proximate cause instruction in California

2014In Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041 , the appellate court held that the trial court in a wrongful death case erred in giving the proximate cause instruction containing the “but for” test of cause in fact, rather than the legal cause instruction using the “substantial factor” test for cause in fact.

2001As for our criticism of the proximate cause instruction in People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 , we acknowledged a concern previously expressed in Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1050-1051 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 , in the context of another instruction, that the proximate cause instruction placed "undue emphasis on physical or temporal nearness." ( People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) We had expressed the fear in Mitchell v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d

2015One result of the difference is the role and application of causation principles. “[Ajlthough Labor Code section 3600 refers to ‘proximate cause,’ its definition in workers’ compensation cases is not identical to that found in the common law of torts. [Citation.] ‘In fact, the proximate cause requirement of Labor Code section 3600 has been interpreted as merely elaborating on the general requirement that the injury arise out of the employment.’ [Citation.] The danger from which the employee’s injury results must be one to which he was exposed in his employment. [Citation.] ‘ “All that is requi

2007(Mason v. Lake Dolores Group (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 822, 833-834 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 ] [§ 3600, subd. (a)(2), “essentially restates] the ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ requirements of section 3600, subdivision (a)”]; Maher, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 734, fn. 3 [the proximate cause requirement of § 3600, subd. (a)(3), “merely elaborates] on the general requirement that the injury arise out of the employment” in § 3600, subd. (a)].) 4 The record here is silent regarding the amount of rent paid by the Vaughts to live in the ranch house.

2023(See Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 320 .) Understanding the rationale for the addition of the “natural and probable consequences” language to the proximate cause instruction is helpful in resolving the question before us.

2001As for our criticism of the proximate cause instruction in People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 , we acknowledged a concern previously expressed in Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1050-1051 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 , in the context of another instruction, that the proximate cause instruction placed "undue emphasis on physical or temporal nearness." ( People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 313, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 .) We had expressed the fear in Mitchell v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1041 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d

2018(Walden, at p. 290 [Georgia officer's seizure of cash caused an injury not "tethered to Nevada in any meaningful company and explained there must be "a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue." (Ibid.) Because the court did not address the strength of a causal link required, state precedent repudiating a proximate cause requirement may remain viable. ( Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1067−1068, citing Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 462−464; see also Vons, at p. 459 [rejecting claim that "only an injury caused by the very activity that formed the defendant's forum contac

2014First, the Vons court concluded that a defendant’s contacts with the state and their connection to the claim at-issue were “inversely related.” It stated, “as the high court suggested in International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. 310 , for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to those contacts are inversely related.

2019In Milton [ v. Perceptual Development Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861 , 867, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ], the *454 appellate court considered the causation requirement of the mandatory relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , supra , 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) The court concluded that the proximate cause standard for legal malpractice actions should also apply to the causation requirement of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) Under that standard, 'a lawyer's negligence need not be the only prox

2019In Milton [ v. Perceptual Development Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861 , 867, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ], the *454 appellate court considered the causation requirement of the mandatory relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , supra , 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) The court concluded that the proximate cause standard for legal malpractice actions should also apply to the causation requirement of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) Under that standard, 'a lawyer's negligence need not be the only prox

2005Rather, it relies on defendants’ purposeful and successful solicitation of business within California—and not on the mere foreseeability that California residents will patronize businesses of a neighboring state. 7 The proximate cause test asks whether “the alleged injury was proximately caused by the contacts in the forum state.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) 8 The “but for” test asks “whether the injury would have occurred ‘but for’ the forum contacts.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 467 .) 9 The substantive relevance test asks whether “conduct constituting a forum contact that took

2002The form 10-K is a consolidated statement, so its representation that DVI and its subsidiaries combined have 375 employees is not inconsistent with Breaux’s statement that DVI itself has no employees. 3 In Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, 464 , the Supreme Court rejected the proximate cause test applied by Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 546 , for analyzing specific jurisdiction.

2017Absent some such limiting principle, a proximate cause inquiry cannot reliably prevent excessive liability because proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. ( Lacy v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 97 , 101, 29 P.2d 781 .) The issue cannot be decided as a matter of law unless the only reasonable conclusion from the facts is an absence of causation. ( State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339 , 353, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309 , 349 P.3d 1013 .) Thus, in all but the most extreme cases, predecessor liability claims are likely to reach a jury,

2017Absent some such limiting principle, a proximate cause inquiry cannot reliably prevent excessive liability because proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. ( Lacy v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 97 , 101, 29 P.2d 781 .) The issue cannot be decided as a matter of law unless the only reasonable conclusion from the facts is an absence of causation. ( State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339 , 353, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309 , 349 P.3d 1013 .) Thus, in all but the most extreme cases, predecessor liability claims are likely to reach a jury,

2022Appeals Bd. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 297 .) This requirement is an elaboration of the proximate cause requirement in section 3600, subdivision (a)(3). ( LaTourette, supra, 17 Cal.4th a p. 651, fn. 1.) But the concept of proximate cause in workers’ compensation is significantly different than in tort law.

2015One result of the difference is the role and application of causation principles. “[Ajlthough Labor Code section 3600 refers to ‘proximate cause,’ its definition in workers’ compensation cases is not identical to that found in the common law of torts. [Citation.] ‘In fact, the proximate cause requirement of Labor Code section 3600 has been interpreted as merely elaborating on the general requirement that the injury arise out of the employment.’ [Citation.] The danger from which the employee’s injury results must be one to which he was exposed in his employment. [Citation.] ‘ “All that is requi

2016Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 219, 222-223 .) 9 something that is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he “substantial factor” test subsumes the “but for” test.’ [Citations.]” (South Coast Framing, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 298 .) “[T]he workers’ compensation system is not based upon fault. ‘It seeks (1) to ensure that the cost of industrial injuries will be part of the cost of goods rather than a burden on society, (2) to guarantee prompt, limited compensation for an employee’s work injuries, regardless of fault, as an inevitable cost of production, (3) t

2015Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 219, 221-223 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 548 , 363 P.2d 548 ] (Pacific Gas & Elec.).

1945Co., 366 Ill. 11 [ 7 N.E.2d 740 , 111 A.L.R. 1133 ]; Lawrenceburg v. Lay, 149 Ky. 490 [ 149 S.W. 862 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 1194, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 480 ]; Shanley v. Hurley, 96 Vt. 119 [ 117 A. 250 , 23 A.L.R. 261 ]; cf. Stultz v. Benson Lumler Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 695 [ 59 P.2d 100 ]; see, Restatement, Torts, § 302, comment (1), §§447-449, 452; 25 Cal.L.Rev. 247; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 70.) This course of reasoning departs from the accustomed one only because of the continuing confusion engendered by the doctrine of proximate cause.

1945Co., 366 Ill. 11 [ 7 N.E.2d 740 , 111 A.L.R. 1133 ]; Lawrenceburg v. Lay, 149 Ky. 490 [ 149 S.W. 862 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 1194, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 480 ]; Shanley v. Hurley, 96 Vt. 119 [ 117 A. 250 , 23 A.L.R. 261 ]; cf. Stultz v. Benson Lumler Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 695 [ 59 P.2d 100 ]; see, Restatement, Torts, § 302, comment (1), §§447-449, 452; 25 Cal.L.Rev. 247; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 70.) This course of reasoning departs from the accustomed one only because of the continuing confusion engendered by the doctrine of proximate cause.

2025Thus, although defendant was not cited by the LAHD, there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s determination that defendant breached the lease by “violat[ing] any city ordinance . . . in or about said premises.” Materiality of the Breach The jury was instructed that defendant’s alleged failure to perform the lease covenant “must not be trivial but must be a substantial violation of important obligations.” On appeal, defendant argues there is no substantial evidence supporting the jury’s special verdict finding that she committed a substantial breach of the lease, as the alleged violat

2025(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138; State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353; see Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235, fn. 1 [“Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages: determining cause in fact and considering various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability”].) Here, we focus on the cause in fact component of proximate cause. “ ‘ “ ‘An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event’ ” ’ ” [citations], and it is commonly referred to as the ‘but-for’ cause . . .” (People v. Carney, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.

2024The danger addressed by the provocative act doctrine is not measured by the violence of the defendant’s conduct alone, but also by the likelihood of a violent response.” (Id. at p. 657.) 10 “When the defendant commits an inherently dangerous felony, the victim’s self- defensive killing is generally found to be a natural and probable response to the defendant’s act, and not an independent intervening cause that relieves the defendant of liability. [Citations.] The question of proximate cause is ordinarily decided by the jury, unless undisputed evidence reveals ‘a cause so remote that a court ma

2023Aetna compares this case to Two Jinn, Inc. v. Government Payment Service, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1326 (Two Jinn), in which a licensed bail agency sued an unlicensed company for providing bail services in violation of the UCL.