subrogation claim in Maryland

2006Under the mechanics’ lien statute at issue in Barry Properties , “there [was] a ‘subsisting lien’ as soon as materials [were] supplied or work [was] performed, ... which constituted] a cloud on the property owner’s title____[Thus,] he no longer [had] unfettered title [and] his equity [was] diminished to the extent of the lien.” 277 Md. at 23-24 , 353 A.2d 222 .

2006Under the mechanics’ lien statute at issue in Barry Properties , “there [was] a ‘subsisting lien’ as soon as materials [were] supplied or work [was] performed, ... which constituted] a cloud on the property owner’s title____[Thus,] he no longer [had] unfettered title [and] his equity [was] diminished to the extent of the lien.” 277 Md. at 23-24 , 353 A.2d 222 .

2024BACKGROUND A. Subrogation Under the doctrine of subrogation, “an obligation extinguished by a payment made by a third person is treated as still subsisting for the benefit of this third person.” Gables Constr., Inc. v. Red Coats, Inc., 468 Md. 632 , 654 n.16 (2020) (quoting Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 412 (1989)).

2020“In contrast, a work related accident that is not the fault of a third party does not give rise to a subrogation claim.” Id.

2010LEXIS 9794 (reasoning owner and insurer could not bring claim against contractor for losses sustained more than four years after construction was complete, because of subrogation waiver and completed project insurance clause in form contract); Midwestern Indem., 801 N.E.2d at 670 (holding an insurer’s subrogation action was precluded by a subrogation waiver and completed project insurance clause, indicating that if the owner “obtained property insurance after project completion it would waive its rights against contractors and subcontractors”); Acuity, 2008 WL 625097 , at *11, 2008 Ohio App. L

2010Co., 756 A.2d 515 (Me.2000) (considering, when a contractor was performing ongoing repairs, whether a subrogation waiver was enforceable); Carlson Rests.

2010Id. at 794-95 .

2009Thus, the County argues, the Owners “must be presumed to know the dates” under Section 17-11-210 of the impact fee ordinance “by which the County PZO and FO were required to make the challenged administrative decisions.” 10 *563 In Moreland, 152 Md.App. at 291-94 , 831 A.2d at 1092-94 , the COSA considered whether the plaintiffs, members of an HMO, were barred by limitations from recovering funds received by a health maintenance organization (“HMO”) from a tortfeasor’s insurance carrier in settlement of the HMO’s subrogation claim.

2009Thus, the County argues, the Owners “must be presumed to know the dates” under Section 17-11-210 of the impact fee ordinance “by which the County PZO and FO were required to make the challenged administrative decisions.” 10 *563 In Moreland, 152 Md.App. at 291-94 , 831 A.2d at 1092-94 , the COSA considered whether the plaintiffs, members of an HMO, were barred by limitations from recovering funds received by a health maintenance organization (“HMO”) from a tortfeasor’s insurance carrier in settlement of the HMO’s subrogation claim.

2005The Legal Landscape Although the prospect of subrogation claims against tenants of the insured has long existed, the actual emergence of such actions has been traced by at least one commentator, Milton Friedman, to a 1950 case that inferentially involved but did not turn on a subrogation claim — General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 , 71 S.Ct. 532 , 95 L.Ed. 683 (1951).

2005The Legal Landscape Although the prospect of subrogation claims against tenants of the insured has long existed, the actual emergence of such actions has been traced by at least one commentator, Milton Friedman, to a 1950 case that inferentially involved but did not turn on a subrogation claim — General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 , 71 S.Ct. 532 , 95 L.Ed. 683 (1951).

2005The Legal Landscape Although the prospect of subrogation claims against tenants of the insured has long existed, the actual emergence of such actions has been traced by at least one commentator, Milton Friedman, to a 1950 case that inferentially involved but did not turn on a subrogation claim — General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 , 71 S.Ct. 532 , 95 L.Ed. 683 (1951).

2005The Legal Landscape Although the prospect of subrogation claims against tenants of the insured has long existed, the actual emergence of such actions has been traced by at least one commentator, Milton Friedman, to a 1950 case that inferentially involved but did not turn on a subrogation claim — General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 , 71 S.Ct. 532 , 95 L.Ed. 683 (1951).

2000Roberts, 349 Md. 499 , 709 A.2d 142 , was premised in substantial part on the government’s “strong interest in keeping its Medicaid program as efficient as possible and limited to its function of being the payor of last resort.” Roberts, 349 Md. at 519 , 709 A.2d at 152 .

2000Roberts, 349 Md. 499 , 709 A.2d 142 , was premised in substantial part on the government’s “strong interest in keeping its Medicaid program as efficient as possible and limited to its function of being the payor of last resort.” Roberts, 349 Md. at 519 , 709 A.2d at 152 .

1998In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. 43 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 , there was a due process challenge to pre-hearing government seizure of a residence subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) as property used to commit or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense!

1998In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. 43 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 , there was a due process challenge to pre-hearing government seizure of a residence subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) as property used to commit or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense!

1996“In Maryland it has long been held that a chose in action may be validly assigned.” Medical Mutual v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 29 , 622 A.2d 103 (1993) (citing Adair v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114, 117-118 (1835)).

1996“In Maryland it has long been held that a chose in action may be validly assigned.” Medical Mutual v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 29 , 622 A.2d 103 (1993) (citing Adair v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114, 117-118 (1835)).

1996Co., 277 Md. 177, 182 , 353 A.2d 249 (1976); see also Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 412 , 559 A.2d 365 (1980) (stating that subrogation “is intended to provide relief against loss and damage to a meritorious creditor who has paid the debt of another”); Rinn v. First Union Nat.

1996Co., 277 Md. 177, 182 , 353 A.2d 249 (1976); see also Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 412 , 559 A.2d 365 (1980) (stating that subrogation “is intended to provide relief against loss and damage to a meritorious creditor who has paid the debt of another”); Rinn v. First Union Nat.

1993The claimant in the workers’ compensation case of Nazario v. Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc., 45 Md.App. 243 , 412 *609 A.2d 1271, cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 (1980), claimed that the insurer should be estopped from making a subrogation claim because it had failed to intervene in the action until after the claimant had settled the case.

1989Surety Co. v. Bethlehem Bank, 314 U.S. 314, 317 , 62 S.Ct. 226, 228 , 86 L.Ed. 241 (1941) (citing H.

1989Surety Co. v. Bethlehem Bank, 314 U.S. 314, 317 , 62 S.Ct. 226, 228 , 86 L.Ed. 241 (1941) (citing H.

1989Nevertheless, this Court held that Schnader was entitled to recover under that doctrine because his pleadings satisfied the requisite elements. 236 Md. at 24-25 , 202 A.2d 326 .

1989Nevertheless, this Court held that Schnader was entitled to recover under that doctrine because his pleadings satisfied the requisite elements. 236 Md. at 24-25 , 202 A.2d 326 .

1974J., Sec. 26, p. 712.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in a federal case, Dampskibsaktieselskabet v. Bellingham Stevedoring Co., 457 F. 2d 889 (9th Cir. 1972) where ship charterers paid demurrage in the apparently mistaken but good faith belief that they were obligated to do so, the Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “The district judge found that this belief was a reasonable interpretation of the terms of the charter-parties and that a reasonable good faith belief that one is obligated to pay is sufficient for application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation.