proximate cause doctrine in Indiana

2017Id. at 1108 .

2017The court noted that the officer would not have been injured if he had not pursued the defendant, but reasoned that “that fact is only sufficient to prove that Moore was a contributing cause of the injury” and that “[t]he actual cause of [the officer’s] fall [was] not clear .from the record.” Id. at 1108 .

2007Mayhue, 653 N.E.2d at 1388 .

2000Rejecting a “pure loss *166 of chance” 7 standard of causation in May-hue, the Court held that Section 323 was the appropriate mode of analysis of a claim for injuries that had been sustained, but which were more likely than not to have occurred even in the absence of any negligence, concluding that standard was the “most consistent with Indiana law.” See id. at 1388-89 .

1986As we stated in Lawson, supra, quoting the court in Ho-vert v. Caldwell, (1983) Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154 , 158: "An intervening cause, with respect to the doctrine of proximate cause, means, not a concurrent and contributing cause, but a superseding cause, which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm or the immediate and direct cause of the injury; and where the cause of an injury or death is the negligent act of an independent responsible intervening agency, such act must be regarded as the proximate cause thereof and the original negligence considered as only the remote cause." The

1984Negligence § 67 at 330-33 (1959), the Supreme Court in Havert, supra, wrote: "An intervening cause, with respect to the doctrine of proximate cause, means, *1215 not a concurrent and contributing cause, but a superseding cause, which is itself the natural "and logical cause of the harm or the immediate and direct cause of the injury; and where the cause of an injury or death is the negligent act of an independent responsible intervening agency, such act must be regarded as the proximate cause thereof and the original negligence considered as only the remote cause. [wlhere there is an independe

2010To determine that the injury was the proximate cause of the violation, "the injury must have been a foreseen consequence of the violation and would not have occurred if the requirements of the statute had been observed." Id.

2006McDillon, 812 N.E.2d at 156 .

2006McDillon, 812 N.E.2d at 156 .

2003Marshall, 680 N.E.2d at 1108 .

2003Id.

1999Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 1 The result reached in Rust Tractor Company and Connie’s Construction Co., Inc. is in general accord with other jurisdictions that have applied a proximate cause analysis in determining coverage under insurance policies which contain clauses excluding certain risks or perils.

1997Id.

1994Id.

1987Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1140 , the court discussed the proximate cause formulation in the pre-existing condition context, and similarly concluded that the condition should not be held to necessarily bar coverage under the proximate cause standard.

1987The court reasoned, "To require a person to be in perfect health at the time of the accident would be an absurdity, rendering the policy virtually worthless." Id. at 1142 .

1986As we stated in Lawson, supra, quoting the court in Ho-vert v. Caldwell, (1983) Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154 , 158: "An intervening cause, with respect to the doctrine of proximate cause, means, not a concurrent and contributing cause, but a superseding cause, which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm or the immediate and direct cause of the injury; and where the cause of an injury or death is the negligent act of an independent responsible intervening agency, such act must be regarded as the proximate cause thereof and the original negligence considered as only the remote cause." The

1986Havert, supra; Lawson, supra. Public Service and GTLA could not have reasonably foreseen that Thompson would strap on steel pole climbers and scale the utility pole after the raccoon.

1939In Sarber v. City of Indianapolis (1919), 72 Ind. App. 594, 604 , 126 N. E. 330 , this court said: “In applying the doctrine of proximate cause, and in determining what was the efficient cause of the injury . . ., we are required to apply our everyday judgment as men to ascertain whether or not there has been such a delinquency on the part of the appellee, uninterrupted by any supervening cause, that the act of the appellee in suffering and permitting the wire to be and remain in the river ought justly be held as the efficient cause of the injury of which complaint is made.

1939In Sarber v. City of Indianapolis (1919), 72 Ind. App. 594, 604 , 126 N. E. 330 , this court said: “In applying the doctrine of proximate cause, and in determining what was the efficient cause of the injury . . ., we are required to apply our everyday judgment as men to ascertain whether or not there has been such a delinquency on the part of the appellee, uninterrupted by any supervening cause, that the act of the appellee in suffering and permitting the wire to be and remain in the river ought justly be held as the efficient cause of the injury of which complaint is made.