proximate cause instruction in Illinois

2026That is, “although sentence two of IPI Civil No. 15.01 is an accurate statement of law on proximate cause in general, it does not state the law regarding the sole proximate cause defense with the specificity Leonardi requires.” Id. ¶ 205 Johnson found that the hospital defendant was entitled to a sole proximate cause instruction, insofar as there was some expert testimony that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by a medical condition, fetal growth restriction (FGR).

2026That is, “although sentence two of IPI Civil No. 15.01 is an accurate statement of law on proximate cause in general, it does not state the law regarding the sole proximate cause defense with the specificity Leonardi requires.” Id. ¶ 205 Johnson found that the hospital defendant was entitled to a sole proximate cause instruction, insofar as there was some expert testimony that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by a medical condition, fetal growth restriction (FGR).

2021Accordingly, this defense is aptly referred to as the ‘empty chair’ defense.” McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 516 , 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (2000). ¶ 101 The First District recently explained the sole proximate cause defense in the context of a medical malpractice case in Ghostanyans v. Goodwin, 2021 IL App (1st) 192125, ¶ 74 .

2021Accordingly, this defense is aptly referred to as the ‘empty chair’ defense.” McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 516 , 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (2000). ¶ 101 The First District recently explained the sole proximate cause defense in the context of a medical malpractice case in Ghostanyans v. Goodwin, 2021 IL App (1st) 192125, ¶ 74 .

2005In Galman, the plaintiff urged the court to abandon the condition/cause distinction and exclusively use the proximate cause standard as described in Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 , 605 N.E.2d at 503 (describing proximate cause as consisting of cause in fact and legal cause).

2005In Galman, the plaintiff urged the court to abandon the condition/cause distinction and exclusively use the proximate cause standard as described in Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 , 605 N.E.2d at 503 (describing proximate cause as consisting of cause in fact and legal cause).

2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan

2024See Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 50 (“the loss of chance doctrine comports with the traditional proximate cause standard” and “requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d at 120 (“the loss of chance concept, when properly analyzed, does not relax or lower plaintiffs’ burden of proving causation”). ¶ 20 To show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, Quintana needed to present evidence that Defendan

2008Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 134 (1997); Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107, 121 (1986).

2008Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 121 .

2022For a proximate-cause inquiry in a negligence action, the question is the following: “Was the defendant’s negligence a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury, and, if so, was the injury of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct?” First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 258-59 .

2020While a defendant need not be able to foresee the specific harm that would occur (see Coleman v. Provena Hospitals, 2018 IL App (2d) 170313 , ¶ 25), the proximate-cause analysis nevertheless asks “whether the intervening efficient cause was of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct” (Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 259 ).

2022As a result, the only party who could be liable at retrial would be Howe (see 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2010)), and therefore, it has to bear the entirety of the judgment, as the circuit court concluded. ¶ 71 Nevertheless, generally, a defendant such as Howe would be allowed to use a sole proximate cause defense and argue that a third party was the sole proximate cause of another’s injuries and death. “ ‘[T]he plaintiff exclusively bears the burden of proof to establish the element of causation through competent evidence ***.’ ” Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 582, 591 (2010) (

2019The court noted that the defendant “wishe[d] to offer evidence of decedent’s other exposures *** to contest causation through the use of the sole proximate cause defense.” Id. at 438 .

2019So while the supreme court did uphold the trial court’s denial of a sole proximate cause instruction, that holding had nothing to do with the number of nonparty actors blamed, and everything to do with how the defendant presented its case at trial. ¶ 47 Clayton v. County of Cook, 346 Ill.

2019In that way, Clayton is distinguishable in much the same way as Holton—the sole proximate cause instruction was properly denied because there was no evidence at trial to support it. ¶ 50 Second and more importantly, in rejecting the idea that multiple causes besides the defendant’s negligence could be the “sole” proximate cause of the decedent’s death, the appellate court in Clayton specifically noted that the defendant had “provided no authority” for that position, that all of the cases the defendant cited involved a single other cause, “not multiple factors.” Id.

2023If the lesser-included offense instruction had been given, and if the jurors found (b) robbery instead of theft, but did not find (a) legal cause, they could have acquitted him of felony murder, while still finding him guilty of robbery. ¶ 65 The key to understanding how the jurors could find defendant accountable for robbery while acquitting him for felony murder is understanding that the proximate cause theory underlying felony murder is different from the accountability or agency theory underlying guilt for the robbery. 27 No. 1-21-0848 ¶ 66 In the accountability instruction given in this c

2023If the lesser-included offense instruction had been given, and if the jurors found (b) robbery instead of theft, but did not find (a) legal cause, they could have acquitted him of felony murder, while still finding him guilty of robbery. ¶ 65 The key to understanding how the jurors could find defendant accountable for robbery while acquitting him for felony murder is understanding that the proximate cause theory underlying felony murder is different from the accountability or agency theory underlying guilt for the robbery. 27 No. 1-21-0848 ¶ 66 In the accountability instruction given in this c

2006THE SOLE-PROXIMATE-CAUSE DEFENSE In Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990), the supreme court wrote that “[t]he essential elements of a cause of action based on common[-]law negligence may be stated briefly as follows: the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach.” In Leonardi, the supreme court further explained the proximate-cause requirement as follows: “In any negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving not only duty and breach of duty, but also that d

2006THE SOLE-PROXIMATE-CAUSE DEFENSE In Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990), the supreme court wrote that “[t]he essential elements of a cause of action based on common[-]law negligence may be stated briefly as follows: the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach.” In Leonardi, the supreme court further explained the proximate-cause requirement as follows: “In any negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving not only duty and breach of duty, but also that d

2021“Following Strino, in the absence of special interrogatories answering whether the plaintiff proved - 30 - negligence based on the MRI films disclosing a nerve compression, we cannot determine from the general verdict whether the sole proximate cause instruction made any difference.” Id.

2021The court concluded as follows: “We find the circuit court erred in granting the plaintiff a new trial based on the sole proximate cause instruction where the jury might well have concluded that the defendant doctors were not negligent in returning its general verdict in favor of the defendants.” Id. at 405 . ¶ 125 b.

2023However, the Hudson court found that, “[a]lthough foreseeability is a necessary component of a proximate cause analysis, it need not be specifically mentioned in a jury instruction to communicate the idea of ‘proximate’ to a jury.” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 ; People v. Nash, 2012 IL App (1st) 093233, ¶ 27 (while 16 No. 1-21-0848 “[f]oreseeability is an essential consideration in a proximate cause analysis, *** explicitly mentioning the term ‘foreseeability’ in a jury instruction is not necessary to convey the concept of ‘proximate’ to a jury”). ¶ 41 In Hudson, the supreme court found that the

2023However, the Hudson court found that, “[a]lthough foreseeability is a necessary component of a proximate cause analysis, it need not be specifically mentioned in a jury instruction to communicate the idea of ‘proximate’ to a jury.” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 ; People v. Nash, 2012 IL App (1st) 093233, ¶ 27 (while 16 No. 1-21-0848 “[f]oreseeability is an essential consideration in a proximate cause analysis, *** explicitly mentioning the term ‘foreseeability’ in a jury instruction is not necessary to convey the concept of ‘proximate’ to a jury”). ¶ 41 In Hudson, the supreme court found that the

2018Our supreme court considered “whether the proximate cause requirement of section 11-501(d)(1)(F) means that the State must prove the defendant’s drug use, rather than his driving, caused the deaths.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 20 .

2018Our supreme court considered "whether the proximate cause requirement of section 11-501(d)(1)(F) means that the State must prove the defendant's drug use, rather than his driving, caused the deaths." Martin , 2011 IL 109102 , ¶ 20, 353 Ill.Dec. 247 , 955 N.E.2d 1058 .

2021App. 3d at 45 (citing Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill.

2020App. 3d at 45 (citing Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill.

2019Rivera v. Garcia , 401 Ill.

2019Rivera v. Garcia, 401 Ill.

2025This preference for the long form is not negated simply by the fact that there were no defendants, other than Monsanto, in this case. ¶ 24 Although the long form of IPI Civil No. 15.01 would have been preferable here to reiterate to the jury that it could find Monsanto liable even if there were other non-Monsanto causes of the plaintiffs’ cancer, “it is not always error to use the short form of the proximate cause instruction even when the long form is preferable.” Campbell v. Wagner, 303 Ill.

2025This preference for the long form is not negated simply by the fact that there were no defendants, other than Monsanto, in this case. ¶ 25 Although the long form of IPI Civil No. 15.01 would have been preferable here to reiterate to the jury that it could find Monsanto liable even if there were other non-Monsanto causes of the plaintiffs’ cancer, “it is not always error to use the short form of the proximate cause instruction even when the long form is preferable.” Campbell v. Wagner, 303 Ill.

2025Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.” Id. at 466-67 .

2024Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.” Id. at 466-67 . ¶ 32 Thus, the reason behind the felony murder statute was to limit the violence accompanying forcible felonies by automatically subjecting individuals to a murder prosecution charge when someone is killed during the commission of a forcible felony.

2008In Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517 , 805 N.E.2d 213 (2004), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that though proof of the actual deception of a plaintiff is required to establish the proximate cause requirement, the deception need not always be direct between the defendant and the plaintiff.

2008In Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517 , 805 N.E.2d 213 (2004), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that though proof of the actual deception of a plaintiff is required to establish the proximate cause requirement, the deception need not always be direct between the defendant and the plaintiff.

2022As a result, the only party who could be liable at retrial would be Howe (see 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2010)), and therefore, it has to bear the entirety of the judgment, as the circuit court concluded. ¶ 71 Nevertheless, generally, a defendant such as Howe would be allowed to use a sole proximate cause defense and argue that a third party was the sole proximate cause of another’s injuries and death. “ ‘[T]he plaintiff exclusively bears the burden of proof to establish the element of causation through competent evidence ***.’ ” Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 582, 591 (2010) (

2019“Like the trial court in Nolan,” the court wrote, “the trial court here erred in excluding evidence that would have supported the defendant’s sole proximate cause defense.” Id. at 591 .

2010On remand, the appellate court, in a footnote, initially noted, "[T]he supreme court's opinion framed the issue that we should address on remand as `United's concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on sole proximate cause.' Ready, 232 Ill.2d at 385 [ 328 Ill.Dec. 836 , 905 N.E.2d 725 ].

2010On remand, the appellate court, in a footnote, initially noted, "[T]he supreme court's opinion framed the issue that we should address on remand as `United's concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on sole proximate cause.' Ready, 232 Ill.2d at 385 [ 328 Ill.Dec. 836 , 905 N.E.2d 725 ].

2010We note that the issue was raised in the appellate court, but that court concluded that, because it was remanding for a new trial, it `need not now address United's contention.' [ Ready, ] 367 Ill.App.3d at 279 [ 305 Ill.

2010We note that the issue was raised in the appellate court, but that court concluded that, because it was remanding for a new trial, it ‘need not now address United’s contention.’ [Ready,] 367 Ill.