proximate cause test in Georgia

2020See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 649 (2) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010).

2020See State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 649 (2) ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010).

2023Determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable that death could result from the predicate crime requires considering “the elements of the felony not in the abstract, but in the actual circumstances in which the felony was committed.” Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 885 (1) (843 SE2d 784) (2020).

2023Determining whether it was reasonably foreseeable that death could result from the predicate crime requires considering “the elements of the felony not in the abstract, but in the actual circumstances in which the felony was committed.” Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 885 (1) (843 SE2d 784) (2020).

2022Finally, the proximate-cause inquiry asks whether “a prudent [manufacturer] would foresee an appreciable risk that,” as a result of an unreasonable design decision, “some harm would happen” “according to ordinary and usual experience.” Johnson, 311 Ga. at 592 (citation and punctuation omitted). 3.

2022Finally, the proximate-cause inquiry asks whether “a prudent [manufacturer] would foresee an appreciable risk that,” as a result of an unreasonable design decision, “some harm would happen” “according to ordinary and usual experience.” Johnson, 311 Ga. at 592 (citation and punctuation omitted). 3.

2022See Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., 281 Ga. 740, 740-741, 744 (3) ( 642 SE2d 691 ) (2007) (holding in the context of a proximate-cause analysis that both a third party, who tortiously fired a paintball gun at the plaintiff’s eye while mistakenly believing the safety mechanism was engaged, and the paintball-gun manufacturer, who allegedly designed the safety mechanism with a defective “safe” indicator, could be liable for the resulting injury). (d) Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design

2022See Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., 281 Ga. 740, 740-741, 744 (3) ( 642 SE2d 691 ) (2007) (holding in the context of a proximate-cause analysis that both a third party, who tortiously fired a paintball gun at the plaintiff’s eye while mistakenly believing the safety mechanism was engaged, and the paintball-gun manufacturer, who allegedly designed the safety mechanism with a defective “safe” indicator, could be liable for the resulting injury). (d) Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design

2022See John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 751 ( 604 SE2d 822 ) (2004) (declining to diverge from longstanding negligence principles for public-policy reasons because the ordinary proximate-cause standard already addressed the relevant policy concerns).

2022See John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 751 ( 604 SE2d 822 ) (2004) (declining to diverge from longstanding negligence principles for public-policy reasons because the ordinary proximate-cause standard already addressed the relevant policy concerns).

2021I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that none of the alleged negligence of Richey’s co-defendants is “ the kind of intervening act that would break the causal chain as a matter of law” because, in its view, Courtney Station’s failure to conduct maintenance on the property for over five years was reasonably foreseeable and not “sufficient of itself to cause the injury.” To be sure, an intervening act will not break the chain of causation between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury if the character of the intervening act “was such that its probable or natural consequenc

2021I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that none of the alleged negligence of Richey’s co-defendants is “ the kind of intervening act that would break the causal chain as a matter of law” because, in its view, Courtney Station’s failure to conduct maintenance on the property for over five years was reasonably foreseeable and not “sufficient of itself to cause the injury.” To be sure, an intervening act will not break the chain of causation between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury if the character of the intervening act “was such that its probable or natural consequenc

2021I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that none of the alleged negligence of Richey’s co-defendants is “ the kind of intervening act that would break the causal chain as a matter of law” because, in its view, Courtney Station’s failure to conduct maintenance on the property for over five years was reasonably foreseeable and not “sufficient of itself to cause the injury.” To be sure, an intervening act will not break the chain of causation between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury if the character of the intervening act “was such that its probable or natural consequenc

2021I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that none of the alleged negligence of Richey’s co-defendants is “ the kind of intervening act that would break the causal chain as a matter of law” because, in its view, Courtney Station’s failure to conduct maintenance on the property for over five years was reasonably foreseeable and not “sufficient of itself to cause the injury.” To be sure, an intervening act will not break the chain of causation between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury if the character of the intervening act “was such that its probable or natural consequenc

2019See Meiners, supra, 210 Ga. App. at 613 (1) (where the first attorney advised a subsequent attorney that a party needed to be served, and the second attorney had more than six months to accomplish service, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the second attorney would have failed to cure the first attorney’s error); see also White, supra, 225 Ga. App. at 469 (although the first attorney’s failure to timely effect service on the proper parties may have been a cause in fact of subsequent attorneys’ decision to accept a settlement, the first attorney’s negligence was “too remote to satisfy the

2011But in any event, we can discern nothing in the record to suggest that Klein and the firm should have foreseen that, as a result of giving bad advice to Duncan about the merits of his claims against NGK, Duncan would elect to enroll in a law school in a faraway place, leave his family behind, and refinance his home to cover the costs of law school and the expenses of his family in the meantime. 6 The alleged malpractice might well be a cause of Duncan leaving his job with NGK, but it is not the proximate cause of his free choice to remake his life and enter into the practice of law. 7 The “int

2015See also Minter v. Tyson Foods, 271 Ga. App. 185, 187 (1), n. 5 ( 609 SE2d 137 ) (2004) (under Padgett, employee who is terminated from employment for reasons directly related to job injury is not required to establish that she made diligent effort to find employment elsewhere before becoming entitled to workers’ compensation benefits).

2015See also Minter v. Tyson Foods, 271 Ga. App. 185, 187 (1), n. 5 ( 609 SE2d 137 ) (2004) (under Padgett, employee who is terminated from employment for reasons directly related to job injury is not required to establish that she made diligent effort to find employment elsewhere before becoming entitled to workers’ compensation benefits).

2015“A finding that the reasons for the termination were a pretext to avoid continued payment of benefits would satisfy the proximate cause requirement.” Id. at 107 (3), n. 9 (citation omitted).

2015“A finding that the reasons for the termination were a pretext to avoid continued payment of benefits would satisfy the proximate cause requirement.” Id. at 107 (3) n. 9 (citation omitted).

2012See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 255 Ga. App. 585, 591-592 (6) ( 565 SE2d 889 ) (2002) (trial court’s charges on accident and proximate cause proper and adjusted to evidence in case when boat passenger jumped in front of approaching boat on collision course with passenger’s boat).

2012See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 255 Ga. App. 585, 591-592 (6) ( 565 SE2d 889 ) (2002) (trial court’s charges on accident and proximate cause proper and adjusted to evidence in case when boat passenger jumped in front of approaching boat on collision course with passenger’s boat).

2012(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Prince v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Ga. App. 108, 110 (2) ( 435 SE2d 482 ) (1993).

2012(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Prince v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Ga. App. 108, 110 (2) ( 435 SE2d 482 ) (1993).

1998Redding was aware Tanner had no ladder and intended to use binoculars for the roof and eaves inspection. "`Except in plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, questions of negligence, proximate cause, including the related issues of foreseeability, assumption of risk, lack of ordinary care for one's own safety, lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another's negligence, contributory and comparative negligence are for the jury.' [Cit.] The proximate cause requirement constitutes a limit on legal liability; it i

1998Redding was aware Tanner had no ladder and intended to use binoculars for the roof and eaves inspection. "`Except in plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, questions of negligence, proximate cause, including the related issues of foreseeability, assumption of risk, lack of ordinary care for one's own safety, lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another's negligence, contributory and comparative negligence are for the jury.' [Cit.] The proximate cause requirement constitutes a limit on legal liability; it i

2025Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 569 (explaining that the proximate cause requirement for felony murder predicated on armed robbery is satisfied when the “victim [is] in fact shot and killed by the defendant in the course of 10 the robbery . . . because one could reasonably foresee that a death could be caused by an armed robbery in just that way.”).

2025The majority opinion explains that the trial court “veered off course” by applying a proximate-cause analysis based on this Court’s decision in Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 ( 894 SE2d 27 ) (2023).

2025Co., Inc., 315 Ga. App. 909, 913 (2) (b) ( 729 SE2d 52 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 30 Id. at 913-14 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Adams, Georgia Law of Torts, § 11:2 (2011–2012 ed.). 17 Here, TICO submitted evidence that its jockey trucks were subjected to regular maintenance and specifically that the subject jockey truck was inspected four days before Johnson’s accident and then again on the morning of the accident, with neither inspection indicating the vehicle was not functioning properly.

2025Co., Inc., 315 Ga. App. 909, 913 (2) (b) ( 729 SE2d 52 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 30 Id. at 913-14 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Adams, Georgia Law of Torts, § 11:2 (2011–2012 ed.). 17 Here, TICO submitted evidence that its jockey trucks were subjected to regular maintenance and specifically that the subject jockey truck was inspected four days before Johnson’s accident and then again on the morning of the accident, with neither inspection indicating the vehicle was not functioning properly.

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[T]he application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be 30 unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.”). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standard, lia- bility may be imposed “for th

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) ( 815 SE2d 837 ) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[The] application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing 30 malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standar

2023Under the proximate- cause standard, the defendant is liable “for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Menzies v. State, 304 Ga. 156, 161 (II) (816 SE2d 638) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Under the proximate- cause standard, the defendant is liable “for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Menzies v. State, 304 Ga. 156, 161 (II) ( 816 SE2d 638 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[T]he application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be 30 unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.”). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standard, lia- bility may be imposed “for th

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) ( 815 SE2d 837 ) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[The] application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing 30 malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standar

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[T]he application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be 30 unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.”). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standard, lia- bility may be imposed “for th

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) ( 815 SE2d 837 ) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[The] application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing 30 malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standar

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) (815 SE2d 837) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[T]he application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be 30 unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.”). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standard, lia- bility may be imposed “for th

2023See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849 (II) ( 815 SE2d 837 ) (2018) (“felony murder requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony”) (citation and punc- tuation omitted); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 (1) (“[The] application of the [felony murder] rule to felonies not foreseeably dangerous would be unsound analytically because there is no logical basis for imputing 30 malice from the intent to commit a felony not dangerous to human life.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). (ii) Proximate Cause As explained above, under the proximate-cause standar

2023Any felony can be a predicate for felony murder so long as it is “inherently dangerous to human life,” meaning that it is “dangerous per se” or “by its circumstances create[d] a foreseeable risk of death.” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 14 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin’s death.

2023Any felony can be a predicate for felony murder so long as it is “inherently dangerous to human life,” meaning that it is “dangerous per se” or “by its circumstances create[d] a foreseeable risk of death.” Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 14 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin’s death.

2023Under the proximate-cause standard, the defendant is liable for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 733 (4) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2023Under the proximate-cause standard, the defendant is liable for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 733 (4) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2022“The element of causation is determined under the proximate cause standard.” Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 585, 587 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 583) (2020).

2022“The element of causation is determined under the proximate cause standard.” Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 585, 587 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 583) (2020).

2019Compare Rapid Group, Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 43, 47-48 (2) ( 557 SE2d 420 ) (2001) (where the attorney of record knew that the trial court had ordered that his client’s pleadings would be struck if discovery responses were not filed, and also knew that his client and its local attorney were not acting timely, the attorney of record should have anticipated a default judgment and his duties were not eliminated by the local attorney’s actions).

2019Compare Rapid Group, Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 43, 47-48 (2) ( 557 SE2d 420 ) (2001) (where the attorney of record knew that the trial court had ordered that his client’s pleadings would be struck if discovery responses were not filed, and also knew that his client and its local attorney were not acting timely, the attorney of record should have anticipated a default judgment and his duties were not eliminated by the local attorney’s actions).

2019See Meiners, supra, 210 Ga. App. at 613 (1) (where the first attorney advised a subsequent attorney that a party needed to be served, and the second attorney had more than six months to accomplish service, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the second attorney would have failed to cure the first attorney’s error); see also White, supra, 225 Ga. App. at 469 (although the first attorney’s failure to timely effect service on the proper parties may have been a cause in fact of subsequent attorneys’ decision to accept a settlement, the first attorney’s negligence was “too remote to satisfy the

2019See Meiners, supra, 210 Ga. App. at 613 (1) (where the first attorney advised a subsequent attorney that a party needed to be served, and the second attorney had more than six months to accomplish service, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the second attorney would have failed to cure the first attorney’s error); see also White, supra, 225 Ga. App. at 469 (although the first attorney’s failure to timely effect service on the proper parties may have been a cause in fact of subsequent attorneys’ decision to accept a settlement, the first attorney’s negligence was “too remote to satisfy the

2010NOTES [1] See, e.g., Wilson, 190 Ga. at 829 , 10 S.E.2d 861 (upholding proximate cause instruction and malice murder conviction where the defendant smashed the victim's skull with a hatchet and the victim died nine months later from infection and gangrenous lung abscess); Ward v. State, 238 Ga. 367, 369 , 233 S.E.2d 175 (1977) (holding that, even if the defendant's act of throwing the drunken victim off a bridge into a river "did not directly cause" the victim's death, "the jury was authorized to find that this act either materially contributed to the death ... or materially accelerated it" un

2010NOTES [1] See, e.g., Wilson, 190 Ga. at 829 , 10 S.E.2d 861 (upholding proximate cause instruction and malice murder conviction where the defendant smashed the victim's skull with a hatchet and the victim died nine months later from infection and gangrenous lung abscess); Ward v. State, 238 Ga. 367, 369 , 233 S.E.2d 175 (1977) (holding that, even if the defendant's act of throwing the drunken victim off a bridge into a river "did not directly cause" the victim's death, "the jury was authorized to find that this act either materially contributed to the death ... or materially accelerated it" un

2010Or, as it may otherwise be stated, the unlawful act must be found by the jury to be the proximate cause of the homicide." (citations omitted)); Cook v. State, 134 Ga.App. 357, 359 , 214 S.E.2d 423 (1975) (approving detailed proximate cause instruction on murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter charges); Johnson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 433, 434 , 317 S.E.2d 213 (1984) ("The term and concept of proximate cause has been applied in vehicular homicide cases in this state for many years."); Hickman v. State, 186 Ga.App. 118, 119 , 366 S.E.2d 426 (1988) (rejecting claim in voluntar

2010Or, as it may otherwise be stated, the unlawful act must be found by the jury to be the proximate cause of the homicide." (citations omitted)); Cook v. State, 134 Ga.App. 357, 359 , 214 S.E.2d 423 (1975) (approving detailed proximate cause instruction on murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter charges); Johnson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 433, 434 , 317 S.E.2d 213 (1984) ("The term and concept of proximate cause has been applied in vehicular homicide cases in this state for many years."); Hickman v. State, 186 Ga.App. 118, 119 , 366 S.E.2d 426 (1988) (rejecting claim in voluntar