27 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Bitnergreen1 sentence2025The trial court denied the officer’s motion for summary disposition under the GTLA, reasoning that the personal representative’s claim “was subject to the ‘damages proximately caused by’ standard of MCL 722.633(1), not the stricter ‘the proximate cause’ standard of MCL 691.1407(2)(c).” Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Swagergreen1 sentence2019The relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct was the immediate factual cause of injury, but whether, weighing the legal responsibilities of the actors involved, the government actor could be considered the proximate cause. [Ray II, 321 Mich App at 759-760 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] “Under the GTLA, a proper proximate cause analysis must assess foreseeability and the legal responsibility of the relevant actors to determine whether the conduct of a government actor, or some other person, was ‘the proximate cause,’ that is, as our caselaw has described it, “the one m | 1 | 1 |
McMillian v. Vlietgreen2 sentences1995Defendant appealed, and the wcac reversed that portion of the magistrate’s opinion that awarded death benefits, opining: In McMillian v Vliet, 422 Mich 570, 576 [ 374 NW2d 679 ] (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court defined proximate cause as "that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the injury, without which such injury would not have occurred.” In the case before us, plaintiffs death was not a natural and continuous sequence of his back injury, but, rather, was the result of medication designed to control his high blood pressure, a preexi 1995Defendant appealed, and the wcac reversed that portion of the magistrate’s opinion that awarded death benefits, opining: In McMillian v Vliet, 422 Mich 570, 576 [ 374 NW2d 679 ] (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court defined proximate cause as "that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the injury, without which such injury would not have occurred.” In the case before us, plaintiffs death was not a natural and continuous sequence of his back injury, but, rather, was the result of medication designed to control his high blood pressure, a preexi | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud 1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Metal Assemblies, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2026In Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 , 65; 903 NW2d 366 (2017), our Supreme Court reiterated its long-standing description of “the proximate cause” under this section of the GTLA as “the one -7- most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury.” See also Robinson, 462 Mich at 462 .6 The Ray Court stated: Under the GTLA, a proper proximate cause analysis must assess foreseeability and the legal responsibility of the relevant actors to determine whether the conduct of a government actor, or some other person, was “the proximate cause,” that is, as our caselaw has described it, “the one most imm 2023This is not a traditional proximate cause analysis.3 Id. at 457 n 14 (“[T]he [motor vehicle exception] statute does not say that governmental agencies are liable for injuries or property damage ‘proximately caused’ by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. | 6 | 2005–2026 |
Stoll v. Laubengayer
green
2 sentences2017While the phrase “proximate cause” has been used synonymously with the term “legal cause,” prior opinions of this Court—Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67 (2004); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (1977); Glinski, 358 Mich 182 ; Stoll, 174 Mich 701—demonstrate that before and after the Legislature’s 1986 amendment of the GTLA, factual causation was an established element of the proximate cause analysis; indeed, they establish that the sine qua non of proximate cause was cause in fact. 1998Cf. Stoll , n. 8 supra at 704, 140 N.W. 532 (observing the absence of a general and authoritative definition of proximate cause applicable in all cases, instead looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the given case). [12] Indeed while the dissent suggests that our holding launches a judicial missile of unbridled judicial activism that will precipitate further revisionist thinking, the claim is vastly over blown. | 2 | 1998–2017 |
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiffs respond by observing that if the Legislature intended to preclude liability even where gross negligence is shown, simply because the plaintiffs or another defendant was also negligent, and if it intended to overturn the doctrine of comparative negligence established in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1970), the legislative history would evidence that intent. 1994The plaintiffs respond by observing that if the Legislature intended to preclude liability even where gross negligence is shown, simply because the plaintiffs or another defendant was also negligent, and if it intended to overturn the doctrine of comparative negligence established in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1970), the legislative history would evidence that intent. | 2 | 1984–1994 |
Whetro v. Awkerman
green
2 sentences1982In Whetro v Awkerman, 383 Mich 235 ; 174 NW2d 783 (1970), our Supreme Court disavowed the proximate cause test. 1982In Whetro v Awkerman, 383 Mich 235 ; 174 NW2d 783 (1970), our Supreme Court disavowed the proximate cause test. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Curtis v. City of Flint
green
2 sentences2024See Dougherty v Detroit, 340 Mich App 339 , 353-354; 986 NW2d 467 (2021) (noting that proximate causation includes both factual cause and legal cause); Curtis v Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 559-562 ; 655 NW2d 791 (2002) (recognizing that MCL 691.1405 requires proof that the injury was the result of the negligent operation of the motor vehicle, which is a higher standard than the but-for standard applicable in an ordinary proximate- cause analysis). 2024See Dougherty v Detroit, 340 Mich App 339 , 353-354; 986 NW2d 467 (2021) (noting that proximate causation includes both factual cause and legal cause); Curtis v Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 559-562 ; 655 NW2d 791 (2002) (recognizing that MCL 691.1405 requires proof that the injury was the result of the negligent operation of the motor vehicle, which is a higher standard than the but-for standard applicable in an ordinary proximate- cause analysis). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Craig v. Oakwood Hospital
green
1 sentence2017While the phrase “proximate cause” has been used synonymously with the term “legal cause,” prior opinions of this Court—Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67 (2004); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (1977); Glinski, 358 Mich 182 ; Stoll, 174 Mich 701—demonstrate that before and after the Legislature’s 1986 amendment of the GTLA, factual causation was an established element of the proximate cause analysis; indeed, they establish that the sine qua non of proximate cause was cause in fact. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Moning v. Alfono
green
1 sentence2017While the phrase “proximate cause” has been used synonymously with the term “legal cause,” prior opinions of this Court—Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67 (2004); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (1977); Glinski, 358 Mich 182 ; Stoll, 174 Mich 701—demonstrate that before and after the Legislature’s 1986 amendment of the GTLA, factual causation was an established element of the proximate cause analysis; indeed, they establish that the sine qua non of proximate cause was cause in fact. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Skinner v. Square D Co.
green
1 sentence2017While the phrase “proximate cause” has been used synonymously with the term “legal cause,” prior opinions of this Court—Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67 (2004); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (1977); Glinski, 358 Mich 182 ; Stoll, 174 Mich 701—demonstrate that before and after the Legislature’s 1986 amendment of the GTLA, factual causation was an established element of the proximate cause analysis; indeed, they establish that the sine qua non of proximate cause was cause in fact. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp.
green
2 sentences2017Because a proximate cause inquiry seeks “to determine the appropriate scope of a negligent defendant’s liability,” Dobbs, § 198, p 681 (emphasis added), it “is an issue that can only arise when the [actor] is negligent and his negligence can be identified as creating specified risks.” Id. at § 210, p 731. 25 Brisboy v Fibreboard Corp, 429 Mich 540, 547 ; 418 NW2d 650 (1988). 26 Robinson, 462 Mich at 462. 2017Because a proximate cause inquiry seeks “to determine the appropriate scope of a negligent defendant’s liability,” Dobbs, § 198, p 681 (emphasis added), it “is an issue that can only arise when the [actor] is negligent and his negligence can be identified as creating specified risks.” Id. at § 210, p 731. 25 Brisboy v Fibreboard Corp, 429 Mich 540, 547 ; 418 NW2d 650 (1988). 26 Robinson, 462 Mich at 462. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Glinski v. Szylling
green
1 sentence2017While the phrase “proximate cause” has been used synonymously with the term “legal cause,” prior opinions of this Court—Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67 (2004); Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (1977); Glinski, 358 Mich 182 ; Stoll, 174 Mich 701—demonstrate that before and after the Legislature’s 1986 amendment of the GTLA, factual causation was an established element of the proximate cause analysis; indeed, they establish that the sine qua non of proximate cause was cause in fact. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Frierson v. West American Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2016Aside from the absence of any statutory language supporting the application of a proximate cause standard to the no-fault act’s benefit provisions, I submit that tort principles such as proximate cause have no place in a no-fault arena.3 “Given the remedial nature of the no-fault act, courts must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the persons who are its intended beneficiaries.” Frierson v West American Ins Co, 261 Mich App 732, 734 ; 683 NW2d 695 (2004). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Feezel
green
2 sentences2016Defendant relies upon People v Feezel, 486 Mich. 184 , 783 N.W.2d 67 (2010), to establish the proposition that his conviction for failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious impairment of a body function required that he be the proximate cause of the accident. 2016Defendant relies upon People v Feezel, 486 Mich. 184 , 783 N.W.2d 67 (2010), to establish the proposition that his conviction for failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious impairment of a body function required that he be the proximate cause of the accident. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Frierson v. West American Insurance
green
1 sentence2016Aside from the absence of any statutory language supporting the application of a proximate cause standard to the no-fault act’s benefit provisions, I submit that tort principles such as proximate cause have no place in a no-fault arena.3 “Given the remedial nature of the no-fault act, courts must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the persons who are its intended beneficiaries.” Frierson v West American Ins Co, 261 Mich App 732, 734 ; 683 NW2d 695 (2004). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Stone v. Williamson
green
2 sentences2010If the negligence was responsible for more than half of the total risk of the bad result and the plaintiff suffered that bad result, then the cause-in-fact prong of the proximate cause analysis is met because it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a cause in 3 I agree with the lead opinion, however, that not all traditional medical malpractice cases need to be expressed in statistical or percentage terms in order to meet the “more probable than not” standard. 4 If a plaintiff cannot meet the burden for a traditional medical malpractice claim, I would hold that the pla 2010If the negligence was responsible for more than half of the total risk of the bad result and the plaintiff suffered that bad result, then the cause-in-fact prong of the proximate cause analysis is met because it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a cause in 3 I agree with the lead opinion, however, that not all traditional medical malpractice cases need to be expressed in statistical or percentage terms in order to meet the “more probable than not” standard. 4 If a plaintiff cannot meet the burden for a traditional medical malpractice claim, I would hold that the pla | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2006The proximate cause standard requires a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the result of that conduct. "[I]t [must] appear[] that the death resulted as the natural, direct, and necessary result of the unlawful act . . . .” People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196 ; 148 NW 400 (1914). 2006The proximate cause standard requires a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the result of that conduct. "[I]t [must] appear[] that the death resulted as the natural, direct, and necessary result of the unlawful act . . . .” People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196 ; 148 NW 400 (1914). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Lardie
green
2 sentences2005Therefore, to the extent that the Lardie Court was simply attempting to articulate a proximate cause requirement by creating its "substantial cause" test, the Lardie Court erred in conflating the "status" and "causation" elements of the crime. [47] Lardie, supra at 259-260 , 551 N.W.2d 656 (emphasis added). 2005As mentioned in note 4 of this opinion, we do not disturb the other holdings in Lardie . [48] MCL 257.625(4); cf. Lardie, supra at 259 , 551 N.W.2d 656 . [49] Lardie, supra at 253 , 551 N.W.2d 656 . [50] Id. at 272 , 551 N.W.2d 656 . [51] As we noted in Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 463-468 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000), we do not lightly overrule precedent. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v Bailey
green
1 sentence2003However, in People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657 ; 549 NW2d *543 325 (1996), our Supreme Court applied a different proximate cause analysis in a voluntary manslaughter case: In assessing criminal liability for some harm, it is not necessary that the party convicted of a crime be the sole cause of that harm, only that he be a contributory cause that was a substantial factor in producing the harm. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor
green
2 sentences2000The majority overrules the proximate cause analysis of Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), and Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125 ; 579 NW2d 840 (1998). 2000The majority overrules the proximate cause analysis of Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), and Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125 ; 579 NW2d 840 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Holder v. Hall
green
2 sentences2000As previously explained, the Legislature changed Fiser's proximate cause analysis with respect to the individual police officers when it enacted the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. [20] Stare decisis means "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.), p. 1577. [21] Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). [22] Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). 2000As previously explained, the Legislature changed Fiser's proximate cause analysis with respect to the individual police officers when it enacted the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. [20] Stare decisis means "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.), p. 1577. [21] Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). [22] Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hohn v. United States
green
2 sentences2000As previously explained, the Legislature changed Fiser's proximate cause analysis with respect to the individual police officers when it enacted the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. [20] Stare decisis means "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.), p. 1577. [21] Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). [22] Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). 2000As previously explained, the Legislature changed Fiser's proximate cause analysis with respect to the individual police officers when it enacted the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. [20] Stare decisis means "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.), p. 1577. [21] Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). [22] Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rogers v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2000The majority overrules the proximate cause analysis of Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), and Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125 ; 579 NW2d 840 (1998). 2000The majority overrules the proximate cause analysis of Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), and Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125 ; 579 NW2d 840 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hagerman v. Gencorp Automotive
green
2 sentences1996This Court also agreed with the WCAC that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that her husband’s death was proximately caused by any work-related injury. 209 Mich App 667 ; 531 NW2d 832 (1995). 1996This Court also agreed with the WCAC that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that her husband’s death was proximately caused by any work-related injury. 209 Mich App 667 ; 531 NW2d 832 (1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ross v. Consumers Power Co.
red
2 sentences1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud 1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Reynolds v. Majewski green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Attorney General v. Kent County Road Commission
green
2 sentences1994Cf. Attorney General v Kent Co Rd Comm, 184 Mich App 525, 527 ; 459 NW2d 11 (1990) (finding that MCL 600.1615; MSA 27A.1615, which mandates that the home county of a governmental unit is "the proper county" for venue, provides for one proper county for venue). [3] Const 1963, art 2, § 8 ("Laws shall be enacted to provide for the recall of all elective officers except judges of courts of record"); art 4, § 2 (senators are to be elected every four years); art 4, § 3 (representatives are to be elected every two years); art 5, § 21 (the Governor is to be elected every four years). [4] Const 1963, 1994Cf. Attorney General v Kent Co Rd Comm, 184 Mich App 525, 527 ; 459 NW2d 11 (1990) (finding that MCL 600.1615; MSA 27A.1615, which mandates that the home county of a governmental unit is "the proper county" for venue, provides for one proper county for venue). [3] Const 1963, art 2, § 8 ("Laws shall be enacted to provide for the recall of all elective officers except judges of courts of record"); art 4, § 2 (senators are to be elected every four years); art 4, § 3 (representatives are to be elected every two years); art 5, § 21 (the Governor is to be elected every four years). [4] Const 1963, | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Schattilly v. Yonker green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Barringer v. Arnold
green
2 sentences1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud 1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kirby v. Larson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moerman v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission
green
2 sentences1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud 1994Nearly identical language appeared in House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163, First and Second Analyses. [18] Both of the Senate Analysis Section analyses refer to language in the original and the amended Senate bills. [19] While Senator Pollack, using her constitutional right to protest, Const 1963, art 4, § 18, mentioned the gross negligence standard, she did not mention or attach any significance to the proximate cause requirement. [1] This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislative action, past and present, on the issue of governmental immunity "evidences a clear legislative jud | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Selmo v. Baratono neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Romankewiz v. Black green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Placek v. City of Sterling Heights green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Thornton v. Luria-Dumes Co-Venture green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Cook v. Charles Hoertz & Son green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Reiss v. Northway Motor & Manfg. Co. neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Tyler v. Weed green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Lambeck v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad neutral | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.