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9 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dilullo v. Josephgreen2 sentences2015The rationale supporting this ruling was advanced by DiLullo v. Joseph, which held, under a commercial lease, that allocating responsibility to the tenant to maintain sufficient insurance in anticipation of a subrogation claim is untenable and 18 would result in economic waste. !d. ~ 15 (discussing DiLullo, 259 Conn. 847 , 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002)). 2015The rationale supporting this ruling was advanced by DiLullo v. Joseph, which held, under a commercial lease, that allocating responsibility to the tenant to maintain sufficient insurance in anticipation of a subrogation claim is untenable and 18 would result in economic waste. !d. ~ 15 (discussing DiLullo, 259 Conn. 847 , 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002)). | 2 | 2 |
North River Ins. Co. v. Snydergreen2 sentences2011Instead, consistent with common business practice, the motel’s insurer paid the claim, and then, pursuant to the subrogation clause of its insurance contract with the motel, assumed the motel’s claim and sued MSAD 43. [¶ 15] We addressed such a claim in North River Insurance Co. v. Snyder, a subrogation action, much like the action here, in which a property owner’s insurer brought a subrogation action against a tenant for fire damage caused by the tenant’s babysitter’s negligent disposal of a cigarette. 2002 ME 146, ¶¶ 3, 4 , 804 A.2d 399 . 2011Instead, consistent with common business practice, the motel’s insurer paid the claim, and then, pursuant to the subrogation clause of its insurance contract with the motel, assumed the motel’s claim and sued MSAD 43. [¶ 15] We addressed such a claim in North River Insurance Co. v. Snyder, a subrogation action, much like the action here, in which a property owner’s insurer brought a subrogation action against a tenant for fire damage caused by the tenant’s babysitter’s negligent disposal of a cigarette. 2002 ME 146, ¶¶ 3, 4 , 804 A.2d 399 . | 1 | 2 |
Sutton v. Jondahlgreen2 sentences2009That doctrine provides that absent an express agreement to the contrary, the tenant can be considered co-insured under the landlord's insurance policy because (1) "both parties have an insurable interest in the premises, the former owns the fee, and the latter has a possessory interest"; (2) the landlords purchased fire insurance to "protect such interests ... as a matter of sound business practice the premium paid had to be considered in establishing the rent rate"; and (3) it follows that "the tenant actually paid the premium as part of the monthly rental." Snyder, at ~ 13, 804 A.2d at 403 ( 2002The Snyders moved for a summary judgment contending that North River’s subrogation 3 claim was barred because the Snyders were “co-insureds” under the policy North River provided to Cortland. 4 [¶ 5] The Magistrate Judge (Cohen, M.J.) agreed with the Snyders and recommended that a summary judgment be granted because, as a matter of law, they were “implied” co-insureds under the landlord’s insurance policy with North River Insurance, and therefore could not be sued in subrogation (citing, inter alia, Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla.Ct.App.1975)). | 1 | 2 |
Kennedy v. Brunswick Convalescent Centergreen1 sentence1998See Kennedy v. Brunswick Convalescent Ctr., 584 A.2d 678, 681 (Me.1991) (subsequent employer not entitled to apportionment after employee settled claim against previous employer). 2 The subrogation principle has been carried forward into the new Act by subsection 2. | 1 | 1 |
Boney, Insurance Comr. v. . Insurance Co.green2 sentences1981Co., supra 213 N.C. at 568, 197 S.E. at 126 ; North-West Insurance Co. v. Western Pacific Ins. 1981Co., supra 213 N.C. at 568, 197 S.E. at 126 ; North-West Insurance Co. v. Western Pacific Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dunson v. South Portland Housing Authority
green
2 sentences2007The hearing officer also concluded, however, that MIGA is responsible for paying the inflation adjustments related to the 1981 date of injury because they are a direct obligation owed to the employee for which “the protection MIGA has from reimbursing insurers is not applicable,” citing Dunson v. South Portland Housing Authority, 2003 ME 16 , 814 A.2d 972 . [¶ 5] We granted MIGA’s petition for appellate review limited to the issue of whether it is obligated to pay the inflation adjustments. 2007The hearing officer also concluded, however, that MIGA is responsible for paying the inflation adjustments related to the 1981 date of injury because they are a direct obligation owed to the employee for which “the protection MIGA has from reimbursing insurers is not applicable,” citing Dunson v. South Portland Housing Authority, 2003 ME 16 , 814 A.2d 972 . [¶ 5] We granted MIGA’s petition for appellate review limited to the issue of whether it is obligated to pay the inflation adjustments. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
North East Insurance v. Concord General Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1997We concluded, however, that the term “volunteer” “should be narrowly and strictly interpreted to allow liberal application of the doctrine of subrogation, and that any doubt as to the applicability of the exception should be resolved against the existence of volunteer status.” Id. (citations omitted). 1997In addition, we reasoned that one is not a volunteer if he pays “under a mistaken belief that he had an obligation to pay or interest to protect.” Id. [¶ 9] We conclude that Nicholas was primarily liable on the debt incurred to finish the addition on the Summit Street house. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stevens v. King
neutral
1 sentence1943Yet our Court has said in Stevens v. King, 84 Me., 291, 24 A. 850,851 , as to the doctrine of subrogation: “It ignores the form and looks to the substance. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Leavitt v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1943In Leavitt v. Railway Co., 90 Me., 153 at 160, ( 37 A. 886 ), our Court said: “ ... an insurer who has paid a loss for which another is responsible, either by statute or at common law, is subrogated to any claim that the insured had against the person whose tortious act caused the injury, or who for any other reason is liable therefor.” It appears to be the reasoning of the Court below that the makers of the note, who are primarily liable thereon, by their tortious act in burning the automobile, caused the loss; that their indorser, the defendant, was free from fault, and the doctrine of subro | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.