subrogation doctrine in North Carolina

1934Tbe attempt to bold plaintiff personally for tbe debt was perhaps an afterthought of plaintiff, but tbe plaintiff’s rights are set forth in Bank v. Page, ante, p. 18 (22) : “Tbe law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with tbe mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor,to assume and to pay off tbe mortgage debt, such agreement inures to tbe benefit of tbe bolder of tbe mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by tbe mortgagee, thenceforth as between them selves, the grantee occupies tbe positi

1934The law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with the mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor, to assume and to pay off the mortgage debt, such agreement inures to the benefit of the holder of the mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by the mortgagee, thenceforth as between themselves, the grantee occupies the position of principal debtor and the mortgagor that of surety, and the liability thus arising from said assumption agreement may be enforced by suit in equity, under the doctrine o

1934Tbe attempt to bold plaintiff personally for tbe debt was perhaps an afterthought of plaintiff, but tbe plaintiff’s rights are set forth in Bank v. Page, ante, p. 18 (22) : “Tbe law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with tbe mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor,to assume and to pay off tbe mortgage debt, such agreement inures to tbe benefit of tbe bolder of tbe mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by tbe mortgagee, thenceforth as between them selves, the grantee occupies tbe positi

1934Tbe attempt to bold plaintiff personally for tbe debt was perhaps an afterthought of plaintiff, but tbe plaintiff’s rights are set forth in Bank v. Page, ante, p. 18 (22) : “Tbe law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with tbe mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor,to assume and to pay off tbe mortgage debt, such agreement inures to tbe benefit of tbe bolder of tbe mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by tbe mortgagee, thenceforth as between them selves, the grantee occupies tbe positi

1994It later turned out that Central Mutual had coverage and on appeal the Court asked this question: “Was claimant such a pure volunteer as to be deprived of the right of subrogation?” In answer, the Court said: “ ‘Cases in our own reports illustrate the doctrine that though the party who makes the payment may, in fact, have no real or valid legal interest to protect, he may yet be sub-rogated when he acts in good faith, in the belief that he had such interest.’ Publishing Co. v. Barber, supra [ 165 N.C. 478 , 81 S.E. 694 ], . . . * * * “It is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of subrogation if (

1994It later turned out that Central Mutual had coverage and on appeal the Court asked this question: “Was claimant such a pure volunteer as to be deprived of the right of subrogation?” In answer, the Court said: “ ‘Cases in our own reports illustrate the doctrine that though the party who makes the payment may, in fact, have no real or valid legal interest to protect, he may yet be sub-rogated when he acts in good faith, in the belief that he had such interest.’ Publishing Co. v. Barber, supra [ 165 N.C. 478 , 81 S.E. 694 ], . . . * * * “It is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of subrogation if (

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

2017Id. at 37 , 464 S.E.2d at 311 (citing N.C.

1996Because the third party judgment exceeded the subrogation claim of the workers’ compensation insurance carrier, this Court agreed and held that G.S. § 97-10.2(j) was inapplicable, even if the actual proceeds of the judgment were insufficient to compensate the subrogation claim. “•Giving the statute its plain meaning, requires us to read the term ‘judgment’ to mean just that, and to reject plaintiffs’ argument that we should look only at the insurance ‘proceeds’ that Mrs. Hieb is to receive in determining the applicability of section 97-10.2(j).” Id. at 38, 464 S.E.2d at 311 .

1938Davison, v. Gregory, 132 N. C., 389 ; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C., 558 ; Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 .

1938Davison v. Gregory , 132 N.C. 389 ; Moring v. Privott , 146 N.C. 558 ; Bank v. Bank , 158 N.C. 238 .

1938Davison, v. Gregory, 132 N. C., 389 ; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C., 558 ; Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 .

1938Davison v. Gregory , 132 N.C. 389 ; Moring v. Privott , 146 N.C. 558 ; Bank v. Bank , 158 N.C. 238 .

1934The law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with the mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor, to assume and to pay off the mortgage debt, such agreement inures to the benefit of the holder of the mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by the mortgagee, thenceforth as between themselves, the grantee occupies the position of principal debtor and the mortgagor that of surety, and the liability thus arising from said assumption agreement may be enforced by suit in equity, under the doctrine o

1934The law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with the mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor, to assume and to pay off the mortgage debt, such agreement inures to the benefit of the holder of the mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by the mortgagee, thenceforth as between themselves, the grantee occupies the position of principal debtor and the mortgagor that of surety, and the liability thus arising from said assumption agreement may be enforced by suit in equity, under the doctrine o

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

2017Constructors, Inc. , 347 N.C. 530 , 534, 538, 495 S.E.2d 356 , 358-59, 361 (1998) (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Hieb and holding that "since the judgment for plaintiff against the third-party tort-feasor in this case, in the amount of $219,052.20, is greater than the amount of the lien at the time of the trial court's order and is thus not 'insufficient to compensate the subrogation claim,' the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the amount of the lien pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j)").

2017Constructors, Inc. , 347 N.C. 530 , 534, 538, 495 S.E.2d 356 , 358-59, 361 (1998) (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Hieb and holding that "since the judgment for plaintiff against the third-party tort-feasor in this case, in the amount of $219,052.20, is greater than the amount of the lien at the time of the trial court's order and is thus not 'insufficient to compensate the subrogation claim,' the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the amount of the lien pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j)").

2017This Court found the subrogation clause "plain and unambiguous" as both parties "agreed to include a subrogation waiver clause in any insurance policies ... which covered the leased premises." Id. at 226-27 , 522 S.E.2d at 801 .

2017This Court found the subrogation clause "plain and unambiguous" as both parties "agreed to include a subrogation waiver clause in any insurance policies ... which covered the leased premises." Id. at 226-27 , 522 S.E.2d at 801 .

2016Co. , 90 N.C.App. 646 , 649, 369 S.E.2d 644 , 646 (1988) (Greene, J., concurring) ("In many instances, pursuit of a subrogation claim against an underinsured tortfeasor is futile because of the financial status of the tortfeasor.").

2016Co. , 90 N.C.App. 646 , 649, 369 S.E.2d 644 , 646 (1988) (Greene, J., concurring) ("In many instances, pursuit of a subrogation claim against an underinsured tortfeasor is futile because of the financial status of the tortfeasor.").

2008This case presents the question of whether the statutory framework governing the State's subrogation claim for medical expenses on a Medicaid recipient's tort claim settlement complies with federal Medicaid law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 , 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006).

2008This case presents the question of whether the statutory framework governing the State's subrogation claim for medical expenses on a Medicaid recipient's tort claim settlement complies with federal Medicaid law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 , 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006).

2004App. 348 , 447 S.E.2d 504 (1994), a case involving an insurance company’s subrogation claim against an employee who had embezzled money from the insured.

2002In Martinez v. Lovette, the court held that the superior court has jurisdiction to decide the amount of an employer's lien in two circumstances: "when a judgment is obtained which is insufficient to compensate the subrogation claim of the Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier, or when a settlement agreement has been agreed upon by the employee and the third party." Martinez v. Lovette , 121 N.C.

2002Hieb v. Lowery , 516 S.E.2d 621 (N.C.App. 1999).

1997Buckner, 113 N.C.

1997In instances such as that sub judice where the Commission has granted an award of temporary total benefits, which by definition have no set termination date, Kennedy, 101 N.C.

1990He quotes verbatim his argument for equitable subrogation which he had included in his brief in the prior related appeal, Harris-Teeter v. Watts, id.

1965That is the holding in Herring v. Jackson, supra; Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589 , 114 S.E. 2d 277 ; Casualty Co. v. Guaranty Co., supra, and like cases.

1965That is the holding in Herring v. Jackson, supra; Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589 , 114 S.E. 2d 277 ; Casualty Co. v. Guaranty Co., supra, and like cases.

1944Wallace v. Benner , 200 N.C. 124 , 156 S.E. 795 ; 50 Am.

1944Wallace v. Benner , 200 N.C. 124 , 156 S.E. 795 ; 50 Am.

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

1934In the petition to rehear, the defendants for the first time suggest that under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, they are entitled to succeed to the rights of the creditor corporation in the securities held by it, as the money advanced by Dulin was used to pay Fisher’s debt, and cite in support thereof Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 197 , 18 S. E., 104 , Bank v. Bank, 158 N. C., 238 , 73 S. E., 157 , Grantham v. Nunn, 187 N. C., 394 , 121 S. E., 662 .

1931Speaking of subrogation, in Publishing Co. v. Barber, 165 N. C., at pp. 487-8, it is said: “The doctrine is one of equity and benevolence, and, like contribution and other similar equitable rights, was adopted from the civil law, and its basis is the doing of complete; essential, and perfect justice between all the parties without regard to form, and its object is the prevention of injustice.” Jeffreys v. Hocutt, 195 N. C., 339 ; Morris v. Y. & B.

1926The principle of law applicable to this contention is thus stated by Justice Hoke in Davie v. Sprinkle, 180 N. C., 582 : “As to collateral paper held by the creditor, the surety, on payment of the principal debt, is ordinarily entitled to the full equitable doctrine of subrogation, but if he pays the principal debt on which he is himself bound, whether by judgment bond or other, without the assignment as suggested, the original obligation is extinguished and he becomes the simple contract creditor of the principal.” Hanner v. Douglass, 57 N. C., 265 ; Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 200 ; Tripp v.

1926The principle of law applicable to this contention is thus stated by Justice Hoke in Davie v. Sprinkle, 180 N. C., 582 : “As to collateral paper held by the creditor, the surety, on payment of the principal debt, is ordinarily entitled to the full equitable doctrine of subrogation, but if he pays the principal debt on which he is himself bound, whether by judgment bond or other, without the assignment as suggested, the original obligation is extinguished and he becomes the simple contract creditor of the principal.” Hanner v. Douglass, 57 N. C., 265 ; Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C., 200 ; Tripp v.