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13 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stoner v. Stonergreen2 sentences2011See State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 47 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 5 P.2d 847 (finding no fundamental error when the district court failed to give that 6 portion of the proximate cause instruction that permits a determination of culpability 7 even when there is evidence that more than one person may have contributed to a 8 victim’s death). 2010See State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 47 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 5 P.2d 847 (finding no fundamental error when the district court failed to give that 6 portion of the proximate cause instruction that permits a determination of culpability 7 even when there is evidence that more than one person may have contributed to a 8 victim’s death). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Munozgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 47 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 5 P.2d 847 (finding no fundamental error when the district court failed to give that 6 portion of the proximate cause instruction that permits a determination of culpability 7 even when there is evidence that more than one person may have contributed to a 8 victim’s death). 2011See State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 47 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 5 P.2d 847 (finding no fundamental error when the district court failed to give that 6 portion of the proximate cause instruction that permits a determination of culpability 7 even when there is evidence that more than one person may have contributed to a 8 victim’s death). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stephensred2 sentences2012See 18 State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462 , 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979), overruled on other 19 grounds by State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 491 , 903 P.2d 228, 233 (1995). 10 1 Further, the parties did not dispute at trial whether Defendant’s actions caused 2 the actual accident, but whether they rose to the required level of recklessness. 2012See 18 State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462 , 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979), overruled on other 19 grounds by State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 491 , 903 P.2d 228, 233 (1995). 10 1 Further, the parties did not dispute at trial whether Defendant’s actions caused 2 the actual accident, but whether they rose to the required level of recklessness. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2012See 18 State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462 , 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979), overruled on other 19 grounds by State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 491 , 903 P.2d 228, 233 (1995). 10 1 Further, the parties did not dispute at trial whether Defendant’s actions caused 2 the actual accident, but whether they rose to the required level of recklessness. 2012See 18 State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462 , 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979), overruled on other 19 grounds by State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 491 , 903 P.2d 228, 233 (1995). 10 1 Further, the parties did not dispute at trial whether Defendant’s actions caused 2 the actual accident, but whether they rose to the required level of recklessness. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Truckinggreen2 sentences2010See Estate of Mitchum, 113 N.M. at 89-90 , 823 P.2d at 331-32 . 2010See Estate of Mitchum, 113 N.M. at 89-90 , 823 P.2d at 331-32 . | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Cohengreen2 sentences1995The Court also emphasized that the operator of the motor vehicle could be held liable for the entire harm because of the operation of the doctrine of proximate cause, id. at 1005-06, and that at one time the majority rule was that a general release given to the original tortfeasor also released the allegedly negligent physician, id. at 1005 n. 3. 1995The Court also emphasized that the operator of the motor vehicle could be held liable for the entire harm because of the operation of the doctrine of proximate cause, id. at 1005-06, and that at one time the majority rule was that a general release given to the original tortfeasor also released the allegedly negligent physician, id. at 1005 n. 3. | 1 | 1 |
Western States Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Sandia Corp.green2 sentences1995Maroulis, Note, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damages For Their Fear of AIDS?, 62 Fordham L.Rev. 225, 237 (1993) (“In fear-of-AIDS cases, the proximate cause inquiry revolves around the issue of whether the plaintiffs fear is reasonable.”); see also Western States Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Sandia Corp., 110 N.M. 676, 680 , 798 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ct.App.) (in negligence case, “reasonableness or unreasonableness of anything is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact which should be determined by a jury”), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653 , 798 P.2d 1039 (1990). 1995Maroulis, Note, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damages For Their Fear of AIDS?, 62 Fordham L.Rev. 225, 237 (1993) (“In fear-of-AIDS cases, the proximate cause inquiry revolves around the issue of whether the plaintiffs fear is reasonable.”); see also Western States Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Sandia Corp., 110 N.M. 676, 680 , 798 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ct.App.) (in negligence case, “reasonableness or unreasonableness of anything is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact which should be determined by a jury”), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653 , 798 P.2d 1039 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Stuckey v. Furr Food Cafeteriagreen2 sentences1991In Stuckey v. Furr Food Cafeteria, 72 N.M. 15, 16 , 380 P.2d 172, 173 (1963), our supreme court construed the words “natural and direct” to “signify an understandable and reason-, able proximity of cause and effect as distinguished from remote and doubtful consequences resulting from a given occurrence.” The court’s language, although useful in the case in which it appeared, provides little guidance for the present situation, in which we must consider the significance under our statute of a non-work-related accident subsequent to a work-related accident. 1991In Stuckey v. Furr Food Cafeteria, 72 N.M. 15, 16 , 380 P.2d 172, 173 (1963), our supreme court construed the words “natural and direct” to “signify an understandable and reason-, able proximity of cause and effect as distinguished from remote and doubtful consequences resulting from a given occurrence.” The court’s language, although useful in the case in which it appeared, provides little guidance for the present situation, in which we must consider the significance under our statute of a non-work-related accident subsequent to a work-related accident. | 1 | 1 |
Malczewski v. McReynolds Construction Co.green2 sentences1985See Malczewski v. McReynolds Construction Co., 96 N.M. 333 , 630 P.2d 285 (Ct.App.1981). 1985See Malczewski v. McReynolds Construction Co., 96 N.M. 333 , 630 P.2d 285 (Ct.App.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Friede
red
2 sentences2019If [the jury instructions] were not proper, [the] plaintiffs participated in the submission of these matters to the jury, and they cannot now seek to have the verdict set aside by way of a motion for a new trial or on appeal.”), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC- 006, 135 N.M. 171 , 86 P.3d 596 ; Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 1977-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8, 90 N.M. 414 , 564 P.2d 619 (“The proximate cause instruction was not only unobjected to by the plaintiff but it had been requested by the plaintiff. 2019If [the jury instructions] were not proper, [the] plaintiffs participated in the submission of these matters to the jury, and they cannot now seek to have the verdict set aside by way of a motion for a new trial or on appeal.”), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC- 006, 135 N.M. 171 , 86 P.3d 596 ; Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 1977-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8, 90 N.M. 414 , 564 P.2d 619 (“The proximate cause instruction was not only unobjected to by the plaintiff but it had been requested by the plaintiff. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft
green
2 sentences2019If [the jury instructions] were not proper, [the] plaintiffs participated in the submission of these matters to the jury, and they cannot now seek to have the verdict set aside by way of a motion for a new trial or on appeal.”), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC- 006, 135 N.M. 171 , 86 P.3d 596 ; Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 1977-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8, 90 N.M. 414 , 564 P.2d 619 (“The proximate cause instruction was not only unobjected to by the plaintiff but it had been requested by the plaintiff. 2019If [the jury instructions] were not proper, [the] plaintiffs participated in the submission of these matters to the jury, and they cannot now seek to have the verdict set aside by way of a motion for a new trial or on appeal.”), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Friede, 2004-NMSC- 006, 135 N.M. 171 , 86 P.3d 596 ; Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 1977-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8, 90 N.M. 414 , 564 P.2d 619 (“The proximate cause instruction was not only unobjected to by the plaintiff but it had been requested by the plaintiff. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Munoz
green
2 sentences2002Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 . 2002Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Torres v. El Paso Electric Co.
red
2 sentences2001The inclusion of independent intervening cause in UJI 13-305 and its accompanying definition in UJI 13-306 “are intended to clarify the meaning of proximate cause in cases in which there is evidence from which reasonable minds could differ in deciding whether an unforeseeable cause has broken the chain of causation.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-029, ¶17 , 127 N.M. 729 , 987 P.2d 386 . {15} In Torres, our Supreme Court made clear “that the doctrine of independent intervening cause should be carefully applied to avoid conflict with New Mexico’s use of several liability.” Id. ¶ 19. 2001The inclusion of independent intervening cause in UJI 13-305 and its accompanying definition in UJI 13-306 “are intended to clarify the meaning of proximate cause in cases in which there is evidence from which reasonable minds could differ in deciding whether an unforeseeable cause has broken the chain of causation.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-029, ¶17 , 127 N.M. 729 , 987 P.2d 386 . {15} In Torres, our Supreme Court made clear “that the doctrine of independent intervening cause should be carefully applied to avoid conflict with New Mexico’s use of several liability.” Id. ¶ 19. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Aragon v. State Corrections Department
green
2 sentences1994Section 52-1-28(B) supplements the proximate cause requirement with a “ ‘natural and direct result’ ” requirement, meaning “a result that occurs in the natural course of life -without intervening events.” Aragon, 113 N.M. at 179 , 824 P.2d at 319 . 1994Section 52-1-28(B) supplements the proximate cause requirement with a “ ‘natural and direct result’ ” requirement, meaning “a result that occurs in the natural course of life -without intervening events.” Aragon, 113 N.M. at 179 , 824 P.2d at 319 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy
green
2 sentences1991We note that Section 52-1-28 did repeat other language of Section 52-1-9; it tracked Section 52-1-9 in using the phrase “arising out of, and in the course of, his employment.” See T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354 , 630 P.2d 753 (1981) (courts should avoid construing statute so as to render part of it surplusage). 1991We note that Section 52-1-28 did repeat other language of Section 52-1-9; it tracked Section 52-1-9 in using the phrase “arising out of, and in the course of, his employment.” See T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354 , 630 P.2d 753 (1981) (courts should avoid construing statute so as to render part of it surplusage). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1990Its hybrid definition of "single occurrence" is as follows: "[A]ll injuries proximately caused by the governmental agency's successive negligent acts or omissions that combined concurrently to create a singular, separate, and unitary risk of harm fell within the meaning of a `single occurrence' when triggered by the discrete event of one runaway truck." (Emphasis added.) I believe a simpler and more practical approach is to determine whether there has been but "one event of an unfortunate character that takes place without one's *265 foresight or expectation." Shamblin, 332 S.E.2d at 644 . 1990Its hybrid definition of “single occurrence” is as follows: “[A]ll injuries proximately caused by the governmental agency’s successive negligent acts or omissions that combined concurrently to create a singular, separate, and unitary risk of harm fell within the meaning of a ‘single occurrence’ when triggered by the discrete event of one runaway truck.” (Emphasis added.) I believe a simpler and more practical approach is to determine whether there has been but “one event of an unfortunate character that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation.” Shamblin, 332 S.E.2d at 644 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.