8 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barham v. Barhamgreen1 sentence2026“The overriding principle in cases determining the correctness of alimony is fairness to all parties.” Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Pierce v. Piercegreen2 sentences2013The overriding principle in cases determining the correctness of alimony is fairness to all parties.” Pierce v. Pierce, 188 N.C. 2013App. 488, 489-90 , 655 S.E.2d 863, 864 (2008) (citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences1995However, the overriding principle governing admission of records, such as the clerk’s Order, is whether “the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Id.; 2 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 229 (4th ed. 1993); Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. 1995App. 443, 446 , 386 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1989), aff’d, 327 N.C. 464 , 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Beall v. Beallgreen2 sentences1980Perhaps the overriding principle in determining whether changed circumstances exist, as well as redetermining the correct amount of alimony, is that which the Supreme Court recognized in Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 679 , 228 S.E. 2d 407, 413 (1976), that “the question of the correct amount of alimony ... is a question of fairness to all parties.” Plaintiffs final argument concerns the issue of from what date the reduced amount of alimony should be paid, if a substantial change of circumstance is found and a modification order is entered. 1980Perhaps the overriding principle in determining whether changed circumstances exist, as well as redetermining the correct amount of alimony, is that which the Supreme Court recognized in Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 679 , 228 S.E. 2d 407, 413 (1976), that “the question of the correct amount of alimony ... is a question of fairness to all parties.” Plaintiffs final argument concerns the issue of from what date the reduced amount of alimony should be paid, if a substantial change of circumstance is found and a modification order is entered. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cardwell v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1987This statement served to reiterate, clarify, and reinforce the Court’s earlier statement in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 325, 338 , that [ajssuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. 1987This statement served to reiterate, clarify, and reinforce the Court’s earlier statement in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 325, 338 , that [ajssuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
California v. Carney
green
2 sentences1987In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 406 (1985), the Supreme Court elaborated on its rationale for the warrant exception, saying that warrantless searches of motor vehicles were sanctioned because “the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” 2 471 U.S. at 392 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 414 . 1987In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 406 (1985), the Supreme Court elaborated on its rationale for the warrant exception, saying that warrantless searches of motor vehicles were sanctioned because “the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” 2 471 U.S. at 392 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 414 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Barham v. Barham
green
1 sentence2026App. 20, 27 (1997), aff’d, 347 N.C. 570 (1998) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Simpson v. NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES'RETIREMENT SYSTEM
green
1 sentence1995Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 323 N.C. at 335 , 372 S.E.2d at 562 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Merritt v. Ridge
green
1 sentence1995Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 323 N.C. at 335 , 372 S.E.2d at 562 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bolick v. SUNBIRD AIRLINES INC.
green
2 sentences1995App. 443, 446 , 386 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1989), aff’d, 327 N.C. 464 , 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). 1995App. 443, 446 , 386 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1989), aff’d, 327 N.C. 464 , 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists
green
2 sentences1983In Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.3d 541 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 526 P.2d 253 (1974), the California Supreme Court reasoned that professional associations which wield monopoly power and affect sufficiently significant economic and professional concerns are clothed with a "public interest," even though it cannot be said that membership is a strict "economic necessity." The court, following a thorough review of common law precedents in this area, concluded that the overriding principle is that "once it is determined that judicial scrutiny of a particular decision is just 1983In Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.3d 541 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 245 , 526 P.2d 253 (1974), the California Supreme Court reasoned that professional associations which wield monopoly power and affect sufficiently significant economic and professional concerns are clothed with a "public interest," even though it cannot be said that membership is a strict "economic necessity." The court, following a thorough review of common law precedents in this area, concluded that the overriding principle is that "once it is determined that judicial scrutiny of a particular decision is just | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.