2017Co. , 1991 OK 84 , 816 P.2d 1135 and Robertson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar Co ., 1992 OK 113 , 836 P.2d 1294 .

2017Co. , 1991 OK 84 , 816 P.2d 1135 and Robertson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar Co ., 1992 OK 113 , 836 P.2d 1294 .

2017Co. , 1991 OK 84 , 816 P.2d 1135 and Robertson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar Co ., 1992 OK 113 , 836 P.2d 1294 .

1937As said by this court in the case of Richardson v. American Surety Co., 97 Okla. 264 , 223 P. 389 : “The principle to be derived from the doctrine of subrogation is that it. is born of equity and results .from the natural justice of placing the burden where it ought to rest.

1937As said by this court in the case of Richardson v. American Surety Co., 97 Okla. 264 , 223 P. 389 : “The principle to be derived from the doctrine of subrogation is that it. is born of equity and results .from the natural justice of placing the burden where it ought to rest.

2006See generally King, 1972 OK 46, ¶¶ 5-6 , 496 P.2d at 802 ; State Farm v. Farmers, 1971 OK 120, ¶ 8 , 489 P.2d at 482 . 1 16 State Farm and Equity assert without citation to authority that Plaintiff had constructive notice of the policy's subrogation clause and all of the other terms of the policy because she accepted benefits.

2006See generally King, 1972 OK 46, ¶¶ 5-6 , 496 P.2d at 802 ; State Farm v. Farmers, 1971 OK 120, ¶ 8 , 489 P.2d at 482 . 1 16 State Farm and Equity assert without citation to authority that Plaintiff had constructive notice of the policy's subrogation clause and all of the other terms of the policy because she accepted benefits.

2006Oklahoma has adopted the "make whole" rule in regard to subrogation interests. 3 Reeds v. Walker, 2006 OK 43, ¶¶ 26-32 , - P.3d -, -, 2006 WL 1686739 ; Equity Fire & Cas.

2006Oklahoma has adopted the "make whole" rule in regard to subrogation interests. 3 Reeds v. Walker, 2006 OK 43, ¶¶ 26-32 , - P.3d -, -, 2006 WL 1686739 ; Equity Fire & Cas.

2002Id. at ¶ 14, 634 P.2d at 720 . ¶ 26 What Baker and Berry teach is that, in the situation of a fault-free injured worker, a workers' compensation insurer's subrogation claim is not limited or subject to apportionment on the basis of comparative fault between the third party and the injured worker's fellow employee or employer, where they are joint tortfeasors.

2002Id. at I 14, 634 P.2d at 720 . 126 What Baker and Berry teach is that, in the situation of a fault-free injured worker, a workers' compensation insurer's subrogation claim is not limited or subject to apportionment on the basis of comparative fault between the third party and the injured worker's fellow employee or employer, where they are joint tortfeasors.

2000The jury awarded actual damages for bad-faith breach of contract in the amount of $200,000.00 and $200,000.00 in punitive damages. 824 P.2d at 1108 . . - USAA knew early in its investigation that Terry was sixteen, was uninsured, and that he had no assets from which to satisfy a subrogation claim.

2000The jury awarded actual damages for bad-faith breach of contract in the amount of $200,000.00 and $200,000.00 in punitive damages. 824 P.2d at 1108 . [5] USAA knew early in its investigation that Terry was sixteen, was uninsured, and that he had no assets from which to satisfy a subrogation claim.

1999As noted in Travelers Insurance Companies v. Dickey, 1990 OK 109 , 799 P.2d 625 , it was the tenant’s insurable interest in the property damaged which gave rise to the equitable principle that barred the insurer’s subrogation claim in Sutton.

1999As noted in Travelers Insurance Companies v. Dickey, 1990 OK 109 , 799 P.2d 625 , it was the tenant’s insurable interest in the property damaged which gave rise to the equitable principle that barred the insurer’s subrogation claim in Sutton.

1996Those cases held that if a plan is silent about the priority of payment, does not expressly give its managers the right to resolve ambiguities, and the facts do not clearly show that the beneficiary’s settlement included reimbursement for medical expenses, the plan will not be allowed to recover, despite ERISA. *576 In Sanders v. Scheideler and NEPCO EMBA, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.C.W.D.Wis.1993), affirmed without opinion, 25 F.3d 1053 , 1994 WL 234497 (7th Cir.1994), the court said: The subrogation clause does not address the priority of the plan’s subrogation rights ... to the undesignated

1996Those cases held that if a plan is silent about the priority of payment, does not expressly give its managers the right to resolve ambiguities, and the facts do not clearly show that the beneficiary’s settlement included reimbursement for medical expenses, the plan will not be allowed to recover, despite ERISA. *576 In Sanders v. Scheideler and NEPCO EMBA, 816 F.Supp. 1338, 1344 (D.C.W.D.Wis.1993), affirmed without opinion, 25 F.3d 1053 , 1994 WL 234497 (7th Cir.1994), the court said: The subrogation clause does not address the priority of the plan’s subrogation rights ... to the undesignated

1989Within three (3) years: An action upon a contract express or implied not in writing; an action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty; and an action on a foreign judgment." [Emphasis added.] [9] 85 O.S. 1981 §§ 1 et seq. [10] 85 O.S.Supp. 1985 § 11. [11] Okl., 592 P.2d 526 [1979]. [12] Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris, supra, note 11 at 528. [13] Cf. Rucker Co. v. M & P Drilling Co., Okl., 653 P.2d 1239, 1242 [1982], where the court held that a clause in a contract between an employer and supplier which freed the latter from all liability connected with

1979Central Surety and Insurance Corporation v. Richardson, 183 Okl. 38 , 80 P.2d 663 (1938). 12A O.S.1971, § 1-201(40) provides: “‘Surety’ includes guarantor.” A surety acquires rights against the principal upon payment of the debt through the equitable doctrine of subrogation.

1979Central Surety and Insurance Corporation v. Richardson, 183 Okl. 38 , 80 P.2d 663 (1938). 12A O.S.1971, § 1-201(40) provides: “‘Surety’ includes guarantor.” A surety acquires rights against the principal upon payment of the debt through the equitable doctrine of subrogation.

1975Maryland Casualty Company v. King, Okl., 381 P.2d 153 .

1975In Jacobs v. Northeastern Corporation, 416 Pa. 417 , 206 A.2d 49 (1965), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that subrogation rights are not “security interests” within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.

1975In Jacobs v. Northeastern Corporation, 416 Pa. 417 , 206 A.2d 49 (1965), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that subrogation rights are not “security interests” within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.

1975Other courts have been called upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of subrogation has been abrogated, modified, affected or abridged by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. *1373 In French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty & Finance Co., 346 Mass. 716 , 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964), the Supreme Judicial Council of Massachusetts said that no provision of the Uniform Commercial Code purports to affect the fundamental equitable doctrine of subrogation.

1975Other courts have been called upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of subrogation has been abrogated, modified, affected or abridged by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. *1373 In French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty & Finance Co., 346 Mass. 716 , 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964), the Supreme Judicial Council of Massachusetts said that no provision of the Uniform Commercial Code purports to affect the fundamental equitable doctrine of subrogation.

1975Co. v. First National City Bank of New York, 411 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1969) (Puerto Rico) ; Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F. 2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Mass, law); Home Indemnity Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 , 193 Ct.Cl. 266 (1970) (applying Ill. law).” In view of one of the express purposes and policies underlying the Code is “to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”; and in view of the still viable and persuasive decisions heretofore set out; and in view of our own decisional law hereinafter discussed, concerning the equitable doctrine

1975In the case of National Shawmut Bank of Boston, supra, (involving a public works contract) the court said that a performing surety, under compulsion, is entitled to step in three shoes.

1975Co. v. First National City Bank of New York, 411 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1969) (Puerto Rico) ; Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F. 2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Mass, law); Home Indemnity Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 , 193 Ct.Cl. 266 (1970) (applying Ill. law).” In view of one of the express purposes and policies underlying the Code is “to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”; and in view of the still viable and persuasive decisions heretofore set out; and in view of our own decisional law hereinafter discussed, concerning the equitable doctrine

1975Co. v. First National City Bank of New York, 411 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1969) (Puerto Rico) ; Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F. 2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Mass, law); Home Indemnity Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 , 193 Ct.Cl. 266 (1970) (applying Ill. law).” In view of one of the express purposes and policies underlying the Code is “to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”; and in view of the still viable and persuasive decisions heretofore set out; and in view of our own decisional law hereinafter discussed, concerning the equitable doctrine

1975Co. v. First National City Bank of New York, 411 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1969) (Puerto Rico) ; Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F. 2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Mass, law); Home Indemnity Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 , 193 Ct.Cl. 266 (1970) (applying Ill. law).” In view of one of the express purposes and policies underlying the Code is “to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”; and in view of the still viable and persuasive decisions heretofore set out; and in view of our own decisional law hereinafter discussed, concerning the equitable doctrine

1973Co. v. Ingle, Okl., 494 P.2d 320 (1972), holding a medical pay subrogation agreement unenforceably void as between an insurer and a third party 2 We know not whether plaintiff’s automobile policy contains a subrogation clause comparable to the one dealt with in the Ingle case.

1972In Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Krueger, Okl., 486 P.2d 737 (1971), we held that as between an insurer and a third party (tortfeasor) the subrogation clause for medical pay in an automobile public liability insurance contract is void.

1963As bearing upon this contention see Grubbs v. Slater (Ky.), 266 S.W.2d 85, 86 , where it was said that a Kentucky statute of the same general purport as the cited statutes “was not intended to restrict but to enlarge the equitable doctrine of subrogation and the common-law rule of contribution.” We are of the opinion that the facts pleaded in plaintiff’s petition show that Color Rite had a cause of action against defendant to recover damages directly resulting from latter’s breach of the warranty provisions of his contract with Color Rite; that fact that plaintiff was not a party to the contra

1963As bearing upon this contention see Grubbs v. Slater (Ky.), 266 S.W.2d 85, 86 , where it was said that a Kentucky statute of the same general purport as the cited statutes “was not intended to restrict but to enlarge the equitable doctrine of subrogation and the common-law rule of contribution.” We are of the opinion that the facts pleaded in plaintiff’s petition show that Color Rite had a cause of action against defendant to recover damages directly resulting from latter’s breach of the warranty provisions of his contract with Color Rite; that fact that plaintiff was not a party to the contra

1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 .

1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 .

1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 .

1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 .