7 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank of Louisville, Cross-Appellant v. Loretta Lustig, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., and Federal Insurance Co., Cross-Appelleesgreen1 sentence2006Bank of Louisville v. Lustig, 961 F.2d 1162, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1992), the New Jersey Court adopted “the conventional proximate cause test as the correct standard to apply when determining whether a loss resulted from the dishonest acts of an employee.” It stated, “[o]ur interpretation comports with our general principles of insurance law, including our practice of interpreting coverage provisions broadly. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Scirex Corporation v. Federal Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2006Jefferson Bank, 965 F.2d at 1281 . ¶28 Also, in Scirex, the Third Circuit applied the proximate cause standard, relying on Jefferson, stating, “Pennsylvania law equates ‘direct cause’ with ‘proximate cause.’” Scirex, 313 F.3d at 843-44 . 2006The federal district court held that “Scirex’s losses were directly tied to these studies, and by rendering those studies worthless, the nurses’ behavior proximately, and therefore directly, caused Scirex’s losses.” Scirex, 313 F.3d at 843-45, 850 . ¶29 In 2004, the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to consider *199 whether the use of a proximate cause test for evaluating the nature of a loss was appropriate under an employee dishonesty policy that requires a direct loss. | 1 | 1 |
Rudeck v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2003Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 44-46, 50-54 , 709 P.2d at 623-24, 627-29 . 2003Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 44-46, 50-54 , 709 P.2d at 623-24, 627-29 . [3] Again, this dissent assumes proximate cause is not at issue. [4] Our opinion in Busta, 276 Mont. at 357-73 , 916 P.2d at 131-41 , was primarily addressed to the issue of proximate cause. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Magrudergreen2 sentences2000See also § 45-2-201(1)(a), MCA (stating that “[cjonduct is the cause of a result if... without the conduct the result would not have occurred”); LaFave & Scott, § 7.12(c), at 284 (suggesting that the tort concepts of proximate cause are inapplicable to crim inal cases, and that a more direct cause is required for criminal liability); State v. Magruder (1988), 234 Mont. 492, 497 , 765 P.2d 716, 719 (stating that this “Court is not able to envision a case under our present criminal code in which a proximate cause instruction would be appropriate”). ¶38 We therefore hold that a person, who is fou 2000See also § 45-2-201(1)(a), MCA (stating that “[cjonduct is the cause of a result if... without the conduct the result would not have occurred”); LaFave & Scott, § 7.12(c), at 284 (suggesting that the tort concepts of proximate cause are inapplicable to crim inal cases, and that a more direct cause is required for criminal liability); State v. Magruder (1988), 234 Mont. 492, 497 , 765 P.2d 716, 719 (stating that this “Court is not able to envision a case under our present criminal code in which a proximate cause instruction would be appropriate”). ¶38 We therefore hold that a person, who is fou | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank
green
2 sentences1990In Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank of Montana (1990), 242 Mont. 155 , 47 St.Rep. 602 , 789 P.2d 567 , this Court analyzed foreseeability under the doctrine of proximate cause. 1990In Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank of Montana (1990), 242 Mont. 155 , 47 St.Rep. 602 , 789 P.2d 567 , this Court analyzed foreseeability under the doctrine of proximate cause. | 2 | 1990–1996 |
Polk v. Planet Insurance
green
2 sentences2008In Polk , we explained that § 39-72-706, MCA, did not circumvent the proximate cause requirement in § 39-72-408, MCA, and the test for compensability is “whether occupational factors significantly aggravated a preexisting condition, not whether occupational factors played the major or most significant role in causing the claimant’s resulting disease.” Polk, 287 Mont. at 85 , 951 P.2d at 1018 . 2008In Polk , we explained that § 39-72-706, MCA, did not circumvent the proximate cause requirement in § 39-72-408, MCA, and the test for compensability is “whether occupational factors significantly aggravated a preexisting condition, not whether occupational factors played the major or most significant role in causing the claimant’s resulting disease.” Polk, 287 Mont. at 85 , 951 P.2d at 1018 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jefferson Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2006Jefferson Bank, 965 F.2d at 1281 . ¶28 Also, in Scirex, the Third Circuit applied the proximate cause standard, relying on Jefferson, stating, “Pennsylvania law equates ‘direct cause’ with ‘proximate cause.’” Scirex, 313 F.3d at 843-44 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini Ford, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Auto Lenders, 854 A.2d 378 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kyriss v. State
green
2 sentences2003Kyriss, 218 Mont. at 168 , 707 P.2d at 8 . ¶66 By incorrectly adopting the language of § 431, the Court set the stage for the error at issue in this case. 2003Kyriss, 218 Mont. at 168 , 707 P.2d at 8 . ¶ 66 By incorrectly adopting the language of § 431, the Court set the stage for the error at issue in this case. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Busta Ex Rel. Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp.
green
2 sentences2003Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 44-46, 50-54 , 709 P.2d at 623-24, 627-29 . [3] Again, this dissent assumes proximate cause is not at issue. [4] Our opinion in Busta, 276 Mont. at 357-73 , 916 P.2d at 131-41 , was primarily addressed to the issue of proximate cause. 2003Rudeck, 218 Mont. at 44-46, 50-54 , 709 P.2d at 623-24, 627-29 . [3] Again, this dissent assumes proximate cause is not at issue. [4] Our opinion in Busta, 276 Mont. at 357-73 , 916 P.2d at 131-41 , was primarily addressed to the issue of proximate cause. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1985The doctors rely on our decision in Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1966), 147 Mont. 185 , 411 P.2d 379 , where we said that the test most generally employed in determining causation is the “but for” test. 1985The doctors rely on our decision in Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1966), 147 Mont. 185 , 411 P.2d 379 , where we said that the test most generally employed in determining causation is the “but for” test. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.