8 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbesgreen2 sentences2012An interpretation of the felony murder statute to allow a second degree murder conviction anytime a parent is criminally negligent in failing to supervise her child and the child dies as a result of some intervening act would be contrary to the rule of lenity and could result in unintended consequences. |2nBased on the statutory language requiring a “killing of a human being ... when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of [an enumerated felony],” the legislative definition of second degree murder as a crime of violence, the jurisprudence requiring a killing as a result of a direct act 2012An interpretation of the felony murder statute to allow a second degree murder conviction anytime a parent is criminally negligent in failing to supervise her child and the child dies as a result of some intervening act would be contrary to the rule of lenity and could result in unintended consequences. |2nBased on the statutory language requiring a “killing of a human being ... when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of [an enumerated felony],” the legislative definition of second degree murder as a crime of violence, the jurisprudence requiring a killing as a result of a direct act | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2012An interpretation of the felony murder statute to allow a second degree murder conviction anytime a parent is criminally negligent in failing to supervise her child and the child dies as a result of some intervening act would be contrary to the rule of lenity and could result in unintended consequences. |2nBased on the statutory language requiring a “killing of a human being ... when the offender is engaged in the perpetration of [an enumerated felony],” the legislative definition of second degree murder as a crime of violence, the jurisprudence requiring a killing as a result of a direct act | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Benoitgreen1 sentence1996Roberts v. Benoit, supra, at 1056. | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. STATE, DEPT. OF INSTITUTIONSgreen1 sentence1977See Webb v. State of Louisiana, 91 So.2d 156 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1956). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.
green
2 sentences1985Co., 248 N.Y. 339 , 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 1985Co., 248 N.Y. 339 , 162 N.E. 99 (1928). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Theunissen v. Guidry
green
1 sentence1980The court in Theunissen, supra, also noted at page 874: "`However, it is the general rule that contributory negligence is a part of the doctrine of proximate cause, that is, to bar a recovery for an injury it must be the proximate cause thereof, and, before an illegal act or omission can be held to be contributory negligence, it must appear that there was a causal connection between such act or omission and the injury complained of. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Boyer v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1979In a supplemental brief, plaintiffs argue that the recent case of Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So.2d 1164 (La.1978) supports their position. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co.
green
2 sentences1968“It is elementary that negligence is not actionable unless it constitutes a proximate cause of the injury sued upon, Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625 , 166 So.2d 252 ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., 160 So.2d 410 , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident. 1968“It is elementary that negligence is not actionable unless it constitutes a proximate cause of the injury sued upon, Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625 , 166 So.2d 252 ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., 160 So.2d 410 , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Bodan v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS'INSURANCE COMPANY
green
1 sentence1968“It is elementary that negligence is not actionable unless it constitutes a proximate cause of the injury sued upon, Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625 , 166 So.2d 252 ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., 160 So.2d 410 , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co.
green
2 sentences1968“It is elementary that negligence is not actionable unless it constitutes a proximate cause of the injury sued upon, Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625 , 166 So.2d 252 ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., 160 So.2d 410 , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident. 1968“It is elementary that negligence is not actionable unless it constitutes a proximate cause of the injury sued upon, Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 246 La. 625 , 166 So.2d 252 ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., 160 So.2d 410 , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., 242 La. 471 , 137 So.2d 298 , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Peterson v. City of Tacoma
neutral
1 sentence1940Held, that he was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not looking to the right again after entering the intersection.' Citing Ellis v. Olson, 139 Wn. 351 , 246 P. 944 ." In stating the rule that in order to bar a recovery the contributory negligence of the plaintiff must be a proximate cause of the accident, Blashfield in his Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., vol. 4, p. 364, § 2553, says: "Contributory negligence is a part of the doctrine of proximate cause, that is, to bar a recovery for an injury it must be the proximate cause thereof, and, before an illegal | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Ellis v. Olson
neutral
1 sentence1940Held, that he was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not looking to the right again after entering the intersection.' Citing Ellis v. Olson, 139 Wn. 351 , 246 P. 944 ." In stating the rule that in order to bar a recovery the contributory negligence of the plaintiff must be a proximate cause of the accident, Blashfield in his Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., vol. 4, p. 364, § 2553, says: "Contributory negligence is a part of the doctrine of proximate cause, that is, to bar a recovery for an injury it must be the proximate cause thereof, and, before an illegal | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.