37 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Janson v. SAJEWSKI FUNERAL HOME, INC.green2 sentences2018These wintry conditions by their nature would have alerted an average user of ordinary intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.] In Janson, id., the Supreme Court relied on and favorably cited this Court’s opinion in Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474 ; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), and specifically page 483 of the opinion, where the Slaughter panel stated: The overriding principle behind the many definitions of black ice is that it is either invisible or nearly invisible, transparent, or nearly transparent. 2018These wintry conditions by their nature would have alerted an average user of ordinary intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.] In Janson, id., the Supreme Court relied on and favorably cited this Court’s opinion in Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474 ; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), and specifically page 483 of the opinion, where the Slaughter panel stated: The overriding principle behind the many definitions of black ice is that it is either invisible or nearly invisible, transparent, or nearly transparent. | 2 | 6 |
Morissette v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1979Justice Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court: "As in Morissette [v United States, 342 US 246 ; 72 S Ct 240 ; 96 L Ed 288 (1952)] and [United States v] United States Gypsum Co, [ 438 US 422 ; 98 S Ct 2864 ; 57 L Ed 2d 854 (1978)], a conclusive presumption in this case would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would 'invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury. 1979Justice Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court: "As in Morissette [v United States, 342 US 246 ; 72 S Ct 240 ; 96 L Ed 288 (1952)] and [United States v] United States Gypsum Co, [ 438 US 422 ; 98 S Ct 2864 ; 57 L Ed 2d 854 (1978)], a conclusive presumption in this case would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would 'invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury. | 2 | 3 |
Slaughter v. Blarney Castle Oil Co.green2 sentences2019In Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474, 483 ; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), this Court addressed the application of the open and obvious doctrine to black ice, explaining: -3- The overriding principle behind the many definitions of black ice is that it is either invisible or nearly invisible, transparent, or nearly transparent. 2019In Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474, 483 ; 760 NW2d 287 (2008), this Court addressed the application of the open and obvious doctrine to black ice, explaining: -3- The overriding principle behind the many definitions of black ice is that it is either invisible or nearly invisible, transparent, or nearly transparent. | 1 | 8 |
Frank W Lynch & Co v. Flex Technologies, Incgreen2 sentences2024“In determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively only, the primary and overriding rule is that legislative intent governs.” Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583 , 624 NW2d 180 (2001) (cleaned up). 2024“In determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively only, the primary and overriding rule is that legislative intent governs.” Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583 , 624 NW2d 180 (2001) (cleaned up). | 1 | 7 |
Lafontaine Saline, Inc v. Chrysler Group LLCgreen2 sentences2021The framework set forth in LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26 (2014), is used to conduct this inquiry into the Legislature’s intent: first, the court considers whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application; second, in some situations, a statute is not regarded as operating retroactively merely because it relates to an antecedent event; third, in determining retroactivity, the court must keep in mind that retroactive laws impair vested rights acquired under existing laws or create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or conside 2016See LaFontaine, 496 Mich at 34 (“questions of statutory interpretation [are reviewed] de novo, including questions regarding retroactivity of amendments”); Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583 ; 624 NW2d 180 (2001) (“In determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively only, the primary and overriding rule is that legislative intent governs. | 1 | 3 |
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Commissioner of Insurancegreen2 sentences2021See also Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Mich v Commissioner of Ins, 204 Mich App 361, 367 ; 514 NW2d 547 (1994). 2021See also Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Mich v Commissioner of Ins, 204 Mich App 361, 367 ; 514 NW2d 547 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Reedgreen2 sentences2014Therefore, we join those courts that have recognized that prenuptial agreements legally procured and ostensibly fair in result are valid and can be enforced. [Reed, 265 Mich App at 144-145 (quotation marks and citations omitted; alternations in original).] The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2014Therefore, we join those courts that have recognized that prenuptial agreements legally procured and ostensibly fair in result are valid and can be enforced. [Reed, 265 Mich App at 144-145 (quotation marks and citations omitted; alternations in original).] The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145 (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bendergreen2 sentences2014While Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent claims that “this statement entirely ignores the overriding principle of our criminal justice system: that a suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” post at 27, we are inclined instead to concur with Justice BOYLE who observed in her Bender dissent that, “[i]f properly administered and validly waived, the Miranda warnings ensure protection of a defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination, while at the same time allowing the police to fulfill their duty in a constitutionally permissible manner.” Bender, 452 Mich a 2014While Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent claims that “this statement entirely ignores the overriding principle of our criminal justice system: that a suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” post at 282, we are inclined instead to concur with Justice BOYLE who observed in her Bender dissent that, “ [i]f properly administered and validly waived, the Miranda warnings ensure protection of a defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination, while at the same time allowing the police to fulfill their duty in a constitutionally permissible manner.” Bender, 452 Mich | 1 | 1 |
California v. Carneygreen2 sentences1999Accord Carney, supra at 392 (“In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” [emphasis added]). 1999Accord Carney, supra at 392 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ("In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met." [emphasis added]). | 1 | 1 |
Havel v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.green2 sentences1989Moreover, that a specific promise has not been expressly stated does not always mean that it was not intended. "[T]he undertaking of each promisor in a contract must include any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included[.]” [Havel v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 83 AD2d 380, 382 ; 445 NYS2d 333, 335 (1981).] The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is limited, and no obligation can be implied which would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship. 1989Moreover, that a specific promise has not been expressly stated does not always mean that it was not intended. "[T]he undertaking of each promisor in a contract must include any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included[.]” [Havel v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 83 AD2d 380, 382 ; 445 NYS2d 333, 335 (1981).] The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is limited, and no obligation can be implied which would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship. | 1 | 1 |
People v. . Flackgreen2 sentences1971In re Wood Estate, supra. In a criminal case, however, the concept of a conclusive or mandatory presumption conflicts “with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” 4 “However clear the proof may be, or however uncontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury.” People v. Flack (1891), 125 NY 324, 334 ( 26 NE 267, 270 ). 5 “The trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the 1971In re Wood Estate, supra. In a criminal case, however, the concept of a conclusive or mandatory presumption conflicts “with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” 4 “However clear the proof may be, or however uncontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury.” People v. Flack (1891), 125 NY 324, 334 ( 26 NE 267, 270 ). 5 “The trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan Farm Bureau v. Secretary of State
green
2 sentences2021There is an overriding rule of constitutional construction that requires that “specific power[s] the people themselves have expressly reserved . . . be saved if possible as against conceivable if not likely evasion or parry by the legislature.” Mich Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967). “[C]onstitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed.” Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971). 2021There is an overriding rule of constitutional construction that requires that “specific power[s] the people themselves have expressly reserved . . . be saved if possible as against conceivable if not likely evasion or parry by the legislature.” Mich Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967). “[C]onstitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed.” Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971). | 4 | 1979–2021 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2021Stevens, 498 Mich at 170 ; People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50 ; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). 2021Stevens, 498 Mich at 170 ; People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50 ; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). | 3 | 2015–2021 |
People v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2026“A judge’s conduct pierces this veil and violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct improperly influenced the jury by creating the appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party.” Stevens, 498 Mich at 171 . 2021Stevens, 498 Mich at 170 ; People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50 ; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). | 2 | 2021–2026 |
Kuhn v. Department of Treasury
green
2 sentences2021There is an overriding rule of constitutional construction that requires that “specific power[s] the people themselves have expressly reserved . . . be saved if possible as against conceivable if not likely evasion or parry by the legislature.” Mich Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967). “[C]onstitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed.” Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971). 2021There is an overriding rule of constitutional construction that requires that “specific power[s] the people themselves have expressly reserved . . . be saved if possible as against conceivable if not likely evasion or parry by the legislature.” Mich Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967). “[C]onstitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed.” Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971). | 2 | 1979–2021 |
Lange v. Hoyt
green
1 sentence2014The court noted that its supplemented instruction “has found some support in other jurisdictions.” Id., citing Lange v Hoyt, 114 Conn 590; 159 A 575 (1932); Christiansen v Hollings, 44 Cal App 2d 332; 112 P2d 723 (1941). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Christiansen v. Hollings
green
1 sentence2014The court noted that its supplemented instruction “has found some support in other jurisdictions.” Id., citing Lange v Hoyt, 114 Conn 590; 159 A 575 (1932); Christiansen v Hollings, 44 Cal App 2d 332; 112 P2d 723 (1941). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Prigg v. Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence2001That rule is, in substance, that no court should construe a clause or section of a constitution as to impede or defeat its generally understood ends when another construction thereof, equally concordant with the words and sense of that clause or section, will guard and enforce those ends. [Id., citing Prigg v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 US (16 Pet) 539, 612; 10 L Ed 1060 (1842).] In our view, the construction of Const 1963, art 2, § 9 first articulated by our Supreme Court in Detroit Automobile Club, supra, best guards and enforces the people’s right to a referendum. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Detroit Automobile Club v. Secretary of State
green
1 sentence2001That rule is, in substance, that no court should construe a clause or section of a constitution as to impede or defeat its generally understood ends when another construction thereof, equally concordant with the words and sense of that clause or section, will guard and enforce those ends. [Id., citing Prigg v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 US (16 Pet) 539, 612; 10 L Ed 1060 (1842).] In our view, the construction of Const 1963, art 2, § 9 first articulated by our Supreme Court in Detroit Automobile Club, supra, best guards and enforces the people’s right to a referendum. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Moreton v. Secretary of State
green
1 sentence2001Further, the Court concluded the appropriations at issue in the “gas tax cases” were made to “enable it to function in that regard, and, being made for that purpose, . . . are not subject to referendum.” Moreton, supra at 592 . 5 Further, I believe that the majority fails to recognize the importance of the referendum, and this Court’s responsibility to protect the people’s power of the referendum, as derived from the constitution and as outlined in Michigan Farm Bureau v Hare, 379 Mich 387, 393 ; 151 NW2d 797 (1967): There is nevertheless an overriding rule of constitutional construction which | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Champion
green
2 sentences1999The “reasonable suspicion” standard applicable to investigatory stops (which has been characterized as being more than a “ ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause,” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 [1996] 4 ), has no application in the case at hand. 1999The “reasonable suspicion” standard applicable to investigatory stops (which has been characterized as being more than a “ ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause,” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 [1996] 4 ), has no application in the case at hand. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[only] the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” [Citation omitted; bracketed words supplied.] Furthermore, in Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 269 ; 93 S Ct 2535 ; 37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973), the Court stated, “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Finally, in South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 386 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), Justice Marshall, in his dissent, recognized the principle that there is only 1997Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[only] the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” [Citation omitted; bracketed words supplied.] Furthermore, in Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 269 ; 93 S Ct 2535 ; 37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973), the Court stated, “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Finally, in South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 386 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), Justice Marshall, in his dissent, recognized the principle that there is only | 1 | 1997–1997 |
South Dakota v. Opperman
green
2 sentences1997Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[only] the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” [Citation omitted; bracketed words supplied.] Furthermore, in Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 269 ; 93 S Ct 2535 ; 37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973), the Court stated, “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Finally, in South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 386 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), Justice Marshall, in his dissent, recognized the principle that there is only 1997Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[only] the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” [Citation omitted; bracketed words supplied.] Furthermore, in Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 269 ; 93 S Ct 2535 ; 37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973), the Court stated, “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Finally, in South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 386 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), Justice Marshall, in his dissent, recognized the principle that there is only | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Franks v. White Pine Copper Division
green
2 sentences1989Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 670 ; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). 1989Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 670 ; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1980A conclusive presumption "would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would 'invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury”. 442 US 510, 523 . 1980Alternatively, a burden shifting presumption would impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant "to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state” and would violate the requirement that the "State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt”. 442 US 510, 524 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Keating International Corp. v. Orion Township
green
1 sentence1979Keating, supra, 548 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Newsome v. Board of State Canvassers
green
2 sentences1979In Kuhn v Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), the Court said: *308 "Furthermore, under a system of government based on grants of power from the people, constitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed. * * * Previous decisions of this Court requiring strict compliance with constitutionally mandated procedures for exercise of the powers of initiative and referendum should not be read as limiting the occasions upon which these powers may be exercised." (Citations omitted.) In Michigan Farm Burea 1979In Kuhn v Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 385 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), the Court said: *308 "Furthermore, under a system of government based on grants of power from the people, constitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed. * * * Previous decisions of this Court requiring strict compliance with constitutionally mandated procedures for exercise of the powers of initiative and referendum should not be read as limiting the occasions upon which these powers may be exercised." (Citations omitted.) In Michigan Farm Burea | 1 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences1979Justice Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court: "As in Morissette [v United States, 342 US 246 ; 72 S Ct 240 ; 96 L Ed 288 (1952)] and [United States v] United States Gypsum Co, [ 438 US 422 ; 98 S Ct 2864 ; 57 L Ed 2d 854 (1978)], a conclusive presumption in this case would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would 'invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury. 1979Justice Brennan wrote for a unanimous Court: "As in Morissette [v United States, 342 US 246 ; 72 S Ct 240 ; 96 L Ed 288 (1952)] and [United States v] United States Gypsum Co, [ 438 US 422 ; 98 S Ct 2864 ; 57 L Ed 2d 854 (1978)], a conclusive presumption in this case would 'conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime,’ and would 'invade [the] factfinding function’ which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
In Re Wood Estate
green
1 sentence1971In re Wood Estate, supra. In a criminal case, however, the concept of a conclusive or mandatory presumption conflicts “with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.” 4 “However clear the proof may be, or however uncontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury.” People v. Flack (1891), 125 NY 324, 334 ( 26 NE 267, 270 ). 5 “The trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard
green
2 sentences1966And in Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, supra , where defendants' purpose was regarded to be of prime significance to decision, this Court said (pp 329, 330): "An agreement or scheme, the manifest object of which is to acquire control over a competitor through its capital stock for the purpose of extinguishing competition, is per se in violation of the antimonopoly laws [citing cases]." In examining any combination, the overriding test, of course, is protection of the public interest. 1966And in Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, supra, where defendants’ purpose was regarded to be of prime significance to decision, this Court said (pp 329, 330): “An agreement or scheme, the manifest object of which is to acquire control over a competitor through its capital stock for the purpose of extinguishing-competition, is per se in violation of the antimonopoly laws [citing cases].” In examining any combination, the overriding test, of course, is protection of the public interest. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.