proximate cause instruction in Kansas

2025This court's analysis discussed Chastain and noted that the statutes on involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide "'still require that the conduct of the defendant cause the death of the victim.'" 36 Kan.

2022The State argued that the proximate cause instruction changed the elements of the crime. 36 Kan.

2022Instead of adding paragraphs 3 and 4 to the elements instruction, 16 the trial court should have instructed the jury: 'The fault or lack of fault of Robyn Curtis is a circumstance to be considered along with all the other evidence to determine whether the defendant's conduct was or was not the direct cause of Robyn Curtis' death.' See Chastain, 265 Kan. at 25 , 960 P.2d 756 .

2022Instead of adding paragraphs 3 and 4 to the elements instruction, 16 the trial court should have instructed the jury: 'The fault or lack of fault of Robyn Curtis is a circumstance to be considered along with all the other evidence to determine whether the defendant's conduct was or was not the direct cause of Robyn Curtis' death.' See Chastain, 265 Kan. at 25 , 960 P.2d 756 .

2022In State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33 , Syl. ¶ 6, 805 P.2d 1 (1991), our Supreme Court held that "[e]rror cannot be predicated on the refusal to give specific instructions where those which were given cover and include the substance of those refused." We are persuaded that the elements instructions given by the district court adequately expressed the proximate cause requirement of both involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide.

2022In State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33 , Syl. ¶ 6, 805 P.2d 1 (1991), our Supreme Court held that "[e]rror cannot be predicated on the refusal to give specific instructions where those which were given cover and include the substance of those refused." We are persuaded that the elements instructions given by the district court adequately expressed the proximate cause requirement of both involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide.

2021We focus, instead, on the elements instruction for aggravated battery which required the jury to find that Mork "knowingly caused great bodily harm to Carlos Triana." (Emphasis added.) In State v. McCarley, 287 Kan. 167, 180 , 195 P.3d 230 (2008), our Supreme Court found the trial court did not commit clear error by failing to 17 give a proximate cause instruction for an aggravated battery offense when the trial court instructed the jury it must find the defendant recklessly "caused" great bodily harm.

2021We focus, instead, on the elements instruction for aggravated battery which required the jury to find that Mork "knowingly caused great bodily harm to Carlos Triana." (Emphasis added.) In State v. McCarley, 287 Kan. 167, 180 , 195 P.3d 230 (2008), our Supreme Court found the trial court did not commit clear error by failing to 17 give a proximate cause instruction for an aggravated battery offense when the trial court instructed the jury it must find the defendant recklessly "caused" great bodily harm.

2010James, 75 S.W.3d at 164 ; see also Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1027-28 (R.I. 2004) (in case against emergency medical technicians where child choked to death after vomiting during a seizure, it was error to give intervening cause instruction because there was no evidence to support the instruction; but unwarranted instruction was harmless under “holistic” approach to examination of instructions). *440 There is contrary authority, however, including two out-of-state cases we previously discussed, Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865, 897 (Tenn. App. 2006), and Chamberland v. Ros

2010James, 75 S.W.3d at 164 ; see also Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1027-28 (R.I. 2004) (in case against emergency medical technicians where child choked to death after vomiting during a seizure, it was error to give intervening cause instruction because there was no evidence to support the instruction; but unwarranted instruction was harmless under “holistic” approach to examination of instructions). *440 There is contrary authority, however, including two out-of-state cases we previously discussed, Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865, 897 (Tenn. App. 2006), and Chamberland v. Ros

2010James, 75 S.W.3d at 164 ; see also Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1027-28 (R.I. 2004) (in case against emergency medical technicians where child choked to death after vomiting during a seizure, it was error to give intervening cause instruction because there was no evidence to support the instruction; but unwarranted instruction was harmless under “holistic” approach to examination of instructions). *440 There is contrary authority, however, including two out-of-state cases we previously discussed, Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865, 897 (Tenn. App. 2006), and Chamberland v. Ros

2008See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Torres, 280 Kan. 309, 326 , 121 P.3d 429 (2005).

2008See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Torres, 280 Kan. 309, 326 , 121 P.3d 429 (2005).

2006The district court viewed the last of these principles as the mere application of a proximate cause requirement and cited Cole v. Shell Petroleum Corp, 149 Kan. 25, 36-37 , 86 P.2d 740 (1939), where the court stated: “The record fails to disclose plaintiffs crops would not have been damaged or that they would not have been damaged to the same extent except for the [defendant’s] structures themselves or the structures as maintained.

2006The district court viewed the last of these principles as the mere application of a proximate cause requirement and cited Cole v. Shell Petroleum Corp, 149 Kan. 25, 36-37 , 86 P.2d 740 (1939), where the court stated: “The record fails to disclose plaintiffs crops would not have been damaged or that they would not have been damaged to the same extent except for the [defendant’s] structures themselves or the structures as maintained.

2006Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 , 100 L.

2006Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 , 100 L.

2006App. 2d 914 , 996 P.2d 339 (2000), the State contends that a proximate cause instruction cannot be used in a case such as this because involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol is a strict liability crime.

2005The Fishers cite Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284 , 580 P.2d 876 (1978), where this court found that the failure to give a proximate cause instruction on the issue of intoxication in a car accident comparative negligence case was not reversible where the instructions in their entirety made “it clear that the intoxication of defendant had to cause or contribute to the accident before the jury could assess liability on that basis.” 224 Kan. at 289 .

2005The Fishers cite Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284 , 580 P.2d 876 (1978), where this court found that the failure to give a proximate cause instruction on the issue of intoxication in a car accident comparative negligence case was not reversible where the instructions in their entirety made “it clear that the intoxication of defendant had to cause or contribute to the accident before the jury could assess liability on that basis.” 224 Kan. at 289 .

2003This is so because it is the illegal conduct of the plaintiff, rather than the attorney’s neg *125 ligence, that is the cause in fact of any injury flowing from the conviction, unless that conviction has been overturned. 909 S.W.2d at 498 .

2003Also addressing the causation issue, the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff convicted of a criminal offense “may negate the sole proximate cause bar to [his or her] claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if [he or she has] been exonerated on direct appeal, through postconviction relief, or otherwise.” Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497-98 .

2001Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions. [Citations omitted.]" 178 Ill.2d at 467 .

2001Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions. [Citations omitted.]” 178 Ill. 2d at 467 .

2001Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed the historical justification for application of the proximate cause rule in felony-murder cases in State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 , 573 A.2d 1359 (1990), stating: "More recently, felony murder has been viewed not as a crime of transferred intent, but as one of absolute or strict liability.

2001Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed the historical justification for application of the proximate cause rule in felony-murder cases in State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 , 573 A.2d 1359 (1990), stating: "More recently, felony murder has been viewed not as a crime of transferred intent, but as one of absolute or strict liability.

1959A careful application by the court of the doctrine of proximate cause, and the common sense of the jury, should prevent any undue hardship in the enforcement of the common-law rule.” (p. 265.) And in State v. Nichols, 34 N. M. 639, 288 Pac. 407 , which reads: “It would, in our opinion, be ridiculous to say that any accidental killing resulting indirectly or remotely while committing an unlawful act is involuntary manslaughter.

1943In Tilden v. Ash, 145 Kan. 909 , 67 P. 2d 614 , in which two defendant drivers of motor vehicles were sued for damages resulting from a collision at an intersection, it was not contended the causes of action were improperly joined but it was stoutly argued by each defendant that the proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the other defendant.

1943In Tilden v. Ash, 145 Kan. 909 , 67 P. 2d 614 , in which two defendant drivers of motor vehicles were sued for damages resulting from a collision at an intersection, it was not contended the causes of action were improperly joined but it was stoutly argued by each defendant that the proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the other defendant.

1933The problem is usually solved, however, by invoking the doctrine of proximate cause.” (p. 554.) There was a causal connection between the employment and the death of a traveling salesman in the case of Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 Kan. 191 , 285 Pac. 536 , wherein the claimant while traveling over a highway was killed by contact with a high-voltage wire which had been strung above the highway and was blown down in a storm; the injury from the wire was a hazard of the road to which the employment of the deceased exposed him.

1933The problem is usually solved, however, by invoking the doctrine of proximate cause.” (p. 554.) There was a causal connection between the employment and the death of a traveling salesman in the case of Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 Kan. 191 , 285 Pac. 536 , wherein the claimant while traveling over a highway was killed by contact with a high-voltage wire which had been strung above the highway and was blown down in a storm; the injury from the wire was a hazard of the road to which the employment of the deceased exposed him.

1917Co. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77 , 1 Pac. 298 .) (p. 440.) We deem it wholly unnecessary in this case to elaborate upon the doctrine of proximate cause.