proximate cause doctrine in Iowa

2023That standard allows the district court to make its own credibility 3 Tyler cites Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7, where our supreme court also declined to decide whether the proximate cause doctrine had continuing viability in criminal cases after the supreme court’s embrace of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009).

2015State v. 3 Keeping a proper lookout is common law duty recognized in Iowa tort cases: “Proper lookout, we have often said, implies being watchful of the movements of the driver’s own vehicle as well as the movements of the thing seen or seeable, and involves the care, watchfulness and attention of the ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances.” Christensen v. Kelley, 135 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1965). 4 Our supreme court has not addressed whether the “legal cause” aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has continuing viability in criminal cases after its decision in Thompson v. Ka

2011Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that a sole proximate cause defense is incompatible with the doctrine of comparative fault); Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323-24 (Iowa 1992) (“Sole proximate cause is not a comparative fault defense because proof of sole proximate cause insulates a defendant from liability.

1997“Sole proximate cause means the only proximate cause.” Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323 (Iowa 1992).

2011See Sponsler, 329 N.W.2d at 665 (“[A] defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on [the sole proximate cause defense] when substantial evidence supports it.”).

1993Id. (citing Six v. Freshour, 231 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Iowa 1975)). *194 The Iowa Supreme Court has established the standards associated with the sole proximate cause defense: A plaintiff has the burden to prove the requisite causal connections between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the injury, but when the defendant asserts that a third party’s conduct or an independent event was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the defendant has the burden of proof on the defense.

2025See Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717 , 731–34 (Ky. 2016) (“We . . . conclude that when the anxiety or torment of bullying is shown to have been a substantial factor in causing death by suicide, the resulting suicide is not a superseding intervening event which bars a victim’s estate from prosecuting a wrongful death claim.”); Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 309–10 (“A plaintiff can show that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the decedent’s suicide by presenting evidence that the 33 decedent’s suicide was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the injury he suffered at the hands

2025See Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717 , 731–34 (Ky. 2016) (“We . . . conclude that when the anxiety or torment of bullying is shown to have been a substantial factor in causing death by suicide, the resulting suicide is not a superseding intervening event which bars a victim’s estate from prosecuting a wrongful death claim.”); Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 309–10 (“A plaintiff can show that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the decedent’s suicide by presenting evidence that the 33 decedent’s suicide was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the injury he suffered at the hands

2016See Tribble, 790 N.W.2d at 127 n.2 (“Prior to our adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson, we employed the “substantial factor” test to permit the fact finder to decide the existence of factual cause when multiple causes were present that alone would have been sufficient to be a factual cause of the harm.”); accord State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Iowa 1995); see also State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992) (“[A] defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility for homicide merely because factors other than his acts contributed another portion of the old proxim

2012We therefore do not address today whether the "legal cause” aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after our decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts formulation of causation for civil cases and substituting the “scope of liability” inquiry for the former concepts of "proximate cause” and "legal cause”); see also State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992) (concluding the contributory negligence of a homicide victim will not constitute a legal cause allowing a defendan

2007The trial court found "the jury was confused regarding the meaning of the term `proximate cause'" and "the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence." There are two components to the proximate-cause inquiry: "(1) the defendant's conduct must have in fact caused the damages; and (2) the policy of the law must require the defendant to be legally responsible for them." Id.; see also Gerst v. Marshall , 549 N.W.2d 810 , 815 (Iowa 1996).

2003There are two components to the proximate-cause inquiry: “(1) the defendant’s conduct must have in fact caused the damages; and (2) the policy of the law must require the defendant to be legally responsible for them.” Id.; see also Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1996).

1993Coop., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1983) (citing Johnson v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 654, 658 , 247 N.W. 488, 490 (1933)).

1993Coop., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1983) (citing Johnson v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 654, 658 , 247 N.W. 488, 490 (1933)).

2023That standard allows the district court to make its own credibility 3 Tyler cites Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7, where our supreme court also declined to decide whether the proximate cause doctrine had continuing viability in criminal cases after the supreme court’s embrace of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009).

2016In Adams we likewise said that we “do not address today whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after our decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski.” 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7.

2026For example, I observe that in formulating the factors to establish legal malpractice our supreme court has discussed the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 53 as follows: “A lawyer is liable . . . only if the lawyer’s breach of a duty of care or breach of fiduciary duty was a legal cause of injury, as determined under generally applicable principles of causation and damages.” Kraklio v. Simmons, 909 N.W.2d 427, 441 (Iowa 2018) (specifically adopting this section).

2018See id.

2018See, e.g. , Benn , 512 N.W.2d at 539 .

2016See Tribble, 790 N.W.2d at 127 n.2 (“Prior to our adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson, we employed the “substantial factor” test to permit the fact finder to decide the existence of factual cause when multiple causes were present that alone would have been sufficient to be a factual cause of the harm.”); accord State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Iowa 1995); see also State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992) (“[A] defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility for homicide merely because factors other than his acts contributed another portion of the old proxim

2016See Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7 (not deciding “whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after our decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 744 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts formulation of causation for civil cases and substituting the ‘scope of liability’ inquiry for the former concepts of ‘proximate cause’ and ‘legal cause’)”). 2 In Tribble, the court discussed multiple causes under the reformulated standard. 790 N.W.2d at 127 .

2016See Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7 (not deciding “whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after our decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 744 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts formulation of causation for civil cases and substituting the ‘scope of liability’ inquiry for the former concepts of ‘proximate cause’ and ‘legal cause’)”). 2 In Tribble, the court discussed multiple causes under the reformulated standard. 790 N.W.2d at 127 .

2016See Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7 (not deciding “whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after our decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 744 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts formulation of causation for civil cases and substituting the ‘scope of liability’ inquiry for the former concepts of ‘proximate cause’ and ‘legal cause’)”). 2 In Tribble, the court discussed multiple causes under the reformulated standard. 790 N.W.2d at 127 .

2016See Tribble, 790 N.W.2d at 127 n.2 (“Prior to our adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson, we employed the “substantial factor” test to permit the fact finder to decide the existence of factual cause when multiple causes were present that alone would have been sufficient to be a factual cause of the harm.”); accord State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Iowa 1995); see also State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992) (“[A] defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility for homicide merely because factors other than his acts contributed another portion of the old proxim

2015Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7. 11 Fox, 810 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Murrary, 512 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Iowa 1994)).

2015Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7. 11 Fox, 810 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Murrary, 512 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Iowa 1994)).

2015State v. 3 Keeping a proper lookout is common law duty recognized in Iowa tort cases: “Proper lookout, we have often said, implies being watchful of the movements of the driver’s own vehicle as well as the movements of the thing seen or seeable, and involves the care, watchfulness and attention of the ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances.” Christensen v. Kelley, 135 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1965). 4 Our supreme court has not addressed whether the “legal cause” aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has continuing viability in criminal cases after its decision in Thompson v. Ka

2014State v. Mott, 635 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001); see State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 596-98 (Iowa 2002); see also State v. Murray, 515 N.W.2d 547 , 551 (Iowa 1994) (“The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation 3 Our supreme court has yet to address “whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after [its] decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski.” State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7 (citing Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009), which adopted the Restatement (Third) of To

2014State v. Mott, 635 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001); see State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 596-98 (Iowa 2002); see also State v. Murray, 515 N.W.2d 547 , 551 (Iowa 1994) (“The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation 3 Our supreme court has yet to address “whether the ‘legal cause’ aspect of the former proximate cause doctrine has any continuing viability in criminal cases after [its] decision in Thompson v. Kaczinski.” State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7 (citing Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009), which adopted the Restatement (Third) of To

2011Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that a sole proximate cause defense is incompatible with the doctrine of comparative fault); Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323-24 (Iowa 1992) (“Sole proximate cause is not a comparative fault defense because proof of sole proximate cause insulates a defendant from liability.

2003See id. at 1286.

2003See id. at 1286.

1999He relies on the distinction between cause in fact and legal causation we explained in Hagen v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 1995).

1995See Beckler v. Merringer, 131 Iowa 614, 616-17 , 109 N.W. 185, 185-86 (1906) (suggesting a proximate cause requirement under the predecessor to Iowa Code section 351.28).

1995See Beckler v. Merringer, 131 Iowa 614, 616-17 , 109 N.W. 185, 185-86 (1906) (suggesting a proximate cause requirement under the predecessor to Iowa Code section 351.28).

1994See Schnebly, 217 N.W.2d at 728 .

1994See Schnebly, 217 N.W.2d at 728 .

1993Id. (citing Six v. Freshour, 231 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Iowa 1975)). *194 The Iowa Supreme Court has established the standards associated with the sole proximate cause defense: A plaintiff has the burden to prove the requisite causal connections between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the injury, but when the defendant asserts that a third party’s conduct or an independent event was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the defendant has the burden of proof on the defense.

1993The Iowa Supreme Court, however, has held: “The defense is available even when a third party alleged to be responsible for the injury is not joined in the case.” Sponsler, 329 N.W.2d at 665 (citing Six v. Freshour, 231 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Iowa 1975)).