proximate cause standard in Utah

2021The “focus[]” of the proximate cause inquiry is “whether liability should attach to a particular cause in fact.” Raab, 2009 UT 61, ¶ 22 . ¶30 The Liability Reform Act delineates the apportionment of comparative fault in civil actions.

2018The central question in assessing proximate cause is "whether liability should attach to a particular cause in fact." Id. ¶ 22 ; see also USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp , 2016 UT 20 , ¶ 114, 372 P.3d 629 (stating that "[u]ltimately, a proximate cause analysis looks to whether an individual who is a but-for cause of the harm should nevertheless be excused from liability"). 3 ¶22 A defendant may, of course, agree (for instance, as part of a plea bargain) that a particular category of restitution was proximately caused by her criminal activity, and may even agree to pay a specific amount of restitu

2023Next, citing Ogden and State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , 427 P.3d 495 (applying the proximate cause standard to a restitution award), the court analyzed causation, examining whether the State had established that the defendant’s crimes were the proximate cause of the pecuniary losses suffered by the victims.

2023Next, citing Ogden and State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101 , 427 P.3d 495 (applying the proximate cause standard to a restitution award), the court analyzed causation, examining whether the State had established that the defendant’s crimes were the proximate cause of the pecuniary losses suffered by the victims.

2016See Steffensen v. Smith's Mgm: Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993); Kilpa-trick, 909 P.2d at 1293 ; Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, 111 , 311 P.3d 564 ; Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 ("To prove proximate cause in legal malpractice cases ..., the plaintiff must show that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been successful.").

2016See Steffensen v. Smith's Mgm: Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993); Kilpa-trick, 909 P.2d at 1293 ; Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, 111 , 311 P.3d 564 ; Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 ("To prove proximate cause in legal malpractice cases ..., the plaintiff must show that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been successful.").

2016Because of this last factor, which is usually determinative of the causation theory, the proximate cause analysis in legal malpractice cases has sometimes been defined as simply an analysis of whether ―a reasonable likelihood exists that [the client] would have ultimately benefitted.‖ Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291 . 206RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.

2016Because of this last factor, which is usually determinative of the causation theory, the proximate cause analysis in legal malpractice cases has sometimes been defined as simply an analysis of whether "a reasonable likelihood exists that [the client] would have ultimately bene-fitted." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291 . 206 .

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2025See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8 , ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel civil action”); State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29 , 499 P.3d 176 (stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned up)). ¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 54

2023Randall, 2019 UT App 120 , ¶¶ 19–22.

2022Id. ¶ 39. ¶26 From this analysis, Calata extrapolates that “[u]nder the language and structure of the Restitution Act, ‘caused by’ and ‘resulted in’ also requires apportionment.” While he concedes that “Laycock and Ogden did not decide the question of whether apportionment applies in restitution proceedings,” Calata contends that “the analysis in these cases dictates that the same apportionment standards that would apply in a parallel civil action apply in restitution proceedings, just as the same causation standard that applies in a parallel civil action applies to restitution proceedings.” ¶

2022Id. ¶ 39. ¶26 From this analysis, Calata extrapolates that “[u]nder the language and structure of the Restitution Act, ‘caused by’ and ‘resulted in’ also requires apportionment.” While he concedes that “Laycock and Ogden did not decide the question of whether apportionment applies in restitution proceedings,” Calata contends that “the analysis in these cases dictates that the same apportionment standards that would apply in a parallel civil action apply in restitution proceedings, just as the same causation standard that applies in a parallel civil action applies to restitution proceedings.” ¶

2021But mere “crime-relatedness” falls short of the proximate cause standard, which requires a showing that the crime, “in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury” and that the injury would not have occurred absent the 20190828-CA 8 2021 UT App 37 State v. Watson crime.

2021In support of his position, Grant cites Cabrera v. Hirth, 779 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 2004), and Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fischer, 392 P.3d 488 (Ariz. 2017).

2021In support of his position, Grant cites Cabrera v. Hirth, 779 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 2004), and Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fischer, 392 P.3d 488 (Ariz. 2017).

2021In support of his position, Grant cites Cabrera v. Hirth, 779 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 2004), and Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fischer, 392 P.3d 488 (Ariz. 2017).

2018And "noneconomic damages" are referred to as "nonpecuniary damages." Noneconomic Damages , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 6 The State explains that, under the proximate cause test, where foreseeability of an injury to a victim based on a defendant's criminal conduct applies, other jurisdictions have determined that it is "foreseeable that a victim would take steps to remedy her fear and lost sense of security after her home has been burglarized." See e.g. , In re M.N. , 2017-Ohio-7302 , ¶¶ 13-14, 96 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (determining that a restitution award for costs "to re

2018And "noneconomic damages" are referred to as "nonpecuniary damages." Noneconomic Damages , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 6 The State explains that, under the proximate cause test, where foreseeability of an injury to a victim based on a defendant's criminal conduct applies, other jurisdictions have determined that it is "foreseeable that a victim would take steps to remedy her fear and lost sense of security after her home has been burglarized." See e.g. , In re M.N. , 2017-Ohio-7302 , ¶¶ 13-14, 96 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (determining that a restitution award for costs "to re

2018State v. Rackham , 2016 UT App 167 , ¶ 9 n.3, 381 P.3d 1161 . 4 In February 2018, the Utah Supreme Court determined that courts should apply the proximate cause test when determining whether a defendant's criminal activity has resulted in pecuniary damages.

2018State v. Rackham , 2016 UT App 167 , ¶ 9 n.3, 381 P.3d 1161 . 4 In February 2018, the Utah Supreme Court determined that courts should apply the proximate cause test when determining whether a defendant's criminal activity has resulted in pecuniary damages.

2018Under our old “modified but-for” test, criminal conduct can be said to “result[] in” pecuniary damages when “(1) the damages would not have occurred but for the conduct . . . and (2) the causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss . . . is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally).” State v. Gibson, 2017 UT App 142, ¶ 11 , 405 P.3d 716 (quotation (continued…) 20160582-CA 9 2018 UT App 101 State v. Oliver ¶22 A defendant may, of course, agree (for instance, as part of a plea bargain) that a particular category of restitution was proximately caused by her criminal activity

2018Under our old “modified but-for” test, criminal conduct can be said to “result[] in” pecuniary damages when “(1) the damages would not have occurred but for the conduct . . . and (2) the causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss . . . is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally).” State v. Gibson, 2017 UT App 142, ¶ 11 , 405 P.3d 716 (quotation (continued…) 20160582-CA 9 2018 UT App 101 State v. Oliver ¶22 A defendant may, of course, agree (for instance, as part of a plea bargain) that a particular category of restitution was proximately caused by her criminal activity

2018"Therefore, the more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm." Dee , 2012 UT App 237 , ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 22 (quoting Watters v. Querry , 588 P.2d 702 , 704 (Utah 1978) ) (quotation simplified). ¶14 Although the UOVC paid reparations to Victim, the State must still satisfy the proximate cause test.

2018"Therefore, the more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm." Dee , 2012 UT App 237 , ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 22 (quoting Watters v. Querry , 588 P.2d 702 , 704 (Utah 1978) ) (quotation simplified). ¶14 Although the UOVC paid reparations to Victim, the State must still satisfy the proximate cause test.

2018"Therefore, the more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm." Dee , 2012 UT App 237 , ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 22 (quoting Watters v. Querry , 588 P.2d 702 , 704 (Utah 1978) ) (quotation simplified). ¶14 Although the UOVC paid reparations to Victim, the State must still satisfy the proximate cause test.

2018Brown , 2009 UT App 285 , ¶ 12 n.10, 221 P.3d 273 (rejecting "the State's argument that it was excused from establishing the causal connection between the crime and the restitution amount because the Office of Crime Victims Reparations had reimbursed" the victim). ¶15 Because the rules of evidence do not apply to restitution proceedings, the State may present hearsay or other inadmissible evidence to meet this burden.

2018Brown , 2009 UT App 285 , ¶ 12 n.10, 221 P.3d 273 (rejecting "the State's argument that it was excused from establishing the causal connection between the crime and the restitution amount because the Office of Crime Victims Reparations had reimbursed" the victim). ¶15 Because the rules of evidence do not apply to restitution proceedings, the State may present hearsay or other inadmissible evidence to meet this burden.

2018And "noneconomic damages" are referred to as "nonpecuniary damages." Noneconomic Damages , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 6 The State explains that, under the proximate cause test, where foreseeability of an injury to a victim based on a defendant's criminal conduct applies, other jurisdictions have determined that it is "foreseeable that a victim would take steps to remedy her fear and lost sense of security after her home has been burglarized." See e.g. , In re M.N. , 2017-Ohio-7302 , ¶¶ 13-14, 96 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (determining that a restitution award for costs "to re

2018And "noneconomic damages" are referred to as "nonpecuniary damages." Noneconomic Damages , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 6 The State explains that, under the proximate cause test, where foreseeability of an injury to a victim based on a defendant's criminal conduct applies, other jurisdictions have determined that it is "foreseeable that a victim would take steps to remedy her fear and lost sense of security after her home has been burglarized." See e.g. , In re M.N. , 2017-Ohio-7302 , ¶¶ 13-14, 96 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (determining that a restitution award for costs "to re

2018Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 46 Fifth, the State argues for a standard other than proximate cause based on our interpretation of two insurance contracts.

2017And, although not mentioned in Bameck, the case of Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), is also materially indistinguishable, In all of those cases, as well as in Taylor, a governmental entity was accused of acting negligently, but was determined to be entirely immune from suit because an immunity-invoking condition or event was at least one of the causes of plaintiff's claimed injuries.