proximate cause instruction in Arizona

12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Smithgreen ariz · 1989 · cited in 5 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1993–2022 2 sentences 2013Although our supreme court stated in Smith , in dictum, that the instruction should be given when causation is in issue and it would be helpful to the jury, 160 Ariz. at 510 , 774 P.2d at 814 , Mott clarified that no proximate-cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation; it did not mandate that a proximate-cause instruction be given whenever a causation issue is raised. 2013Although our supreme court stated in Smith , in dictum, that the instruction should be given when causation is in issue and it would be helpful to the jury, 160 Ariz. at 510 , 774 P.2d at 814 , Mott clarified that no proximate-cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation; it did not mandate that a proximate-cause instruction be given whenever a causation issue is raised.	4	5
State v. Mottgreen ariz · 1997 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2013–2017 2 sentences 2017A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3); see State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16 (1998) (court need not give every instruction requested by the defense: “The test is whether the [given] instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case”). “[N]o proximate cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation . . . a proximate-cause instruction [need not] be given whenever a causation issue is raised.” State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190 , 197 n.6, ¶ 17 (App. 2013); see also Mott, 187 Ariz. at 546 (pro 2017See State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 90, ¶ 81 (2003) (“We 12 STATE v. SILVA Decision of the Court have encouraged trial courts to closely follow statutory language when instructing on felony murder.”), vacated on other grounds by, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004); see also State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 546 (1997) (explaining a trial court need not provide a proximate cause instruction when the given instructions “instruct the jury on the elements of the crime, including causation,” and, in their entirely, adequately reflect the law). ¶38 Silva’s proposed instruction, on the other hand, stated that Sil	3	3
State v. Lawsongreen ariz · 1985 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1989–2022 2 sentences 2022See § 13-203(A); see also State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547, 559 (1985) (explaining it was proper for the trial court “to give a ‘but for’ test for causation with a proximate cause instruction”; the trial court acted properly “in defining both standards to the jury”); State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 236 (App. 1990); see also Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (noting that “[p]roximate cause” is “sometimes called ‘legal cause’”). 1989Defendant relies upon State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525 , 698 P.2d 1244 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541 , 760 P.2d 541 (1988), and State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547 , 698 P.2d 1266 (1985), for his assertion that a felony murder charge requires a proximate cause instruction.	1	2
Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, Inc.green ariz · 1990 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022“Proximate cause” exists if the alleged criminal act produced an injury or death “in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.” Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (quoting Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546 (1990)); see also State v. Smith, 160 Ariz. 507 , 509–10 (1989).	1	1
State v. Martygreen arizctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022See § 13-203(A); see also State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547, 559 (1985) (explaining it was proper for the trial court “to give a ‘but for’ test for causation with a proximate cause instruction”; the trial court acted properly “in defining both standards to the jury”); State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 236 (App. 1990); see also Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (noting that “[p]roximate cause” is “sometimes called ‘legal cause’”).	1	1
Perry v. United Statesgreen scotus · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 90, ¶ 81 (2003) (“We 12 STATE v. SILVA Decision of the Court have encouraged trial courts to closely follow statutory language when instructing on felony murder.”), vacated on other grounds by, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004); see also State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 546 (1997) (explaining a trial court need not provide a proximate cause instruction when the given instructions “instruct the jury on the elements of the crime, including causation,” and, in their entirely, adequately reflect the law). ¶38 Silva’s proposed instruction, on the other hand, stated that Sil	1	1
State v. Shumwaygreen ariz · 1983 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3); see State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16 (1998) (court need not give every instruction requested by the defense: “The test is whether the [given] instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case”). “[N]o proximate cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation . . . a proximate-cause instruction [need not] be given whenever a causation issue is raised.” State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190 , 197 n.6, ¶ 17 (App. 2013); see also Mott, 187 Ariz. at 546 (pro	1	1
State v. Prasertphonggreen ariz · 2003 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See State v. Prasertphong, 206 Ariz. 70, 90, ¶ 81 (2003) (“We 12 STATE v. SILVA Decision of the Court have encouraged trial courts to closely follow statutory language when instructing on felony murder.”), vacated on other grounds by, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004); see also State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 546 (1997) (explaining a trial court need not provide a proximate cause instruction when the given instructions “instruct the jury on the elements of the crime, including causation,” and, in their entirely, adequately reflect the law). ¶38 Silva’s proposed instruction, on the other hand, stated that Sil	1	1
State v. Rodriguezgreen ariz · 1998 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3); see State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16 (1998) (court need not give every instruction requested by the defense: “The test is whether the [given] instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case”). “[N]o proximate cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation . . . a proximate-cause instruction [need not] be given whenever a causation issue is raised.” State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190 , 197 n.6, ¶ 17 (App. 2013); see also Mott, 187 Ariz. at 546 (pro	1	1
State v. Hallgreen ariz · 1981 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994See Hall, 129 Ariz. at 594-95 , 633 P.2d at 404-05 ; Lopez, 173 Ariz. at 555-56 , 845 P.2d at 451-52 . 1994See Hall, 129 Ariz. at 594-95 , 633 P.2d at 404-05 ; Lopez, 173 Ariz. at 555-56 , 845 P.2d at 451-52 .	1	1
State v. Leegreen ariz · 1984 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984). 1989State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).	1	1
United States v. Darrel E. Sheltongreen ca9 · 1978 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury’s right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a “but for” test for causation with a proximate cause instruction. 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury's right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a "but for" test for causation with a proximate cause instruction.	1	1
National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Commissiongreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury’s right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a “but for” test for causation with a proximate cause instruction. 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury's right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a "but for" test for causation with a proximate cause instruction.	1	1
North Carolina v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury’s right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a “but for” test for causation with a proximate cause instruction. 1985See also United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2822 , 61 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979) (special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 512 (2d ed. 1982) (special verdicts are disfavored because they restrict the jury's right to return a verdict in the teeth of the law and facts.) Defendant also argues that it was inconsistent to give a "but for" test for causation with a proximate cause instruction.	1	1
Springer v. Government Employees Ins. Co., Inc.green lactapp · 1975 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982 2 sentences 1982See also Springer v. Government Employees Insurance Company, Inc., 311 So.2d 36 (La. 1975), for a proximate cause analysis of injury caused by a car that crossed the median. 1982See also Springer v. Government Employees Insurance Company, Inc., 311 So.2d 36 (La.1975), for a proximate cause analysis of injury caused by a car that crossed the median.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Wiley green ariz · 1985 2 sentences 1997Wiley merely held that a proximate cause instruction was not improper. 144 Ariz. at 540 , 698 P.2d at 1259 . 1997Wiley merely held that a proximate cause instruction was not improper. 144 Ariz. at 540 , 698 P.2d at 1259 .	2	1989–1997
State of Arizona v. Jesus Xavier Almaguer green arizctapp · 2013 1 sentence 2017A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3); see State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16 (1998) (court need not give every instruction requested by the defense: “The test is whether the [given] instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case”). “[N]o proximate cause instruction is required when the instructions in their entirety properly inform the jury of the elements of the offense, including causation . . . a proximate-cause instruction [need not] be given whenever a causation issue is raised.” State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190 , 197 n.6, ¶ 17 (App. 2013); see also Mott, 187 Ariz. at 546 (pro	1	2017–2017
State v. Valenzuela green ariz · 1999 2 sentences 2002P.); State v. Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. 404 , 405 ¶ 2, 984 P.2d 12 , 13 ¶ 2 (1999). ¶20 A trial court does not commit fundamental error by failing to sua sponte give a proximate cause instruction in a felony murder case when causation is not at issue in the trial. 2002P.); State v. Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. 404 , 405 ¶ 2, 984 P.2d 12 , 13 ¶ 2 (1999). ¶20 A trial court does not commit fundamental error by failing to sua sponte give a proximate cause instruction in a felony murder case when causation is not at issue in the trial.	1	2002–2002
State v. Lopez green arizctapp · 1992 2 sentences 1994See Hall, 129 Ariz. at 594-95 , 633 P.2d at 404-05 ; Lopez, 173 Ariz. at 555-56 , 845 P.2d at 451-52 . 1994See Hall, 129 Ariz. at 594-95 , 633 P.2d at 404-05 ; Lopez, 173 Ariz. at 555-56 , 845 P.2d at 451-52 .	1	1994–1994
Wausau Underwriters Insurance v. Howser green scd · 1990 1 sentence 1993In addition, the court determined that the proximate cause requirement was not met because “[the victim’s] injuries were caused by the gunshot, not by the gunman's vehicle.” Id.	1	1993–1993
Kessler v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. green la · 1991 1 sentence 1993The case of Kessler v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 573 So.2d 476 (La.1991), is another one in which a court held that proximate cause between the injury and the vehicle was necessary for insurance coverage.	1	1993–1993
State v. SUPERIOR CT IN & FOR MARICOPA CTY. green ariz · 1988 2 sentences 1989Defendant relies upon State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525 , 698 P.2d 1244 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541 , 760 P.2d 541 (1988), and State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547 , 698 P.2d 1266 (1985), for his assertion that a felony murder charge requires a proximate cause instruction. 1989Defendant relies upon State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525 , 698 P.2d 1244 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541 , 760 P.2d 541 (1988), and State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547 , 698 P.2d 1266 (1985), for his assertion that a felony murder charge requires a proximate cause instruction.	1	1989–1989
State v. Nash green ariz · 1985 2 sentences 1989Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) request a proximate cause instruction on felony murder; (2) object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning felony murder; and (3) receive an instruction defining “knowingly.” To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 , 105 S.Ct. 2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985), and that the deficiency 1989Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) request a proximate cause instruction on felony murder; (2) object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning felony murder; and (3) receive an instruction defining “knowingly.” To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 , 105 S.Ct. 2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985), and that the deficiency	1	1989–1989
Fortune Odend'hal, Jr., V green scotus · 1985 1 sentence 1989Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) request a proximate cause instruction on felony murder; (2) object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning felony murder; and (3) receive an instruction defining “knowingly.” To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 , 105 S.Ct. 2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985), and that the deficiency	1	1989–1989
Kemp v. Davis green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1989Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) request a proximate cause instruction on felony murder; (2) object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning felony murder; and (3) receive an instruction defining “knowingly.” To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 , 105 S.Ct. 2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985), and that the deficiency 1989Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) request a proximate cause instruction on felony murder; (2) object to the prosecutor’s argument concerning felony murder; and (3) receive an instruction defining “knowingly.” To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 , 105 S.Ct. 2689 , 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985), and that the deficiency	1	1989–1989
State v. Hitchcock green ariz · 1960 2 sentences 1985The “but for” standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961). 1985The “but for” standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961).	1	1985–1985
Van Hook v. United States green scotus · 1961 2 sentences 1985The “but for” standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961). 1985The "but for" standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961).	1	1985–1985
Hitchcock v. Arizona green scotus · 1961 2 sentences 1985The “but for” standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961). 1985The "but for" standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961).	1	1985–1985
Allison v. Indiana green scotus · 1961 2 sentences 1985The “but for” standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961). 1985The "but for" standard, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-203, was not intended to supersede prior case law but instead to be consistent with the proximate cause analysis as enunciated in State v. Hitchcock, 87 Ariz. 277 , 350 P.2d 681 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 609 , 81 S.Ct. 823 , 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961).	1	1985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-203 (4) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-105 (3) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105 (3) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4031 (3) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

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Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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