proximate cause bar in Texas

2025Accordingly, “plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post- conviction relief, or otherwise.” Id. at 497–98.

2025“So if convicted criminals want to sue their defense attorneys, they must first remove the proximate-cause bar,” and they do so “by being ‘exonerated.’” Id. (quoting Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498 ).

2009See Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 481 (Tex. 1995). 10 .

2009See Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 481 (Tex. 1995). 11 or related misrepresentations, ERS accepted a risk that the funds advised by Putnam would be outperformed by the funds advised by other firms, just as it accepted a converse risk that the funds advised by Templeton and DuPont would be outperformed by the Putnam-advised funds.

2016This is the classic proximate cause test with the component elements of cause in fact and foreseeability.” Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 126 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied); see Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M.

2016See id.; see also Hill, 964 S.W.2d at 126 (noting that the classic proximate cause test applies to tor-tious interference cases).

2005A sufficient nexus exists between the alleged negligence in the misuse of the stethoscope and pulse oxym-eter and Blackmon’s death under a traditional proximate-cause analysis, and the alleged misuse, which occurred nine hours before Blackmon’s death, is neither too attenuated temporally nor too weak caus ally. 6 See Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 33 ; Baston, 49 S.W.3d at 428-29 ; Hardy , 2 5.W.3d at 609-10.

2005A sufficient nexus exists between the alleged negligence in the misuse of the stethoscope and pulse oxymeter and Blackmon's death under a traditional proximate-cause analysis, and the alleged misuse, which occurred nine hours before Blackmon's death, is neither too attenuated temporally nor too weak causally. [6] *723 See Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 33 ; Baston, 49 S.W.3d at 428-29 ; Hardy, 2 S.W.3d at 609-10 .

2022See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 583 (rejecting a proximate cause test as exceeding the guarantees of due process and noting that such an analysis would “require a court to delve into the merits to determine whether a jurisdictional fact is actually a legal cause of the injury”).

2016This emphasis is likewise misplaced.39 For the same reasons, we held that a Utah tour operator, about which a Texan learned via word of mouth from a Texan third party, cannot be haled into Texas court on the basis of just alleging the tour operator’s liability for a death that occurred in Arizona.40 The Moki Mac Court reviewed various options for analyzing the relatedness between a nonresident’s contacts and the litigation itself.41 We considered “but-for” relatedness and criticized that analysis as being “too broad and conceptually unlimited in scope.”42 A proximate cause standard on the othe

2013We reach this conclusion considering both the proximate cause standard, pursuant to which these transfers resulting in Specialties’s loss of revenue would not have occurred but for the improper solicitation, see Phoenix Refining Co., 81 S.W.2d at 61; Cook Consultants, Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 236, and the breach of contract causation standard, pursuant to which this loss was “the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence” of Delzell’s, Duckworth’s, and— through the unchallenged conspiracy finding — Grice’s improper solicitation, see Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.1981).

2012We reach this conclusion considering both the proximate cause standard, pursuant to which these transfers resulting in Specialties’s loss of revenue would not have occurred but for the improper solicitation. see Phoenix Refining C’o., 8 1 S.W.2d at 61; C’ook Consultants, Inc.. 700 S.W.2d at 236 , and the breach of contract causation standard, pursuant to which this loss was “the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence” ofDe[zell ‘s, Duckworth’s, and—-through the unchallenged conspiracy finding—Grice ‘s improper solicitation, see Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 198

2012Seitel relies largely upon language in Utica National Insurance Co. of Texas v. American Indemnity Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. 2004).

2012Seitel relies largely upon language in Utica National Insurance Co. of Texas v. American Indemnity Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex.2004).

2010The supreme court squarely addressed this issue in Peeler and held that “plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.” Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497-98 (emphasis added); see also Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of

2010The supreme court squarely addressed this issue in Peeler and held that “plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.” Peeler , 909 S.W.2d at 497-98 (emphasis added); see also Swilley v. McCain , 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction

2009Branch v. Estate of Blackmon, 169 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005) (“The court in White did not expressly or implicitly abandon the TTCA’s proximate-cause requirement for a different standard such as immediate cause, direct cause, or sole cause.”), vacated on other grounds, 195 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

2009Branch v. Estate of Blackmon, 169 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005) (“The court in White did not expressly or implicitly abandon the TTCA’s proximate-cause requirement for a different standard such as immediate cause, direct cause, or sole cause.”), vacated on other grounds, 195 S.W.3d 98 (Tex.2006) (per curiam).

2003See Rodriguez v. Moerbe, 963 S.W.2d 808, 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); J.

2003See Rodriguez v. Moerbe, 963 S.W.2d 808, 821 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); J.

2020They can do so, the plurality said, by being “exonerated.” Id. at 498 . 6 Yet the Peeler plurality did not precisely define the term “exonerated” because the disposition of that case did not so require.

1995See, e.g., O'Blennis, 691 S.W.2d at 503 .

2022See United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463, 481 (Tex. 2017) (a defendant must preserve error by objecting when an independent theory of recovery is submitted defectively, including when an element of that theory is omitted).

2022See Noble Drilling (US) Inc. v. Fountain, 238 S.W.3d 432, 439-40 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Cepeda v. Orion Marine Constr., Inc., 499 S.W.3d 579, 583-84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (comparing causation standards under negligence and Jones Act claims).

2022See Noble Drilling (US) Inc. v. Fountain, 238 S.W.3d 432, 439-40 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Cepeda v. Orion Marine Constr., Inc., 499 S.W.3d 579, 583-84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (comparing causation standards under negligence and Jones Act claims).

2022Rather, in adopting “a middle ground,” the supreme court requires only “a substantial connection between [the nonresident’s] contacts and the operative facts of the 13 litigation.” Id. at 585 (citing Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 229–33; Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)).

2020P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d 2 Cf. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 , 497–98 (Tex. 1995) (plurality op.) (“[P]laintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.”); Johnson v. Odom, 949 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (applying Peeler to client’s claims against attorney for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of cont

2018See 564 U.S. at 689– 31 90.

2016Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2016This emphasis is likewise misplaced.39 For the same reasons, we held that a Utah tour operator, about which a Texan learned via word of mouth from a Texan third party, cannot be haled into Texas court on the basis of just alleging the tour operator’s liability for a death that occurred in Arizona.40 The Moki Mac Court reviewed various options for analyzing the relatedness between a nonresident’s contacts and the litigation itself.41 We considered “but-for” relatedness and criticized that analysis as being “too broad and conceptually unlimited in scope.”42 A proximate cause standard on the othe

2014Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice v. Hawkins, 169 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2005, no pet.).

2014In short, “convicts may not shift the consequences of their crime to a third party.” Id. at 498; see also Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, P.C., 880 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (“Can a client who contends that his willful criminal act or criminal conviction [for bank fraud] directly resulted from his attorney’s negligent services sue that attorney for legal malpractice?