48 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2006We conclude, however, that such a broad exception to the sole proximate cause doctrine would render the doctrine useless in numerous instances and would constitute a sub silentio overruling of our Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Burns, supra, 213 Conn. 307 , which, as indicated, is not within the province of this court. *103 In reaching that conclusion, we need look only so far as the decisions of this court and our Supreme Court, decided both before and after White v. Burns, supra, 307 , in which it was determined that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the challenged highway defect 1995Recently, in White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 336 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990), our Supreme Court reviewed this area of the law and concluded that “[s]ole proximate cause remains the standard of causation under § 13a-144.” The plaintiff claims, however, that Zeidwig v. Derby, supra, 129 Conn. 693 , created an exception to the sole proximate cause standard under § 13a-144. | 4 | 8 |
Smith v. City of New Havengreen2 sentences2013If the negligence of himself or of a third person is also a proximate cause, he cannot say with truth that he was injured by the defect; [the plaintiff] can only say with truth that he was injured by his own or another’s carelessness and the defect, and the two combined give no cause of action under the statute.’ ” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 61-62 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001) “Thus, from the inception of the sole proximate cause doctrine, we have embraced the notion that a municipality’s liability under the defective highway statute may be defeated by 2013If the negligence of himself or of a third person is also a proximate cause, he cannot say with truth that he was injured by the defect; [the plaintiff] can only say with truth that he was injured by his own or another’s carelessness and the defect, and the two combined give no cause of action under the statute.’ ” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Smith v. New Haven, 258 Conn. 56, 61-62 , 779 A.2d 104 (2001) “Thus, from the inception of the sole proximate cause doctrine, we have embraced the notion that a municipality’s liability under the defective highway statute may be defeated by | 2 | 4 |
Williamson v. Commissioner of Transportationgreen2 sentences1995“The incorporation of the sole proximate cause requirement for actions brought under the state defective highway statute dates back to Perrotti v. Bennett, 94 Conn. 533 , 109 A. 890 (1920).” Williamson v. Commissioner of Transportation, 209 Conn. 310, 317 , 551 A.2d 704 (1988). 1995“The incorporation of the sole proximate cause requirement for actions brought under the state defective highway statute dates back to Perrotti v. Bennett, 94 Conn. 533 , 109 A. 890 (1920).” Williamson v. Commissioner of Transportation, 209 Conn. 310, 317 , 551 A.2d 704 (1988). | 2 | 4 |
Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen2 sentences2001See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 197 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991) (“[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence”); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (“when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be sa 2001See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 197 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991) (“[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence”); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (“when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be sa | 2 | 2 |
Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc.green2 sentences2019In light of the significant changes to our tort system implemented by tort reform, however, this court determined in Barry "that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff's injuries. [In such] circumstances, superseding cause instructions serve to complicate what is fundamentally a proximate cause analysis.... [B]ecause our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Con 2019In light of the significant changes to our tort system implemented by tort reform, however, this court determined in Barry "that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiff's injuries. [In such] circumstances, superseding cause instructions serve to complicate what is fundamentally a proximate cause analysis.... [B]ecause our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Con | 1 | 7 |
Perrotti v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2006Summary judgment was rendered in favor of those entities on counts four and five on the ground that the plaintiff had not provided any expert who would testily that the work had been performed below the standard of care required or that any such work negligently performed was the proximate cause of the collision. 6 Although the plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he did not claim that there were any factual issues in dispute. 7 The sole proximate cause doctrine, which was applied first to municipal highways in Bartram v. Sharon, supra, 71 Conn. 686 , was extended to 2006Summary judgment was rendered in favor of those entities on counts four and five on the ground that the plaintiff had not provided any expert who would testily that the work had been performed below the standard of care required or that any such work negligently performed was the proximate cause of the collision. 6 Although the plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he did not claim that there were any factual issues in dispute. 7 The sole proximate cause doctrine, which was applied first to municipal highways in Bartram v. Sharon, supra, 71 Conn. 686 , was extended to | 1 | 5 |
Bartram v. Town of Sharongreen2 sentences2009Our Supreme Court first identified the sole proximate cause standard for determining municipal liability under the predecessor to § 13a-149 in Bartram v. Sharon, 71 Conn. 686, 690 , 43 A. 143 (1899). 2009Our Supreme Court first identified the sole proximate cause standard for determining municipal liability under the predecessor to § 13a-149 in Bartram v. Sharon, 71 Conn. 686, 690 , 43 A. 143 (1899). | 1 | 5 |
Kolich v. Shugruegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322 , 502 A.2d 918 (1986) (plaintiff claimed improperly secured guardrail was substantial factor in injuries also caused by intoxicated third party driver and could not prevail under defective highway statute requiring highway defect to be sole proximate cause of injuries); Sirot v. Burns, 37 Conn. App. 551 , 657 A.2d 681 (when plaintiff failed to prove third party free of negligence, plaintiff could not prevail on claim that defective median barrier was sole proximate cause of injuries), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 908 , 659 A.2d 1209 (1995); Roy v. Michaud 2006See, e.g., Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322 , 502 A.2d 918 (1986) (plaintiff claimed improperly secured guardrail was substantial factor in injuries also caused by intoxicated third party driver and could not prevail under defective highway statute requiring highway defect to be sole proximate cause of injuries); Sirot v. Burns, 37 Conn. App. 551 , 657 A.2d 681 (when plaintiff failed to prove third party free of negligence, plaintiff could not prevail on claim that defective median barrier was sole proximate cause of injuries), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 908 , 659 A.2d 1209 (1995); Roy v. Michaud | 1 | 3 |
MacHado v. City of Hartfordgreen2 sentences2012This argument misunderstands the implication of the sole proximate cause requirement, as recently clarified in Machado v. Hartford, supra, 292 Conn. at 379 , 972 A.2d 724 . 2012This argument misunderstands the implication of the sole proximate cause requirement, as recently clarified in Machado v. Hartford, supra, 292 Conn. at 379 , 972 A.2d 724 . | 1 | 2 |
Lukas v. City of New Havengreen2 sentences2009“It is settled law in this state that the liability of [a town] under § 13a-149 is purely for breach of a statutory duty and does not arise from negligence.” Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 212 , 439 A.2d 949 (1981). 2009“It is settled law in this state that the liability of [a town] under § 13a-149 is purely for breach of a statutory duty and does not arise from negligence.” Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 212 , 439 A.2d 949 (1981). | 1 | 2 |
Vacco v. Microsoft Corp.green2 sentences2019See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp. , supra, 260 Conn. at 90 -92 , 793 A.2d 1048 . 2019See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp. , supra, 260 Conn. at 90 -92 , 793 A.2d 1048 . | 1 | 1 |
Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc.green1 sentence2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co | 1 | 1 |
| Angelillo v. City of Meridengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mahoney v. Beatmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Catz v. Rubensteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Warner v. Liimatainengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Merhi v. Becker
green
2 sentences1996The "substantial factor" test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, "`whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature CT Page 7209 as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.' Merhi v. Becker , 164 Conn. 516 , 521 , (1973))". 1996The "substantial factor" test, in truth, reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions; that is, "`whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.' Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516 , 521 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973); see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. | 4 | 1989–1996 |
Messina v. City of New Haven
neutral
2 sentences2013See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, [supra, 219 Conn. 197 ] (‘[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence’); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (‘when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be said to have been c 2013See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, [supra, 219 Conn. 197 ] (‘[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence’); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (‘when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be said to have been c | 2 | 2001–2013 |
Roth v. MacDonald
green
2 sentences2013See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, [supra, 219 Conn. 197 ] (‘[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence’); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (‘when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be said to have been c 2013See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, [supra, 219 Conn. 197 ] (‘[§] 13a-149 does not permit recovery unless the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury, even if the concurring cause was a third party’s negligence’); Roth v. MacDonald, 124 Conn. 461, 463 , 200 A. 725 (1938) (driver’s negligence was contributing factor to accident, relieving municipality of liability for passengers’ injuries); Messina v. New Haven, 119 Conn. 166, 168 , 174 A. 188 (1934) (‘when an injury results from a defect combined with the culpable negligence of a third party it cannot be said to have been c | 2 | 2001–2013 |
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Our Supreme Court has defined proximate cause “as [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .” Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 383 , 441 A.2d 620 (1982). “[T]he test of *157 proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs injuries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. 2011Our Supreme Court has defined proximate cause “as [a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .” Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 383 , 441 A.2d 620 (1982). “[T]he test of *157 proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs injuries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. | 2 | 1993–2011 |
Wei Ping Wu v. Town of Fairfield
green
2 sentences1999"An essential element of any negligence action is the establishment of the defendant's conduct as a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Wu v. Fairfield , 204 Conn. 435 , 438 , 528 A.2d 364 (1987). 1999"An essential element of any negligence action is the establishment of the defendant's conduct as a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Wu v. Fairfield , 204 Conn. 435 , 438 , 528 A.2d 364 (1987). | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Bioski v. Castelano, No. 0115265 (Mar. 21, 1995)
green
2 sentences1999"As the court in Nolan instructs, the cause of action for negligent supervision, in order to avoid the limitations imposed by the effect of the doctrine of proximate cause, must not be predicated on the furnishing of alcohol." Bloski v. Castelano, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 115265 (Mar. 21, 1995, Flynn, J.) ( 14 Conn. L. 1996In such a situation, a patron or business visitor of the establishment who sustained an injury in person or property as a consequence of such negligence in supervision might have a common-law cause of action under the rule of cases such as Lowthert v. Loyal Order of Moose of Stamford Lodge 940 Inc. , 147 Conn. 529 , 533 , 163 A.2d 106 ." "As the court in Nolan instructs, the cause of action for negligent supervision, in order to avoid the limitations imposed by the effect of the doctrine of proximate cause, must not be predicated on the furnishing of alcohol." Bloski v. Castelano , Superior Co | 2 | 1996–1999 |
Comba v. Town of Ridgefield
green
2 sentences1997See , e.g., Williamson v. Commissioner , 209 Conn. 310 (1988); Kolich v. Shugrue , 198 Conn. 322 (1986); Comba v. Ridgefield , 177 Conn. 268 (1979); Tuckel v. Argroves , 148 Conn. 366 (1961). 1990See, e.g., Williamson v. Commissioner, 209 Conn. 310 , 551 A.2d 704 (1988); Lamb v. Burns, supra; Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322 , 502 A.2d 918 (1986); Comba v. Ridgefield, 177 Conn. 268 , 413 A.2d 859 (1979); Donnelly v. Ives, 159 Conn. 163 , 268 A.2d 406 (1970); Murphy v. Ives, supra; Tuckel v. Argraves, 148 Conn. 355 , 170 A.2d 895 (1961); Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 134 Conn. 235 , 56 A.2d 519 (1947). | 2 | 1990–1997 |
Ward v. Ramsey
green
2 sentences2020The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection. . . . ‘‘In other words, [p]roximate cause [is] defined as an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . . [T]he inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions . . . [is] whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foresee- able risk created by the defendant’s negligence.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Ramsey, 146 Conn. App. 485 , 490–92, 77 2020The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection. . . . ‘‘In other words, [p]roximate cause [is] defined as an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . . [T]he inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions . . . [is] whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foresee- able risk created by the defendant’s negligence.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Ramsey, 146 Conn. App. 485 , 490–92, 77 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kowal v. Hofher
green
2 sentences2017This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id."Legal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation." Kowal v. Hofher , 181 Conn. 355 , 359, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). "[P]olicy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate cause." Id., at 360 , 436 A.2d 1 . 2017This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id."Legal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation." Kowal v. Hofher , 181 Conn. 355 , 359, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). "[P]olicy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate cause." Id., at 360 , 436 A.2d 1 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sansone v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences2013Co., 47 Conn. Supp. 35, 39-41 , 770 A.2d 500 (1999), aff'd, 62 Conn. App. 526, 527 , 771 A.2d 243 (2001) (concluding trial court analysis was “consistent with our applicable law and precedents” and adopting court’s “well reasoned decision”). 2013Co., 47 Conn. Supp. 35, 39-41 , 770 A.2d 500 (1999), aff'd, 62 Conn. App. 526, 527 , 771 A.2d 243 (2001) (concluding trial court analysis was “consistent with our applicable law and precedents” and adopting court’s “well reasoned decision”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Phelps v. Lankes
neutral
2 sentences2013The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phelps v. Lankes, 74 Conn. App. 597, 601-602 , 813 A.2d 100 (2003). 2013The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phelps v. Lankes, 74 Conn. App. 597, 601-602 , 813 A.2d 100 (2003). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sansone v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins., No. Cv98-0411373 (Sep. 24, 1999)
green
2 sentences2013Co., 47 Conn. Supp. 35, 39-41 , 770 A.2d 500 (1999), aff'd, 62 Conn. App. 526, 527 , 771 A.2d 243 (2001) (concluding trial court analysis was “consistent with our applicable law and precedents” and adopting court’s “well reasoned decision”). 2013Co., 47 Conn. Supp. 35, 39-41 , 770 A.2d 500 (1999), aff'd, 62 Conn. App. 526, 527 , 771 A.2d 243 (2001) (concluding trial court analysis was “consistent with our applicable law and precedents” and adopting court’s “well reasoned decision”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012We [decided] that [a separate] instruction on superseding cause complicates what is essentially a proximate cause analysis and risks jur[or] confusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 43 , 946 A.2d 839 (2008). 2012We [decided] that [a separate] instruction on superseding cause complicates what is essentially a proximate cause analysis and risks jur[or] confusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 43 , 946 A.2d 839 (2008). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Himmelstein v. Town of Windsor
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 49, 974 A.2d 820 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp.
green
2 sentences2012II We next address the plaintiff's contention that the Appellate Court's proximate cause analysis was inconsistent with our statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., *845 supra, 288 Conn. 392 , 953 A.2d 28 , that the substantial factor causation standard is met if "the employment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute[d] to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way." Id., at 412-13, 953 A.2d 28 . 2012II We next address the plaintiff's contention that the Appellate Court's proximate cause analysis was inconsistent with our statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., *845 supra, 288 Conn. 392 , 953 A.2d 28 , that the substantial factor causation standard is met if "the employment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute[d] to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way." Id., at 412-13, 953 A.2d 28 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co 2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Jones v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Luther
green
1 sentence2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp.
green
2 sentences2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co 2011See Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 237-38 , 875 A.2d485 (2005); Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn. App. 248, 253 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844 , 970 A.2d 834 , cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907 , 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). 11 We note again that, although the parties entered into an agreement in June, 2006, the plaintiff failed to accept the agreements offered by the employer regarding the maximum medical improvement and 10 percent permanent partial disability rating of the plaintiffs brain. 12 Although both the co | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lerner v. Fleet Bank green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Agriesto v. Town of Fairfield green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ormsby v. Frankel green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Roy v. Michaud green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Right v. Breen green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Ives green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Moxon v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Colleges neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Roy v. Michaud green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Sirot v. Burns green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Right v. Breen green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Right v. Breen neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bowers v. Bowers green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Vona v. Lerner green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Vona v. Lerner green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Lewis v. Commissioner green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Craig v. Driscoll green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Cheverie v. Ashcraft & Gerel green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.